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This dissertation consists of two distinct yet related projects on the meaning of 
life. Part I centers on the challenge of understanding what the, admittedly, vague 
question, “What is the meaning of life?” is asking. This I call the linguistic project. After 
assessing the oft-repeated charge of incoherence, surveying extant interpretations of the 
question, and discussing other significant dialectical issues in Chapter One, I argue in 
Chapters Two through Four that the question should be understood as the request for a 
narrative of the world that sufficiently addresses those areas of greatest existential import 
to human beings. I call this the narrative interpretation, and propose it as a rival 
interpretive strategy to what I call, following R. W. Hepburn, the amalgam thesis. The 
amalgam thesis is the most common interpretive approach whereby the question, “What 
is the meaning of life?” is largely seen as a place-holder for a whole set of questions, such 
as, “Why are we here?” “What is the purpose of life?” and “What makes life 
worthwhile?” among others. On the amalgam thesis, the question is viewed as little more 
than a disjunctive question. In contrast, the narrative interpretation views the question as 
making a singular request. However, it is a request, the answer to which captures all of 
the intuitions and sub-questions thought to be relevant to the meaning of life under a 
single unifying construct (i.e., a narrative). After a detailed discussion of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of the narrative interpretation, I enlist the concept of 
Weltanschauung in order to lend further philosophical plausibility to this interpretation. 
Finally, I consider several philosophical advantages it enjoys over the amalgam thesis. 
 In Part II (Chapters Five through Seven), I enlist my narrative interpretation in 
order to compare the two dominant metaphysical narratives in the West, namely, 
x 
naturalism and theism, in its Christian instantiation. This I call the metaphysical project. 
These chapters are largely comparative rather than evaluative. Chapter Five primarily 
functions as a prolegomena for Part II where I (i) discuss important definitional matters 
surrounding naturalism and theism, (ii) consider how the concept of narrative maps onto 
entire metaphysical systems like naturalism and theism, and (iii) address Sartrian-type 
objections to life being anything like a dramatic narrative. In Chapter Six, I compare 
naturalistic and theistic constituent narrative elements on two of five narrative fronts that 
a narrative must narrate across in order to qualify as what I call a candidate meaning of 
life narrative (i.e., satisfies the right formal conditions). These two related fronts involve 
explanations of (i) Why the universe exists, and even the stronger, why anything exists at 
all, and (ii) what purpose(s) there is in life, if any. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I discuss the 
concept of narrative ending, and how it relates to the meaning of life. Here, I consider (i) 
the rationale behind why it is that the ending of a narrative is so important to broadly 
normative appraisals of the narrative as a whole, (ii) the respective “endings” of the 
naturalistic and theistic meaning of life narratives, (iii) how the evaluative significance of 
narrative ending provides a powerful way to frame perennial meaning of life discussions 
of death and futility within the more general territory of life’s meaning, and (iv) how the 
evaluative significance of narrative ending sheds light on the relevance of incorporating 






Analytic Philosophy and the Meaning of Life 
 
 
 The story has been told of Bertrand Russell once being in the back of a cab. As 
Russell was perhaps the most famous philosopher of his day, the driver of the cab likely 
saw this as an opportunity to get Russell’s thoughts on the perceived quintessential topic 
of philosophy, the meaning of life. So, he asked him, “What’s it all about?” Probably to 
the driver’s shock, his famous occupant had no answer.1 If one is familiar with twentieth 
century analytic philosophy, Russell’s silence speaks volumes. Much more than a good 
story, the cab driver’s encounter with Russell highlights two salient, yet conflicting 
realities that surround the question, “What is the meaning of life?”  
 First, those who have allegedly devoted their lives to this very question (i.e., 
professional philosophers) generally either ignore it or, more seriously, are suspicious 
that it is incoherent and meaningless, much like the question, “What does the color red 
taste like?”2 With respect to the first trend, Karl Britton notes: 
 Men and women want to read philosophy because they think it will help them 
 to understand the meaning of life: and many philosophers confess that this is 
 what first led them to study philosophy. On the whole, however, the question 
                                                 
1 As cited in Julian Baggini, What’s It All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p. 1. 
 
2 For example, see, among others, A. J. Ayer, “The Claims of Philosophy,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. 
D. Klemke (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 224; Julian Baggini, What’s It All About? 
Philosophy and the Meaning of Life, p. 1; Kurt Baier, “The Meaning of Life,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. 
E. D. Klemke, p. 113; R. W. Hepburn, “Questions about the Meaning of Life,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. 




 of the meaning of life does not loom large in the teaching or writing of 
 professional philosophers nowadays . . .3 
 
The extremely brief entry on the meaning of life in The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy4 and the complete lack of an entry in The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy5 are telling indicators of this tendency, although a substantive entry is 
available in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online.6 There is some evidence, 
though, that the trend of neglect is slowing, perhaps even reversing in light of recent 
work on the topic, including, among others, books by Julian Baggini, Terry Eagleton, and 
John Cottingham, as well as numerous journal articles and a recent special issue of The 
Monist devoted exclusively to the topic.7 As for the trend of semantic suspicion, it is now 
generally recognized that the question, though vague, probably avoids the charge of 
outright incoherence.8 
                                                 
3 Karl Britton, Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 1. 
 
4 Alan Lacey, “The Meaning of Life,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. Ted Honderich 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
5 Robert Audi, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
 
6 Thaddeus Metz, "The Meaning of Life", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2007 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/life-
meaning/>. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy also has a substantial entry on the meaning of life 
written by Susan Wolf. 
 
7 See Julian Baggini, What’s It All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life; John Cottingham, On the 
Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003) and The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and 
Human Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Terry Eagleton, The Meaning of Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Thaddeus Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” 
Philosophy Compass 2/2 (2007): pp. 196-217, and an entire issue devoted to the topic in Philosophical 
Papers 34:3 (2005). The special issue of The Monist appeared in January 2010. 
 
8 I think another reason for the question’s neglect in analytic philosophy has been the esoteric, enigmatic 
connotations often attached to the question. The story of how such connotations originated need not 
concern us here. Unfortunately, I think analytic philosophers have uncritically accepted these connotations, 
and this capitulation to such unnecessary and unjustified associations has exercised considerable influence 
in the widespread neglect and even contempt for the question within analytic philosophy. 
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 The second reality highlighted in the cab driver’s encounter with Russell is that 
most people consider the question, “What is the meaning of life?” to be among the most 
important that can be asked, if not the most important. This, of course, creates a prima 
facie impasse. The preeminent question of human existence appears to be one that many 
philosophers thing is rationally sub-par, or at least less deserving of our philosophical 
energies than a consideration of, for example, how consciousness arises from matter or 
whether discussions of epistemic luck and control hold the key to understanding the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of propositional knowledge.9 Unfortunately, then, this 
existentially motivated request born out of deep yearnings of the human heart, may meet 
disappointment if one turns to philosophers to illumine the question. Alasdair Macintyre 
laments that such large-scale and existentially important questions receive so little 
attention by professional philosophers: 
 Yet, while Hume turned away from philosophical questions about the ends of 
 life to the diversions of dining and backgammon, there has developed since a 
 kind of philosophy that sometimes functions for those who engage in it just as 
 dining and backgammon did for Hume. It reduces all questions to technical or 
 semitechnical questions and it has the effect of making the serious and 
 systematic asking of questions about the ends of life, rather than the asking of 
 second-order philosophical questions about those first-order questions, appear 
 if not cold, at least strain’d and ridiculous.10 
 
Macintyre’s claim is perceptive, and the point he makes is relevant to discussions of the 
meaning of life. Indeed, at least some of what is done by philosophers operating under 
                                                 
9 I do not intend here to de-value what I consider to be profound philosophical questions in the philosophy 
of mind and epistemology. 
 
10 Alasdair Macintyre, “The ends of life, the ends of philosophical writing,” in his The Tasks of Philosophy: 
Selected Essays, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 131-32. 
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the rubric of analytic philosophy has made inquiry into the meaning of life look 
“strain’ed and ridiculous.”11 
 While the trend of neglect is unfortunate and the trend of suspicion is likely 
misguided, the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is undeniably characterized by 
significant vagueness, such that both trends are partly understandable. Indeed, one cannot 
plausibly deny that this vagueness makes the question difficult to understand. 
Philosophically, the question seems unmanageable to many. It is surely not a question 
about the semantic meaning of the word “life,” but what then is it a question about? Is it a 
question about purpose? Is it a question about value? Is it a question about significance? 
Most philosophers currently writing on the topic think it is somehow a question about all 
of these and other topics, but only insofar as it is viewed as a long disjunctive question or 
an amalgam of related yet distinct requests about purpose, value, worth, significance, 
death, and futility, among others. Furthermore, it is a question that takes us into 
normative territory while remaining distinct from purely ethical requests about rightness 
and wrongness. Beyond this, there is little consensus. It is in these still philosophically 
murky, yet clearing waters that I propose the central theses of this dissertation. 
 This dissertation consists of two distinct yet related projects on the meaning of 
life. The first project (The Linguistic Project) consists in attempting to understand what 
the, admittedly, vague question, “What is the meaning of life?” means. It seems to me 
that the question’s inherent vagueness has caused philosophers too quickly to view the 
                                                 
11 Of course, neither the trend of neglect nor the charge of incoherence is quite as severe as Freud’s 
assertion that “The moment a man questions the meaning and value of life, he is sick . . . By asking this 
question one is merely admitting to a store of unsatisfied libido to which something else must have 
happened, a kind of fermentation leading to sadness and depression.” Letters to Marie Bonaparte of 13 
August 1937; in Letters of Sigmund Freud, trans. T. and J. Stern (New York: Basic Books, 1960). 
Interestingly, Freud also reportedly said on multiple occasions that he “heartily abhorred philosophy.” 
Letter of Siegfried Bernfeld to Ernest Jones, June 19, 1951 (Jones Archives). 
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original question (“What is the meaning of life?”) as nothing more than an amalgam or to 
re-formulate the question in terms of purpose or value, for example. While such projects 
have philosophical merit, they do not satisfy two desiderata that, I think, any 
interpretation of the question should satisfy: (i) the original formulation of the question is 
interpreted without morphing it into another question(s),12 and (ii) the interpretation is 
able to unify the questions enumerated by the amalgam thesis under a single concept, 
thus making them more explicitly about the meaning of life as opposed to, for example, 
value or purpose only. In this dissertation, I introduce and defend an interpretation of the 
question that, among other merits, better satisfies these interpretive desiderata. I call this 
the narrative interpretation. Roughly, this interpretation considers the question, “What is 
the meaning of life?” as requesting, at its core, a narrative of the world that sufficiently 
addresses those areas of greatest existential import to rational, emotional, and self-
reflective creatures such as us. 
 Chapters One and Two are primarily prolegomena. In Chapter One I assess the 
charge of incoherence against the question of life’s meaning, survey extant interpretations 
of the question, and discuss additional significant dialectical issues. In Chapters Two 
through Four I explain and defend my own narrative interpretation of the question. 
Chapter Two serves to set the context for the remainder of the Linguistic Project, as I 
introduce material in order to facilitate my interpretation. In Chapter Three I develop the 
narrative interpretation in detail, presenting the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
what constitutes the meaning of life on my interpretation. Finally, in Chapter Four I lend 
                                                 
12 I take (i) to be a desideratum of any interpretation of the question largely because I think the use of 
“meaning” is not primarily an indicator of confusion, but a legitimate marker (arguably vague) of what it is 
people seek when inquiring into the meaning of life. That which is being sought is not reducible to a 
question about purpose or value or worth alone. 
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further philosophical plausibility to my interpretation through a discussion of worldview. 
Here, I also note specific advantages of the narrative interpretation over the amalgam 
thesis. 
 In the second part (The Metaphysical Project) I enlist my narrative interpretation 
in order to compare the two dominant metaphysical narratives in the West, namely, 
naturalism and theism. These chapters will be largely comparative rather than evaluative. 
Chapter Five functions primarily as a prolegomenon for Part II where I discuss important 
definitional matters surrounding naturalism and theism, consider how the concept of 
narrative maps onto entire metaphysical systems like naturalism and theism, and address 
Sartrian-type objections to life being anything like a dramatic narrative. In Chapter Six I 
compare the naturalistic and theistic meaning of life narratives on two of five narrative 
fronts that a narrative must narrate across in order to qualify as what I call a candidate 
meaning of life narrative (i.e., satisfies the right formal conditions). These two related 
fronts involve explanations of (i) Why the universe exists, and even the stronger, why 
anything exists at all, and (ii) what purpose(s) there is in life, if any. Finally, in Chapter 
Seven I discuss the concept of narrative ending, and how it relates to the meaning of life. 
Here, I consider the rationale behind why it is that the ending of a narrative is so 
important to broadly normative appraisals of the narrative as a whole. I discuss the 
respective “endings” of the naturalistic and theistic meaning of life narratives. And, 
finally, I show how the evaluative significance of narrative ending provides a powerful 
way to frame the perennial meaning of life discussions of death, futility, and the problem 
of evil within the more general territory of life’s meaning. 
 7
 My narrative interpretation exhibits considerable merit on the following three 
philosophical fronts, the first two broadly linguistic and the third, metaphysical. First, if 
successful, it demonstrates that the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is both 
meaningful and coherent. Second, it will provide a plausible competing interpretive 
strategy to the amalgam thesis, and one that, I think, is superior. And, third, it offers an 
additional paradigm through which the ongoing dialectic between naturalism and theism 
can be assessed. In the end, one will likely never fully succeed in trimming away all the 
vagueness inherent in the question, “What is the meaning of life?” Despite this 
concession, I think my narrative interpretation addresses this vagueness better than any 




PART I  
The Linguist Project 
 
Men and women want to read philosophy because they think it will help them to 
understand the meaning of life: and many philosophers confess that this is what first led 
them to study philosophy. On the whole, however, the question  of the meaning of life 
does not loom large in the teaching or writing of professional philosophers nowadays . . . 
 




Not all important-sounding questions make sense. For a fair part of the twentieth century 
it was common in much of the Anglophone world to dismiss many of the traditional grand 
questions of philosophy as pseudo-questions. People who felt perplexed by the ancient 
puzzle of the meaning of life were firmly reminded that meaning was a notion properly 
confined to the arena of language: words or sentences or propositions could be said to 
have meaning, but not objects or events in the world, like the lives of trees, or lobsters, or 
humans. So the very idea that philosophy could inquire into the meaning of life was taken 
as a sign of conceptual confusion. 
 












Questioning the Question: Its Coherence, Extant Interpretations,  
and Other Significant Dialectical Issues 
 
 
1.1 The Charge of Incoherence 
 While the analytic philosophical landscape has changed significantly over the last 
half century, making it again possible to discuss with philosophical integrity topics in, for 
example, philosophical theology, there appears to be a subtle positivist hangover that has 
made attempts to self-consciously discuss the meaning of life within the tradition suspect. 
Perhaps the positivist strongholds are more stubborn in this area. Thaddeus Metz does 
well to remind us that, “It is worth remembering that it used to be common to believe that 
statements about life’s meaning are not well-formed propositions.”1 A necessary 
condition for a proposition to be “well-formed” is that it is coherent rather than 
nonsensical. An oft-repeated criticism of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” has 
been that it lacks coherence. Even though this criticism is no longer considered warranted 
by philosophers working on the question, it will be helpful to begin by addressing it. 
 Coherence is a necessary condition to be met in order for a question to be 
meaningful. But coherence is not a property that all questions possess. “What object is 
larger than the largest of all objects?” and “What caused the first cause?” are examples of 
incoherent questions. Of course, considered qua grammar they are fine. Furthermore, 
there is no hint of incoherence in any of the individual concepts employed like object, 
                                                 
1 Thaddeus Metz, “Recent Work on the Meaning of Life,” Ethics 112 (July 2002):  p. 801. 
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larger, largest, cause, and first. The problem, however, is that something has gone awry 
in how the concepts are related in the request. That is to say, the semantic meaning of 
some of the terms will not allow them to be coherently placed in the grammatical 
relationships in which they are situated with the other terms. Once one grasps the 
semantic content of the question, the request becomes impossible to fulfill given what is 
asked. For example, since the largest of all objects is, by definition, the largest, there can 
be no object that is larger. To ask what is larger is absurd. Similarly, given that the first 
cause is, by definition, the first cause, no prior cause can precede it.2 Coherence, then, is 
at least a necessary condition for a question to be meaningful. 
 Accordingly, the first step in addressing the question, “What is the meaning of 
life?” should be to assess its coherence. This is especially crucial given the status it has 
been assigned by noted philosophers within the analytic philosophical tradition.3 For 
example, A. J. Ayer states in response to the claim that it falls within the province of the 
philosopher to make clear the meaning of life, “And who is to answer these supremely 
important questions if not the philosopher? The reply to this is that there is no true answer 
to these questions; and since this is so it is no use expecting even the philosopher to 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, the sentence uttered is meaningful in the sense that it has semantic meaning, and yet the 
speech-act fails (i.e., in this case, is meaningless) in the wider sense of not being able to get off the ground 
because of what the sentence uttered means. I am using “meaningful” and “meaningless” in this wider, 
more-inclusive sense. 
 
3 There is a danger in referring to the analytic philosophical tradition, for it is certainly not monolithic nor 
is it easy to define. Dean Zimmerman notes that the term “analytic” when used in philosophical contexts in 
the early twentieth century did not primarily mean linguistic analysis but, in the case of Russell, to “his 
belief that facts could be understood by analyzing their constituents . . .” (pp. 7-8). Furthermore, these facts 
were taken by Russell and G. E. Moore to be parts of the world and not sentences (p. 8). In light of the 
distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy, Zimmerman says, “One thing that should be 
pointed out right away is that the word “analytic” in “analytic philosophy” means very little—at least, when 
used broadly, with “Continental” as the contrasting term.” Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, eds. 
Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 7. 
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provide one.”4 For Ayer, the question’s coherence hinges on whether the request is for a 
proposition or rather some sort of rule by which to live.5 If the question is understood to 
require a true or false proposition as an answer, then it is meaningless according to Ayer, 
because no such proposition can be given. However, if it is asking for a rule to live by, 
the question is coherent and meaningful.6 The reason the question is meaningless on the 
first interpretation follows from Ayer’s verifiability principle of meaning.7 On this 
principle, in order for a statement to be meaningful it must be either a tautology (thus 
including all analytic propositions) or capable of being verified. Statements, therefore, 
that do not meet this standard do not qualify as propositions. Every proposition, in order 
to be meaningful, must be either necessarily true, in the case of analytic propositions, or, 
in the case of non-analytic propositions, possibly true. However, no proposition that 
meets these verifiability standards can be given in response to the request, “What is the 
meaning of life?” 
 Along with Ayer, but for different reasons, one seems to find Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus, at least cryptically, casting suspicion on the meaningfulness of the question 
about life’s meaning, “When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the 
question be put into words. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it 
                                                 
4 A. J. Ayer, “The Claims of Philosophy,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. Klemke (New York: Oxford 




6 Thus, Ayer allows for a multiplicity of meanings according to which people can lead meaningful lives in 
so far as they find rules and maxims to live by that are meaningful to them. 
 
7 See Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 152; first published in 1936). 
 
 12
is also possible to answer it” (6.5).8 It is plausible to take Wittgenstein here as referring to 
what he calls the “the problem of life” (6.521) or “the sense of life” (6.521) in later 
aphorisms. I take these locutions to be rough markers for “the meaning of life.” For 
Wittgenstein, there is no answer to questions about the sense of life or the meaning of 
life. Such answers, offered in terms of propositions with truth values, do not exist, and 
therefore neither does a meaningful question. One can neither ask a meaningful question 
nor give a meaningful answer on the topic of life’s meaning. Where does this leave us on 
the matter? Wittgenstein closes the Tractatus with this thought, a proposition he 
identifies in the preface to his work as the Tractatus’s primary claim, “What we cannot 
speak about we must pass over in silence” (7).9 
 Although for different reasons, Ayer and the early Wittgenstein likely spoke for a 
substantial percentage of twentieth century analytic philosophers in their criticisms of the 
question and its coherence. Whereas the linguistically and logically untrained view it as 
no different from questions like, “When did the Battle of the Bulge take place?” or “What 
is the name of the sixteenth U.S. president?” many analytic philosophers were suspicious 
that it is much more like, “What color is philosophy?” or the legendry Oxford 
examination pseudo-question, “Is this a good question?” One can also see parallels 
between the rejection of the meaning of life question as coherent and the rejection of 
other metaphysical and religious claims as coherent by early and mid-twentieth century 
philosophers in the logical positivist tradition. Within this movement it was seen as 
intellectually obligatory to reject propositions like “God exists” on the grounds that they 
                                                 
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 88. 
 
9 Ibid., p. 89. Cf. 3, “The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be 
said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.” 
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lack cognitive content, partly because there is some measure of suspicion that we cannot 
even know what the term “God” means.10 Similarly, one might wonder what it could 
possibly mean to inquire after life’s meaning. Here, it is not the inquiry into the meaning 
of the concept or term “life” that is troublesome, but rather, the request for the meaning 
of the phenomenon of life itself or perhaps human life.11 According to many, it makes no 
sense to ask this question of the phenomenon of life or human life or the space-time 
universe. Meaning applies to semantic constructions, not to objects, events, states of 
affairs, or existence itself; or, if it does, it does so only very loosely. 
 There exists an additional parallel between the charge of incoherence leveled 
against the meaning of life question and non-cognitivist views in meta-ethics like 
emotivism. Emotivism is a non-cognitivist meta-ethical view whereby moral utterances 
like, “It is wrong to murder” are not propositions with truth content, but are only markers 
for some emotive urge like, “Yikes, I hate murder.” They are simply moral sentiments 
that lack a factual meaning.12 Those disparaging of the question of life’s meaning within 
the analytic tradition often saw it as little more than a wrong-headed way of formulating a 
raw emotional response to the sheer magnitude and mystery of Existence. This response 
is properly contained in phrases like “Wow!” “Amazing!” and “How wonderful and 
awful!” but not in the form of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” This question 
                                                 
10 One reason “God” may lack cognitive content, it was argued, is because the very concept is incoherent. 
One way in which it was said to be incoherent follows from disharmony among the traditional theistic 
attributes like omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. 
 
11 Use of the term “life” is another problem for the question. Is one referencing human life, life as a whole, 
the lives of individual persons, or something else of which “life” is just a loose and possibly ill-chosen 
marker? 
 
12 See A. J. Ayer, “Critique of Ethics and Theology,” in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 30-31. 
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is only a misguided marker for a mental event that is all together different from a 
question capable of an answer in the form of a true or false proposition. Kurt Baier, in his 
Inaugural Lecture delivered at the Canberra University College, 1957, affirms this: 
 . . . whether or not we ought to have or are justified in having a mystical feeling 
 or a feeling of awe when contemplating the universe, having such a feeling is not 
 the same as asking a meaningful question, although having it may well incline us 
 to utter certain forms of words. Our question “Why is there anything at all?” [or, 
 analogously, “What is the meaning of life?”] may be no more than the expression 
 of our feeling of awe or mystification, and not a meaningful question at all.13 
 
Baier’s largely non-cognitivist view treats the question of life’s meaning as expressing 
some non-propositional mental state, for example, awe, and should not be viewed as the 
request for a proposition with a truth content. This is not unlike non-cognitivist views in 
meta-ethics, and such views have had their place in the meaning of life discussion. 
 I think the charges of incoherence along with the standard ways of reducing the 
question to something wholly different in kind as in the case of the non-cognitivist move 
in early analytic philosophy are largely, but not wholly, misguided. One probably ought 
to concede that the question, in its popular form, suffers from some measure of 
vagueness. For example, does it ask for the meaning of life, where life is the cluster of 
phenomena that populate and compose existence, or some other question? If the former, 
what does it mean to ask for the meaning of entities like people and trees, or events like 
water boiling or death? And if one is asking why things are as they are, which is a 
common interpretation of the question, is one asking empirical, scientific questions about 
efficient causality, or rather teleologically-driven questions about final causality? It will 
take effort to sort through this, but I think that the question’s fundamental philosophical 
integrity can be upheld. Indeed, despite its salient vagueness, I think the charge of 
                                                 
13 Kurt Baier, “The Meaning of Life,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. Klemke, p. 113. 
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incoherence proceeds too quickly from vagueness to the verdict of irredeemable 
incoherence. 
1.2 Assessing the Charge of Incoherence: Non-Linguistic Uses of “Meaning” 
 The question’s vagueness and accompanying criticisms of its coherence are 
largely functions of its incorporation of the term “meaning.” “Meaning” has multiple 
meanings, and at least some of the more prominent ones mitigate its usefulness in the 
context of trying to formulate the intuitions driving the question of life’s meaning. R. W. 
Hepburn alludes to such a situation: 
 According to the interpretations being now worked out, questions about the 
 meaning of life are, very often, conceptually obscure and confused. They are 
 amalgams of logically diverse questions, some coherent and answerable, some 
 neither. A life is not a statement, and cannot therefore have linguistic contexts.14  
 
Indeed, if one is asking for the semantic meaning of life rather than “life,” then the 
accusation of incoherence is plausible. We rightly ask for the meanings of semantic 
constructions, but surely not of things like physical entities, events, or life in general. The 
problem then is that “meaning” is a term which appears to most naturally find its home 
within linguistic contexts. However, life itself does not appear to be such a context. Kai 
Nielson summarizes the dilemma: 
 Part of the trouble centers around puzzles about the use of the word “meaning” in 
 “What is the meaning of life?” . . . the mark (token) “meaning” in “What is the 
 meaning of life?” has a very different use than it has in “What is the meaning of 
 ‘obscurantist’?” “What is the meaning of ‘table’?” “What is the meaning of 
 ‘good’?” “What is the meaning of ‘science’?” and “What is the meaning of 
 ‘meaning’?” In these other cases we are asking about the meaning or use of the 
 word or words, and we are requesting either a definition of the word or an 
 elucidation or description of the word’s use. But in asking: “What is the meaning 
                                                 




 of life?” we are not asking—or at least this is not our central perplexity—about 
 “What is the meaning of ‘life’?15 
 
 While asking the meaning of “life,” would be entirely coherent, it is certainly not 
the request encapsulated in “What is the meaning of life?” When asking, “What is the 
meaning of life?” we are not asking the same question as when we ask, for instance, 
“What is the meaning of “courage.” In the latter instance we desire the word’s definition 
or possibly a description of its usage. However, in the former case, we are not asking for 
the meaning of a word or a sentence or anything really linguistic at all. That is to say, in 
asking the question, most of us are not asking for any sort of definition of “life” or a 
description of this term’s usage. But then, what are we asking? This is where the problem 
lies. 
 The problem is soluble though, given that asking what something means need not 
be a request for a definition or description. There are additional non-linguistic contexts in 
which the locution, “What is the meaning of x?” makes perfect sense. Some of them even 
share family resemblances to the question of life’s meaning. Hepburn notes, “But 
admittedly we do use the word “meaning” outside linguistic contexts. We speak of the 
meaning of a gesture, of a transaction, of a disposition of troops . . .”16 In these contexts, 
he thinks we are referencing “the point or purpose or end of an act or set of acts,”17 in 
invoking the concept of meaning. This, then, is at least one non-linguistic context in 
which “meaning” functions quite naturally. I will return to a non-linguistic context that 
shares commonalities with the way “meaning” is used in the question of life’s meaning 
                                                 
15 Kai Nielson, “Linguistic Philosophy and ‘The Meaning of Life’,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. 
Klemke (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 234. 
 





shortly. But first it will be helpful to mention a few other non-linguistic usages for 
“meaning,” even though they are not synonymous to its usage in “What is the meaning of 
life?” This is important in order to keep the following fact salient, as it is germane to this 
discussion: the word “meaning” is naturally and plausibly applied to non-linguistic 
phenomena. 
 We often use the locution, “What is the meaning of x?” when we are puzzled by, 
say, someone’s non-linguistic behavior. For example, perhaps a friend makes a face at us, 
and we are not sure what such a face signifies. In this situation, we may ask her, “What 
did you mean by looking at me that way?” In asking such a question we are trying to 
ascertain the relevant intentions responsible for producing the configuration of the facial 
muscles, or, in other words, what the face is supposed to signify.18 In such instances, 
when asking for the meaning of the face, we are in search of something else over and 
above the physical facial configuration, but that perhaps supervenes upon it, to which we 
seek an answer of the following form, “This particular configuration of facial muscles 
means [intentionally signifies] x.” 
 The locution, “What is the meaning of x?” is also plausibly employed in contexts 
involving natural signs, or what Fred Dretske has referred to as “indication” or “indicator 
meaning.”19 Roughly, a natural sign is one whose presence is causally or nomically 
correlated with the presence of a second event or state of affairs, a state of affairs whose 
occurrence is not the result of any sort of intentional agency. If one finds the language of 
                                                 
18 By introducing intentions into the causal process eventuating in the facial configuration, I do not mean to 
beg any questions against those who think an exhaustively physicalist and mechanistic account fully 
explicates the causal processes terminating in some facial muscle configuration x. One may reduce 
intentions to a wholly physical process if they desire, though I do not find this reduction project plausible. 
 
19 See his Explaining Behavior (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 54 ff. Dretske himself credits H. P. 
Grice for this sense of meaning. Grice’s seminal discussion can be found in his “Meaning,” The 
Philosophical Review 66 (July 1957): pp. 377-88. 
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causality or some sort of nomic category to be too strong in referring to this relationship, 
one might take a Humean approach and explain natural signs in terms of regular 
association or constant conjunction. Regardless of how one understands the relationship 
between the sign and a second state of affairs to which it “points,” nature is full of such 
signs. The changing color of the leaves is a sign that winter is coming. The presence of a 
certain type of cloud is a sign that rain is imminent. Such signs may be spoken of in terms 
of meaning. For example, we can plausibly say that the presence of radiant leaves means 
that winter is on its way or that the presence of rain clouds means rain is coming. In this 
context, when we use “meaning,” we note simply that one thing signifies [non-
intentionally] another thing’s presence or near-presence. 
 Another way in which the formula, “What is the meaning of x?” may be used is in 
contexts where we want to know what, for example, an author or poet or playwright 
meant by her book, poem, or production. We may have read all the words or listened to 
all the lines from beginning to end and yet are puzzled, and so ask what the whole thing 
means. Here, we want to grasp the character or significance of the work that, for 
whatever reason, still eludes our understanding. We desire a unifying construct, theme(s), 
or something of this nature that brings coherence and intelligibility to the constituent 
parts. Of course, those very parts contribute to this ordering principle, and so the danger 
of hermeneutical circularity looms here. What we are inquiring after when we ask, “What 
is the meaning of this book or play?” is something in the neighborhood of the 
overarching plan, purpose, or significance of the work. We want to know how best to 
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understand and interpret the parts, and, consequently, what those parts, considered in 
their entirety, are communicating.20 
 A final way in which the locution, “What is the meaning of x?” functions in a 
non-linguistic context is especially relevant for my central thesis in Part I of this 
dissertation. It is this usage that comes closest to how the locution ought to be interpreted 
when one asks, “What is the meaning of life?” I will save fuller development of it for 
Chapters Two and Three, and so will only briefly mention it here. We quite naturally and 
legitimately, even if loosely, invoke the formula, “What is the meaning of x?” in 
situations where x is some fact, event, or phenomenon we encounter and of which we 
want to know, in the words of N. T. Wright, the fact’s or event’s or phenomenon’s “. . . 
implication in the wider world within which this notion [or fact, event, or phenomenon] 
makes the sense it makes.”21 This “wider world” Wright considers to be a worldview or 
something similar.  
 Wright’s comment resides within his discussion of how one comes to understand 
the Easter Event (that is, the putative bodily resurrection of Jesus of Nazerath). For 
example, a well-educated Roman soldier who comes to learn of the event may 
contextualize it, and therefore “fix” its meaning, through the myth of Nero redivivus, the 
idea that Nero had come back to life in order to return to Rome in all his glory.22 The 
event means something different for him than for, say, Saul of Tarsus. The wider 
                                                 
20 I will not enter the complex hermeneutical discussion of where meaning resides in the process of 
interpreting texts or any discourse for that matter. Doing so is not germane to the immediate claims and 
aims of this dissertation. 
 
21 N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, Vol. 3, Christian Origins and the Question of God 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), p. 719. 
 
22 Ibid., p. 720. 
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worldview framework or narrative (or even simply a more localized narrative which is, 
itself, part of a larger worldview narrative) will play a heavy hermeneutical role, then, in 
“discovering”23 what any given fact, event, or phenomenon means. Determining this 
meaning will be a product of asking and answering questions like: 
What larger narrative(s) does the sentence [intended to refer to a fact, event, or 
phenomenon] belong in? What worldviews do such narratives embody and 
reinforce? What are the universes of discourse within which this sentence, and the 
event it refers to, settle down and make themselves at home – and which, at the 
same time, they challenge and reshape from within?24  
 
Wright’s discussion of this usage of “meaning” is instructive and is how I think the word 
should be seen as functioning in the locution, “What is the meaning of x?” when such 
question is asked about the meaning of life. I will build on this claim in detail in Chapter 
Three. 
1.3 Interpreting the Question: The Amalgam Thesis 
 It seems hard to deny that the question, “What is the meaning of life?” suffers 
from some measure of vagueness. There exist a couple of options for addressing this 
vagueness short of the outright charge of incoherence that was common for a substantial 
portion of the twentieth century in analytic philosophy. One option is to retain the use of 
“meaning” and secure a usage that applies to non-linguistic phenomena, given that in 
asking the question, we are not asking for the semantic meaning of the word “life.” This 
strategy is especially concerned with finding a natural interpretation of the question 
through a plausible employment of the term “meaning.” While not the most common 
strategy for interpreting the question in the contemporary discussion, my interpretation of 
                                                 
23 Some may think the stronger term, “determine” is better than “discover.” I do not wish to enter the 
complex debate about the hermeneutical properties of a worldview. 
 
24 N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, p. 720. 
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the question is an example of this approach. The interpretive strategy currently prevalent, 
though, involves discarding the word “meaning” and reformulating the question entirely. 
On this approach, the question is morphed into a cluster of other supposedly less vague 
questions, even if no less difficult to answer, like, “What is the purpose of life?” or 
“What makes life valuable?” among others. 
 Following precedent in the literature, especially R. W. Hepburn, I will term this 
approach for addressing the vagueness in the question the amalgam thesis. Roughly, the 
amalgam thesis says that the original question, framed in terms of meaning, is a largely 
ill-conceived place-holder for a cluster of related requests, and thus, not really a single 
question at all. Consider again R. W. Hepburn’s claim: 
 According to the interpretations being now worked out, questions about the 
 meaning of life are, very often, conceptually obscure and confused. They are 
 amalgams of logically diverse questions, some coherent and answerable, some 
 neither. A life is not a statement, and cannot therefore have linguistic contexts.25 
 
In his recent book on the topic, Julian Baggini presents something similar to the amalgam 
thesis: 
The problem is that it [the meaning of life question] is vague, general and unclear. 
It is not so much a single question but a place-holder for a whole set of questions: 
Why are we here? What is the purpose of life? Is it enough just to be happy? Is 
my life serving some greater purpose? Are we here to help others or just 
ourselves?26  
Like Hepburn and Baggini, Thaddeus Metz posits something in the neighborhood of the 
amalgam thesis, “. . . the field has found it difficult to reduce this question to a single 
basic idea. For instance, I have argued that this question is associated with a variety of 
                                                 
25 R. W. Hepburn, “Questions about the Meaning of Life,” p. 262. 
 
26 Julian Baggini, What’s It All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p. 1.  
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closely related but not entirely overlapping questions . . . which exhibit family 
resemblances.”27 
 One way of understanding the amalgam thesis is to view it as making the question 
of life’s meaning little more than a disjunctive question, “’What is the purpose of life’? 
or ‘What makes life valuable’? or ‘What makes life worthwhile’? or x?” On amalgam 
thesis premises, then, in asking the question, “What is the meaning of life?” we ought to 
see ourselves as asking either a question about purpose or value or worth or something 
else.28 There is something right about this. Indeed, when you ask both non-philosophers 
and philosophers what they take the question to mean, you will likely hear it explicated in 
terms value, worth, significance, or purpose.29 Due to the dominance of the amalgam 
thesis as an interpretive strategy and its arguable philosophical merit, most contemporary 
philosophical treatments of the question consider it in one of its reformulated versions 
like, “What makes life valuable?” “What makes life significant?” “What is the purpose of 
life?” “Does my life achieve some good purpose?” or “What makes life worth living?” 
among others.30 So, there exist at least two interpretive levels of the question on the 
                                                 
27 Thaddeus Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” Philosophy Compass 2/2 (2007):  p. 211. 
Metz’s work relating to this claim can be found in “The Concept of a Meaningful Life,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 38 (April 2001): pp. 137-53; “Recent Work on the Meaning of Life,” pp. 781-814; 
and “Critical Notice: Baier and Cottingham on the Meaning of Life,” Disputatio 19 (2005): pp. 251-64. 
 
28 The primary problem with this though is that these questions are about purpose and value and worth 
rather than the meaning of life. I will address this concern further at the end of Chapter Four. 
 
29 My informal and unscientific polling of colleagues, family, and friends both from within and from 
without the philosophical discipline has confirmed this empirically. 
 
30 Thaddeus Metz stipulates several conditions, in the form of questions it must address, that a theory must 
meet in order to be a theory about the meaning of life: “what should an agent strive for besides obtaining 
happiness and fulfilling obligations? Which aspects of a human life are worthy of great esteem or 
admiration? In what respect should a rational being connect with value beyond the animal self? And, from 
Charles Taylor (1989, chap. 1), the following could be added: which goods command our awe? How many 
an individual identify with something incomparably higher? What is worthy of our love and allegiance?” 
“Recent Work on the Meaning of Life,” pp. 802-03. Karl Britton parses the question as follows, “The 
question (What is the meaning of life?) is put in many different ways. What is the meaning of it all? What 
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amalgam thesis, one tracking something like the question’s formal properties, the other 
tracking the subsequent questions’ material content. In other words, the amalgam thesis 
posits that the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is really just a disjunctive 
question (formal property) whereby questions about purpose, value, worth, and 
significance are asked (material property). In the next section, I will briefly summarize 
the dialectical situation characterizing two of the more prominent questions thought to be 
asked in asking, “What is the meaning of life?” 
1.4 Extant Interpretations 
 As noted, working within the amalgam thesis paradigm entails that the original 
request in terms of meaning is viewed as irredeemably vague, and this vagueness is 
remedied by morphing the question into one that is more intelligible and yet continues to 
capture at least one, from among a broader cluster, of the human experiences, intuitions, 
and sub-questions that generated the original in the first place. One of the upshots of this 
is that against the general trends of neglect and logical suspicion in mid-twentieth century 
analytic philosophy, there is presently a renewed interest in the question of life’s meaning 
in the contemporary analytic philosophical world.31 As a result of the amalgam thesis’s 
current influence, though, the contemporary dialectic between naturalists and theists on 
the topic broadly operates within these interpretative parameters.32 It will be helpful, 
                                                                                                                                                 
is the meaning of everything? What is it all in aid of? Why is there anything at all and why just what there 
is and not something quite different?” Philosophy and the Meaning of Life, pp. 1-2. Cf. Milton K. Munitz, 
Does Life Have a Meaning? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), pp. 14-19. 
 
31 For a summary of contemporary treatments of the meaning of life, the state of the debate, and a helpful 
bibliography on recent work, see Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” pp. 196-217. Also 
see Metz, "The Meaning of Life", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2007 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/life-meaning/>. 
 
32 Metz chooses, as the most fundamental way of distinguishing views of life’s meaning, to frame the 
options in terms of supernaturalism, subjective naturalism, and objective naturalism. Essentially, I am 
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then, to briefly survey the general features and dialectical entailments of these 
interpretations. I will leave more detailed analysis of, especially, meaning and purpose to 
the second part of the dissertation. Such discussion will fit naturally within what I have 
called the Metaphysical Project. However, for taxonomic purposes, a brief word is in 
order here. I will discuss the “meaning as purpose” view in greater detail than the 
“meaning as value” view, as a substantial portion of the contemporary dialectic is 
observable in this context. I will consider meaning and value only in those ways in which 
the discussion moves beyond the context of purpose. 
1.4.1 Meaning and Purpose 
 Ask someone what she thinks the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is 
asking and it is not uncommon to be told that it is asking something like, “What is the 
purpose of life?”33 or perhaps “For what purpose(s) should I aim in life?” In fact, the 
former is probably the most common interpretation of the question. Michael Martin notes 
that “. . . when a person asks, “What is the meaning of life?” he or she might be asking 
what the purpose or purposes of life is . . .”34 Garrett Thomson affirms this, “The debate 
about whether life has a meaning usually centers on the question whether it has some 
point or purpose. ‘Does life have a meaning?’ is usually understood as ‘Does it have a 
point?’ where ‘point’ means ‘goal’ or ‘purpose.’35 Finally, R. W. Hepburn claims that 
there exists “. . . an equation between meaningfulness and purposiveness. For a life to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
covering the same ground, but have chosen to bring these three options under the distinction between 
purpose and value interpretations of the question. 
 
33 Here, I think “life” functions in some cases as a marker for something like the life that self-conscious 
creatures possess, and in other cases for the more general idea of reality or existence in its totality. 
 
34 Michael Martin, Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), p. 186. 
 
35 Garrett Thomson, On the Meaning of Life (London: Wadsworth, 2003), p. 47. 
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meaningful, it must be purposeful: or—to make life meaningful is to pursue valuable 
ends.”36 Indeed, there is overwhelming precedent for interpreting the question in terms of 
purpose.  
 On this interpretation, the question is analogous to encountering a cylindrical 
object with sharpened graphite at one end and a piece of rubber on the other, and asking, 
“What is the meaning of this physical object?” While the use of “meaning” in this context 
is admittedly loose, a natural way to interpret this request is as the request for the 
purpose(s) of the object. We are often given to such inquiries when we encounter 
artifacts. We suspect, and reasonably so, that agency and intentionality are part of their 
causal origins, and these features of the causal history of the artifact strongly suggest that 
it has a function. Consequently, when inquiring into the purpose of the object we have 
come to call a “pencil” in the English-speaking world, one is inquiring into its function. 
This, then, is a teleological question. In Aristotelian terms, we would say that one desires 
to know the final cause of the object, in this case, being to write.37 
 When asking the question of life’s meaning, just as when asking the question of 
the pencil’s meaning, it is often the case that one is asking what purpose or purposes life 
may have. While the question is rarely clarified so as either to ask whether life in general 
has a purpose or simply whether my life and her life and his life have a purpose, I think it 
is safe to say that many take an answer to the former to also be an answer to the latter. 
This need not be so, however, for it is entirely possible to think that different lives have 
                                                 
36 Hepburn, “Questions about the Meaning of Life,” p. 262. 
 
37 Of course, one might also be inquiring into the efficient or material causes of the pencil (probably not the 
formal though), but this is doubtful. Requests for efficient and material causation do not track the 
question’s use of “meaning” as naturally as final causation. 
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different purposes. However, placement of the definite article before “meaning” strongly 
suggests that the question is motivated by the assumption that life, or yours and my life, 
has only a singe purpose.38 Indeed, the way the question is asked implies that a 
meaningful life is linked to finding and adopting this singular, overarching purpose.39 
This assumption is challenged by many.40 And so there is no single way to understand 
precisely what is being asked even when the question has been reformulated in terms of 
purpose.  
 Furthermore, one can distinguish between a descriptive purpose claim and a 
prescriptive purpose claim. The former category would include certain ends for which we 
act in virtue of the kinds of creatures we are. So, perhaps one might refer to a purpose of 
life as being to reproduce. The latter category asks the normative question of what ends 
we ought to pursue. Here, it is claimed that our aspirations, goals, and activities ought to 
be directed toward the accomplishment of certain ends if we are to lead satisfying lives. 
Seeking the purpose of life is largely pursued within the prescriptive purpose context. In 
other words, around what end or ends should I order my desires and labors in this life in 
order to lead a fulfilling existence? And so the question of life’s meaning is saturated 
with prescriptive assumptions and not merely descriptive ones. 
 At this point, I have introduced additional conceptual baggage into the discussion. 
Notions like a satisfying life and fulfilling existence cannot be divorced from discussions 
of the meaning of life. This question has a profoundly existential component to it. We 
                                                 
38 R. A. Sharpe, “In Praise of the Meaningless Life,” Philosophy Now 25 (Summer 1999): p. 15. 
 
39 J. J. C. Smart, “Meaning and Purpose,” Philosophy Now 24 (Summer 1999): p. 16. 
 
40 For example, see Julian Baggini, What’s It All About?; R. A. Sharpe, “In Praise of the Meaningless Life;” 
J. J. C. Smart, “Meaning and Purpose;” and A. J. Ayer, “The Claims of Philosophy.” 
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seek a purpose or purposes that quiet an inner storm and satiate a gut-level thirst to live 
for something larger than ourselves, although the notion of “larger than self” itself suffers 
from some measure of vagueness. It may be that dispelling every last bit of vagueness in 
the issue of life’s meaning is not possible. This should not trouble us too greatly, for 
vagueness is a lurking reality in many other philosophical domains. The basic idea 
though, is that a purpose is sought that is of such a nature that one is satisfied and settled 
in structuring one’s life around this purpose. On the issue of what counts as a good or 
worthwhile or valuable purpose and whether that purpose(s) is extrinsic and discovered 
or intrinsic and created, there exists a divergence of viewpoints.41  
 These different views largely track the naturalist/supernaturalist divide, although 
there is disagreement among naturalists on what conditions must be met in order for 
something to count as a valuable or worthwhile or good purpose. Some naturalists, I will 
call them subjectivists, think that within certain parameters,42 whatever an agent deems is 
a worthwhile purpose is, necessarily, a worthwhile purpose. Others, whom I will call 
objectivists, think that there exist objective criteria—certain natural, mind-independent 
facts—by which some purposes are worthwhile and others are not.43 I will further 
elucidate this in Chapter Six. For now it is sufficient to note that the two most common 
ways to understand the origin and nature of purpose as it relates to this discussion are: (i) 
                                                 
41 It is not clear that these two broad categories are actually mutually exclusive. For example, it is certainly 
possible that a purpose for mankind that is divinely given is also intrinsic to his nature as homo sapien. 
Here, then, I use “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” as markers for something like purpose ultimately originating 
from a source outside of human beings (extrinsic) and purpose ultimately originating from within human 
beings and strongly linked to the exercise of their wills (intrinsic). 
 
42 This is an important caveat, for even most subjective naturalists would not endorse the extreme position 
that dedication of oneself to, for example, torturing innocent children for fun counts as a valuable purpose, 
even though some objective naturalists and supernaturalists may think a reductio looms and that the 
subjectivist’s position ultimately leads to such an undesirable conclusion. 
 
43 I borrow the terms “subjectivist” and “objectivist” from Thaddeus Metz’s work on the meaning of life. 
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divinely imposed and (ii) self imposed.44 This taxonomy is limited though. The word 
“imposition” in the first context is fuel to those who charge the divine purpose view as an 
assault on the dignity of man. I acknowledge this danger, and will have more to say about 
it in Chapter Six. Conceding the limitations of this taxonomy, it remains a beneficial and 
largely accurate way of distinguishing the general philosophical options within the 
meaning-as-purpose context. 
1.4.2 Meaning and Value 
 Discussing meaning in terms of purpose in life and meaning in terms of value are 
largely inseparable. In asking, “What is the purpose of life?” it is assumed that valuable 
purposes are those worth pursuing and which contribute to a meaningful life. In asking, 
“What makes life valuable?” it is presupposed that, in order to lead a meaningful life, one 
will have as her purpose, in a sense, the pursuit of these valuable ends. And so, 
formulating the question either in terms of purpose or value appear to be different 
perspectives on a question that is asking something very similar in both instances. 
Additionally, it can be seen that the notion of a worthwhile life is closely linked with 
purpose and value, and therefore meaning in life. A worthwhile life is likely one that, on 
balance, is more valuable than not, where a valuable life might be plausibly explicated in 
terms of relationship with that which is valuable or pursuit of valuable ends. Working out 
what this means is part of the task that analytic philosophers working in the field have set 
                                                 
44 There is a third option, the Aristotelian one. It is an interesting alternative to (i) and (ii), but which 
occupies little space in the current philosophical discussions. Briefly, Aristotle argued that everything in 
nature aims toward some end. This end need not terminate in an extrinsic cause such as intelligence or god. 
Nature itself functions as an end in some sense. He argued that teleological explanations, in order to be 
complete and satisfying, must terminate in an end which itself is intrinsically valuable and not merely 
instrumentally valuable. Again, this ultimate end is neither self-imposed nor divinely imposed but is, in a 
sense, naturally imposed. In the case of man, Aristotle argues in Nicomachean Ethics that eudaimonia 
(commonly translated as happiness although there are complex translation issues at play here) is the final 
end under which man’s purposive activities are subsumed. 
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for themselves. But Metz is surely right in noting that “theories of life’s meaning [in 
terms of worth, value, purpose, significance, etc.] are united in virtue of family 
resemblances.”45  
 The dialectic between theism and naturalism on the question of purpose is similar 
in the context of value. Although, whereas the central issue in the context of purpose in 
life is between divinely imposed purpose and self imposed purpose, the central issue in 
the realm of value and meaning is whether theistic premises are necessary and sufficient 
for value in life or whether naturalism has the conceptual resources sufficient to secure 
the right kinds of value for a meaningful life in a world devoid of finite and infinite 
spiritual realities. There does exist, however, an important in-house debate among 
naturalists about whether the kinds of value sufficient for a meaningful life are purely 
preferential (subjectivist) or whether they are natural, mind-independent facts about the 
world around which we ought to orient our lives (objectivist). 
1.5 Futility, Death, and the Absurd 
 In charting the vague boundaries that delimit the conceptual territory occupied by 
the meaning of life, one must not neglect a discussion of death and futility. Indeed, 
considerations of death and futility are salient in some of the most enduring works 
recognized by all as in some way addressing the meaning of life.46 Most people 
intuitively think that death and futility belong centrally to discussions about the meaning 
of life, even if one cannot explicitly fit the concepts into the reformulated requests 
                                                 
45 Metz, “Recent Work on the Meaning of Life,” p. 802. 
 
46 For example, one finds such considerations in Tolstoy, Camus, and Qohelet in Ecclesiastes, if one is 
inclined to think Ecclesiastes is, in some sense, about the meaning of life. 
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comprising the amalgam thesis.47 In terms of the amalgam thesis, however, one can 
implicitly find discussions of futility in a reformulated request such as, “Is life 
worthwhile?” or “Is life worth living?” I will save a more sustained discussion of death 
and futility for Chapter Seven; however, it will be helpful here to provide a brief 
overview of the cluster of issues that are important in this context. 
 Interestingly, recognition of futility’s connection to life’s meaning predates the 
contemporary discussion by centuries.48 Intuitively, futility appears to be antithetical to a 
meaningful existence, but why? What is the essence of futility, and why does its presence 
threaten a meaningful life? Furthermore, must the pervasiveness of futility cross some 
threshold in order to threaten meaning? Here, we must also distinguish “cosmic” futility 
from futility within more localized contexts. Cosmic futility refers to the perceived 
futility of life if all conscious life and the universe itself cease to exist, or in the case of 
the universe, become permanently and irredeemably hostile to life at some point in the 
future. A more localized futility might be that type associated with seeking to fulfill some 
short-term goal that is, in principle, unrealizable. Can negative implications for a 
meaningful life be derived from how it is all going to end on naturalism? Are conclusions 
of cosmic futility even plausible given Thomas Nagel’s philosophical work on 
standpoints? Finally, is some futility that is said to threaten meaning in life the product of 
unrealistic goal-setting and standards on what counts as worthwhile? All these questions 
are important ones in discussions of futility in meaning of life contexts. It is necessary to 
further note that just as in discussions of meaning in terms of purpose and meaning in 
                                                 
47 An example, though, might be: “How can my life be valuable given that I will die?” 
 
48 One example is likely the Old Testament book of Ecclesiastes, although some Old Testament exegetes 
are quick to warn that a reading of Ecclesiastes through the paradigm of modern existentialism is largely 
anachronistic. 
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terms of value, naturalistic and theistic views divide rather clearly in discussions of 
futility. 
 I turn now to the plight of Sisyphus, the paradigmatic case of futility in the west. 
Sisyphus and the futility pictured so vividly in his case are no strangers to the meaning of 
life discussion. But what is the essence of futility, and why is its presence supposed to 
threaten a meaningful life? We certainly see it in the case of Sisyphus, but can we 
uncover the conditions signifying its presence? I will first consider the case of Sisyphus 
followed by a discussion of futility more generally. 
 The futility in Sisyphus’ plight appears to be a product of at least two related 
features of his situation. First, his task seems pointless; he accomplishes nothing. If one 
takes finally reaching the top and having the stone stay as the goal, Sisyphus never 
realizes this goal. Of course, his task does have a point in the sense that the gods have 
endowed it with a point, namely, to do what he is doing as punishment. But this does not 
rescue the scenario from futility. The punishment is punishment precisely because the 
task assigned is utterly futile. Indeed, the point of the task is to be unmistakably and 
irredeemably futile. Second, Sisyphus’ plight is characterized by endless repetition. Here, 
it is not repetition qua repetition that produces futility,49 but that a task that is almost but 
never finished must be repeated forever. These two features function jointly to produce 
the futility. If Sisyphus’ struggles eventually terminated in the rock staying, the charge of 
futility would not be as plausible. Additionally, if Sisyphus endlessly rolled stones in 
                                                 
49 Some, following Bernard Williams, think that repetition itself is a sufficient condition for agents in 
unending states of affairs coming to be primarily dominated by the condition of boredom. While not the 
same as futility, there is a connection. For Williams’ essay see, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the 
Tedium of Immortality,” in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. by John Martin Fischer (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 73-92. 
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order to create some sort of lasting and eternally growing artifact of immense beauty, the 
charge of futility would not be as plausible.50 Although in this last case one might be 
suspicious that futility has not been circumvented, because Sisyphus would never finish 
the artifact. 
 In more general discussions of futility, there appear to be two prominent ways in 
which something can be said to be futile, both of which relate to meaning of life 
discussions. The first is uncontroversial and clearly a case of futility. The second is 
controversial, and is what substantially threatens a meaningful life according to some. 
Probably the most common connotation that futility carries is the idea of striving to 
accomplish an impossible goal. This sense shares similarities with the Sisyphus case. 
Here, there is a tension between effort and end, such that no matter how much energy is 
exerted to attain the goal, it will prove ineffectual. The effort is futile. The one engaged in 
the effort will not nor cannot accomplish what she sets out to do. Trying to build a 
skyscraper with one’s bare hands or attempting to jump over the moon would be futile 
endeavors for us. Accomplishing these tasks is physically impossible, even though not 
logically, and any effort to attain them will result in a state of affairs dominated by 
futility. For those who closely link the meaning of life with the attainment of purposes, 
one’s meaning in life then will be directly correlated with whether or not those purposes 
are, in principle, attainable.51 To the extent that they are not, the presence of futility will 
become a more prominent feature of one’s life. Hence, on this view, futility and meaning 
                                                 
50 Richard Taylor defends this claim in Good and Evil: A New Direction, Chapter 18 (London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 258-59. 
 
51 There is the additional issue of whether one’s aims are actually attained and not simply attainable in 
principle, so that a further condition on a meaningful life may be that one’s purposes have to be attained. 
At minimum, though, to avoid futility, one must aim for attainable ends. 
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are negatively correlated such that as futility increases, meaningfulness decreases. This is 
why our intuition is to say, in at least one sense, that Sisyphus’ life is meaningless.52 
 But there is a different and more controversial sense in which futility enters the 
meaning of life discussion. A powerful intuition is shared by many whereby futility is 
strongly negatively correlated with what I will call “staying power.” This is largely where 
death enters the discussion, although futility can be present in the absence of death. 
Indeed, the plight of Sisyphus demonstrates that a certain kind of post-mortem survival is 
sufficient to bring about a futile state of affairs.53 The rough idea is that futility is a 
dominant feature of states of affairs where agents and their accomplishments and 
achievements do not last. I use “staying power” then in reference to humans as well as 
their activities and the products of their creative energies. There is a widespread and 
deep-seated intuition that if neither we nor the products of our human energies last, then 
our lives are fundamentally futile. Part of the reason this intuition grips so many is that 
we often associate significance with things that last a long time. This is readily seen in a 
slogan such as, “Diamonds are forever.” There are at least two forms of this intuition. 
The weak form only requires that we and what we do, or at least relevant parts of what 
we do, live on in some less than absolute sense into the distant future (e.g., genetic traces 
through progeny, aesthetic traces through creative pursuits, moral and social traces 
through family, friends, and culture, etc.). The strong form, however, requires that we and 
relevant aspects of our lives continue forever. At minimum, this requires that we 
                                                 
52 Although, in another sense, his life is meaningful in that it participates in a meaningful framework of 
gods, purposes, etc. There are multiple vantage points from which to talk about the meaning of life. 
 
53 This is why theists claim that never-ending post-mortem existence may be necessary for a meaningful 
life, but not sufficient. 
 
 34
somehow “survive” the biological demise of our physical bodies,54 and that there remains 
a continuity of personal identity across the threshold of death.  
 In light of the strong form of the futility intuition, C. S. Lewis, in his essay De 
Futilitate, notes three options available in response to the prospect of definitive death for 
humanity and the universe: (i) take the intuition seriously and adopt a pessimist 
viewpoint (e.g., Schopenhauer, Camus, and possibly Bertrand Russell), (ii) accept the 
naturalist position on death but reject the intuition (e.g., Michael Martin, Erik 
Weilenberg, and Owen Flanagan), or (iii) take the intuition seriously, reject the naturalist 
position, and opt for theism (e.g., Ecclesiastes, Tolstoy, William Lane Craig, or perhaps a 
non-theistic religious viewpoint).55 I will explain these options in greater detail in 
Chapter Five. 
 As in other philosophical contexts, there exists a profound clash of intuitions 
when it comes to the cosmic futility thesis, and counter-examples are enlisted to show 
that there are valuable and worthwhile pursuits in life even if it all will come to naught at 
some point in the finite future. While the cosmic futility intuition is strong, putative 
counter-examples can be produced that seem to weaken or even undermine this intuition. 
Interestingly, the counter-examples may result in one finding herself with two competing 
and seemingly irreconcilable intuitions: (i) that of cosmic futility, and (ii) that of the 
                                                 
54 Despite its dualist overtones, this claim is meant to be consistent with extant views on the ontology of the 
human person, even versions of physicalism that claim human persons just are their bodies. While a 
physicalist ontology of the human person may make it more difficult to think of how one could survive the 
demise of her body, and ipso facto her, there are physicalists who think this is possible. For example, see 
essays in Kevin Corcoran, ed. Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Peter Van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, eds., Persons: 
Human and Divine. 
 
55 C. S. Lewis, “De Futilitate” in Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1995), p. 59. 
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value and worth of projects that will come to naught in the grand scheme of things. Here, 
Thomas Nagel’s work on standpoints is beneficial in sorting through the issue, as he 
thinks there is something correct in the pervasive human intuitions of cosmic futility and 
absurdity. 
 In “The Absurd,” 56 Nagel defines an absurd situation as one that “includes a 
conspicuous discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and reality.”57 Examples of 
such absurdity would include a national leader who declares a war is over two years after 
this has already been officially decreed, or trying to fill a vehicle with gas when it has just 
been done. These are examples of absurdity because there is a significant lack of fit 
between what one is trying to accomplish and the actual state of affairs which he is in that 
militates against the agent’s intentions. Nagel argues that, for some, life as a whole 
exhibits the characteristic of absurdity in that many have pretensions or aspirations about 
a meaningful life that are fundamentally at odds with the nature of the universe on the 
naturalistic paradigm. Specifically, Nagel thinks the condition of absurdity supervenes 
upon “the collision between the seriousness with which we take our lives and the 
perpetual possibility of regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or 
open to doubt.”58 Essentially, there exists a clash of viewpoints, both of which rational, 
self-reflective creatures such as ourselves can adopt. The first is a near, subjectively 
involved standpoint from which our activities are significant and meaningful to us as we 
actively participate in them. The second is a distant, objectively detached standpoint from 
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which everything we do appears insignificant and meaningless.59 Indeed, humans, unlike 
other sentient creatures, are able to view our lives sub specie aeternitatis. Nagel’s 
conclusion is that we should adopt a position of irony, as opposed to either heroism 
(possibly Russell) or pessimism (Schopenhauer), towards this incongruity of 
standpoints.60 I think a rough analog of Nagel’s analysis of absurdity and how it threatens 
a meaningful life can be imported into discussions of cosmic futility. 
 Most of us, when engaged in life’s activities like child-rearing, attaining some 
goal, or enjoying some aesthetically pleasing activity, find these things to be significant, 
worthwhile, and meaningful. Much like Tolstoy, however, many of us at various times in 
life step back from a near and engaged viewpoint, and reflect upon these endeavors from 
a more distant perspective. This distant viewpoint consists of a future state of affairs in 
which we, all other sentient life, and the universe itself are no longer here.61 It is the 
deepest context from which to view our lives and the world. Adopting this latter 
viewpoint leads many to think that the earthly endeavors that populate our lives are not, 
in the deepest sense, significant, worthwhile, or meaningful, because reality, in the 
deepest sense, is indifferent to our joys, triumphs, struggles, and sorrows. Both we and 
the universe are on a course ending in non-existence,62 and this seems to make our lives 
ultimately futile. At one and the same time many of us share the intuition that saving a 
                                                 
59 This ability is partially what separates humans from other sentient life, and additionally makes the 
meaning of life our question. Presumably, crickets do not ask why they chirp, reproduce, and get smashed 
on the back porch, or more generally, why they even exist in the first place. We are distinct from crickets in 
this respect. 
 
60 Nagel, “The Absurd,” pp. 184-85. 
 
61 Although there is a logical worry here that if the universe is all that exists and it no longer exists that 
“this” cannot be called a state of affairs, for it would be nothing. 
 
62 Or, in the case of the universe, an irreversiblely used-up, hostile-to-life, state of affairs would obtain. 
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child stranded on railroad tracks is valuable even if the universe ceases to exist in a few 
weeks after the rescue, and yet the coming oblivion of everything makes the sense of 
futility hard to shake. Taking Nagel’s advice in the context of absurdity, the remedy to 
this situation is simply an ironic resignation that this is just the way it is given the uses to 
which we put our rational and self-reflective capacities and the way the world actually is 
on naturalism.  
 In contrast to Nagel, the theist might argue that God remedies the cosmic sense of 
futility that follows from this situation by changing the situation itself. Our response need 
not be irony, for the nature of the distant viewpoint is radically altered on theism. Given 
theistic premises, the distant viewpoint includes more details than our deaths and the 
death of the universe. It also includes a supernatural intentionality through which the 
world exists. It includes an infinite being who is perfect in every way. On the theistic 
view, it is argued that there is no “lack of fit” between the near viewpoint and the distant 
viewpoint precisely because the distant viewpoint includes a personal, supernatural being 
who grounds the significance, worth, and meaning of human endeavors in the here and 
now. Indeed, the distant viewpoint includes a viewer who is interested. The tension does 
not appear to arise on theism. Notice here that it is not simply that living on indefinitely 
secures the worth of our endeavors now even though this may be a necessary condition. 
Rather, it is the existence of the theistic God that does so. Of course, here, all the standard 
worries about whether God can ground meaning come to the fore. But there is an 
additional worry, one which Nagel himself raises. 
 Remember, the absurdity of life arises according to Nagel in that we can adopt a 
deeper vantage point from which to view our endeavors. From this deeper perspective, 
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these activities that consume us on this earth seem arbitrary and without ultimate 
justification for why they, and not some others, are important to us or even why any are 
important at all. The tension between the two standpoints makes life absurd, argues 
Nagel. The theist can argue that this tension evaporates when God becomes part of that 
wider perspective. But Nagel has a response. He argues that the very same questions can 
be raised of the God-perspective that are raised of the near human-perspective on 
naturalism. “What makes doubt inescapable with regard to the limited aims of individual 
life also makes it inescapable with regard to any larger purpose that encourages the sense 
that life is meaningful. Once the fundamental doubt has begun, it cannot be laid to rest.”63 
Nagel’s point is that one might shift what was the near, involved viewpoint in the first 
scenario to include God, and then adopt the distant, deep, and detached viewpoint from 
which to ask what ultimately justifies what God does, why what He does is important, 
and so on. Settling this impasse will center on a discussion of whether the regress of 
asking for justification from wider and wider vantage points is plausibly terminated in the 
necessary being posited by theism.64 
 I want to close this section by noting a few points on the topic of endings. I will 
take up the issue more substantively in Chapter Seven, but it is important to say a bit 
about it in the context of futility. I have already discussed some of the driving reasons 
why many adopt the conclusion of cosmic futility as a characteristic feature of life in a 
naturalistic universe. But there is another idea that seems to play an important role, but 
which has received little or no explicit attention in the literature on life’s meaning. It is 
common to think that the way a state of affairs, but especially a narrative, ends is perhaps 
                                                 
63 Nagel, “The Absurd,” p. 180. 
 
64 I will discuss related issues in Chapter Six. 
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that which is most evalautively significant for our broadly normative appraisals of the 
state of affairs or narrative as a whole. That is to say, our emotional reaction, aesthetic 
response, and/or moral evaluation of a narrative is largely a function of how it ends.  
It is plausible, even if only loosely in the case of naturalism, to view the history of 
the cosmos as a cosmic narrative complete with beginning, things-in-between, and 
ending. There is a strong tendency, whether reasonable or not, to take the ending of the 
universe’s narrative to be extremely important to our appraisal of the in-between states of 
affairs. Consequently, given the naturalistic ending where death has the final word, many 
judge the middle states of affairs to be predominantly and irredeemably futile. Of course, 
that conclusion can be challenged as I have noted, but the important idea here is the 
human propensity to give endings some sort of normative priority for how we evaluate 
the entire story. If something like this is true, it is no mystery why discussions of death 
and futility so closely track discussions of the meaning of life. 
1.6 Summary 
 My primary aim in this chapter has been to set the context for the remainder of the 
dissertation by discussing the coherence, interpretation, and important dialectical issues 
surrounding the question, “What is the meaning of life?” Despite the oft-repeated charge 
of incoherence, the question is demonstrably coherent even though it suffers from some 
measure of vagueness. This vagueness is evidenced by the multiplicity of interpretations 
of what the question is asking. The most common approach in the current literature, what 
I have called the amalgam thesis, views the question as little more than a disjunctive 
question consisting of a cluster of distinct yet related requests about purpose, value, and 
worth among others. In addition, issues involving death, futility, and absurdity closely 
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track discussions of life’s meaning. Any plausible interpretation of what the question is 
asking will have to find a natural home for this cluster of topics. In Chapter Two, I 
consider some important topics that will facilitate the explanation and defense of my 









 There is, no doubt, something correct in extant philosophical interpretations of the 
question, “What is the meaning of life?” Requests like, “What is life’s purpose?” “What 
makes life valuable?” or “Is life worthwhile and not irredeemably futile?” are often 
considered rough synonyms for the original, and hint at intuitions and sub-questions out 
of which it is motivated. This is partly due to the fact, as noted in §1.3 of Chapter One, 
that the question is plausibly viewed as an amalgam of distinct, yet interrelated questions 
about purpose, value, worth, and significance, among others. In current philosophical 
discussions of life’s meaning, the dialectic between theists and naturalists as well as 
subjectivist and objectivist naturalists is most often framed within interpretive parameters 
set by the amalgam thesis. 
 Though the amalgam thesis is not without philosophical merit, I will begin 
construction of a framework in this chapter for a competing interpretation of the meaning 
of life question, one that more fully captures and addresses, under a single unifying 
construct, the multiplicity of prior questions and intuitions with which it is associated and 
from which it is generated.1 Additionally, my proposed interpretation allows for the 
                                                 
1 This is largely in opposition to Metz, who claims that “. . . there is no single idea that unifies all the 
diverse views that have been deemed to be about the meaning of life . . .” “Recent Work on the Meaning of 
Life,” Ethics 112 (July 2002): p. 802. Of course, my interpretation breaks so substantially from the existing 
interpretive parameters such that his claim does not entirely relate. I agree with him, if he means that 
neither purpose nor value nor significance nor worth acts as a single idea that can unify all the proposals 
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original formulation, explicated in the admittedly vague terms meaning and life, to be 
retained without needing to be reformulated. The reformulated questions in terms of 
purpose, value, significance, and worth require substantial linguistic revision of the 
original question, and are, individually, too limited in scope to capture the all-
encompassing nature of the original question. For that matter, even considered jointly, 
they fail to capture this feature of the question that I take to be indispensable to 
understanding it—the desire for global or all-inclusive explanation, where by “global” I 
largely mean an explanation that addresses all the existentially important aspects of life 
and not just one or a few. I will explain and defend this claim more fully later; for now it 
is worth noting that if this feature of the question (its global or all-inclusive or 
comprehensive scope) is lost, a central aspect of the question is lost. None of the 
reformulated meaning of life questions most often being discussed by philosophers 
sufficiently captures this element, and the amalgam thesis only partially accounts for it.  
 There is an interpretation of the meaning of life question though that accounts for 
everything the reformulated versions address (jointly) and more. Additionally, it has the 
advantage over the amalgam thesis of (i) rendering the question intelligible in its original 
linguistic form, (ii) extracting everything generally deemed relevant to the meaning of 
life from the question in its original linguistic form, rather than having to morph it into 
several other distinct questions which are then only combined disjunctively, and related 
(iii) making questions and discussion about, for example, purpose and value in this 
context about the meaning of life and not only about purpose and value. I consider these 
to be significant philosophical advantages. I propose, then, that the question should be 
                                                                                                                                                 
that have been offered as being that in which the meaning of life consists. My proposal is not like one of 
these at all. 
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understood as the request for a global explanation or narrative of the world through which 
we can situate and make sense of our lives as well as those phenomena of existence we 
deem of greatest existential import.2 In the remainder of the dissertation, I will call this 
approach the narrative interpretation. 
 My aim in this chapter is to discuss a cluster of topics necessary for the 
subsequent presentation of the narrative interpretation of the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” I begin by noting that my proposal is largely prescriptive. That is, I am 
proposing how I think the question ought to be interpreted. However, I think any 
prescriptive interpretation must take into account descriptive realities of, for example, 
how people do, in fact, interpret the question along with the intuitions driving it. I think 
my interpretation accounts for this empirical data more adequately than current 
reformulations and the amalgam thesis. Second, I argue that a way of asking the question, 
“What is the meaning of life?” that is often taken as making an identical request (“What 
constitutes a meaningful life?” or “What makes a life meaningful?”) actually carries 
subtly different connotations, and this difference substantially affects how one interprets 
the meaning of the request itself. I note that my interpretive proposal follows most 
naturally when the request is retained in its original linguistic form (“What is the meaning 
of life?”). Finally, I will discuss the concept of narrative as a mode of discourse, and how 
I am employing this concept in my interpretation of the question of life’s meaning.  
                                                 
2 I will most often speak of what we seek in asking, “What is the meaning of life?” in terms of narrative, 
although our search for a deep explanatory framework or a comprehensive context through which to 
understand and live our lives is roughly synonymous to how I am modestly employing the concept of 
“narrative.”  
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2.2 Descriptive Issues, Prescriptive Issues, and a Philosophically Sufficient 
Interpretation 
 
 When discussing the question, “What is the meaning of life?” we should 
distinguish between two distinct yet related issues. First, there is the empirical issue of 
how some sample of the population, in fact, interprets the question. Second, there is a 
separate issue of how the question ought to be interpreted. This is the philosophically 
reflective approach where one has conceded the vagueness inherent in the question’s 
standard linguistic form, and where the question is either reformulated in a way that is 
philosophically respectable and yet continues to capture central intuitions and 
motivations which initially prompt the question, or a plausible interpretation is offered of 
the question in its original linguistic form. 
 I take it that any philosophical proposal for what the question means will need to 
address both descriptive and prescriptive considerations. That is, it should sufficiently 
account for the range of pre-philosophic intuitions and sub-questions that motivate the 
question of life’s meaning in the first place. It must do its best to harmonize with them. 
But it must not stop here. Additionally, the requirement of conceptual clarity and 
coherence stands as a condition to be met by any proposal deemed plausible. Of central 
concern is the original question’s vagueness. This must be addressed, and may require 
revising or amending the common-sense, lay usage. It may not though. 
 In this dissertation, I am not primarily concerned with the empirical issue of how 
the question is, in fact, interpreted. Thus, I would not be content merely with the results 
of a survey. My main goal is to propose a philosophically plausible interpretation of the 
question, “What is the meaning of life?” How ought we interpret the request is the issue 
with which I am concerned. However, as noted, I consider it a desideratum of any 
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philosophically plausible interpretation of the question’s meaning that it be able to 
sufficiently square its interpretive contours with the intuitions and sub-questions from 
which the question of life’s meaning is generated. That is to say, it will have to account 
for those descriptive elements that we find giving rise to the question as well as what 
people, in fact, take themselves to mean in asking it. In this sense, I am interested in how 
people, as a matter of fact, interpret the request. But I want to move beyond this, 
proposing what I take to be a superior interpretation to those currently under 
philosophical consideration. So, my proposal is not one merely about what people 
generally understand the question to be asking. That is a surveyor’s task. It is, rather, a 
proposal that attempts to interpret the question’s central request in a way that brings 
philosophical respectability to the question in its original linguistic form and harmonizes 
with the intuitions and sub-questions from which the question is generated, intuitions and 
sub-questions, however, that people generally leave unarticulated or fail to understand for 
one reason or another. 
2.3 The Meaning of Life vs. A Meaningful Life 
Philosophers often criticize lay considerations of the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” because of a perceived uncritical interaction with the question in its 
standard linguistic form, one that is vague. However, criticism can be directed at 
philosophers themselves who, once philosophical paradigms and certain dialectical 
parameters have gained momentum, fail to move outside of those boundaries and 
consider afresh some philosophical question from a different, and perhaps more fruitful 
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perspective.3 Furthermore, many philosophers working on the topic may be guilty of 
conflating two questions that seem prima facie synonymous, but which in fact are, in 
important ways, conceptually distinct. I think this has happened with the questions, 
“What is the meaning of life?” and “What makes a life meaningful?” However, the 
locution the meaning of life is simply not reducible to a discussion about what makes a 
life meaningful. 
After providing evidence of this conflation, I will argue that though the questions 
are relevantly similar, they are actually conceptually distinct requests. Along with 
showing this, my goal in this section is to both fill in the context out of which my 
interpretive claim gains further plausibility and also to add a layer of nuance to a 
philosophical discussion that is in relative infancy and in need of philosophical 
maturation.4 More precision is needed if the philosophical discussion of life’s meaning is 
going to continue to proceed forward. 
2.3.1 Conflating “What is the Meaning of Life?” and “What Makes a Life 
Meaningful?” 
  
Prima facie, there may appear to be little difference between the following 
questions: (a) “What is the meaning of life?” and (b) “What makes a life meaningful?”5 
There is evidence to indicate that the following disjunction is true. Philosophers working 
on the topic often either assume that (a) and (b) are roughly synonymous, or at least that 
(b) is the more relevant and answerable question. I will call the first disjunct the 
                                                 
3 For example, one thinks here of Gettier’s historic challenge to the reigning tripartite analysis of the 
conditions under which propositional knowledge obtains, an analysis largely unchallenged for two 
thousand years. 
 
4 In a sense, the discussion of life’s meaning is ancient. I here reference its infancy against the contextual 
backdrop of contemporary analytic philosophy. 
 
5 Unless otherwise indicated, I use “question” to mean what is asked by a speaker in the performance of a 
speech-act.  
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“conflation thesis” (CT), and the second disjunt the “relevance thesis” (RT). The second 
disjunct, (b), is most often in the background framing the discussion in the current 
philosophical considerations of the question of life’s meaning. Whether the evidence 
favors CT or RT as the modus operandi of philosophers working on the topic, each, in its 
own way, results in a deficient or truncated account of the territory subsumed under the 
meaning of life. 
Something in the neighborhood of both CT and RT is observable in the work of 
Thaddeus Metz, who has published widely on the topic of life’s meaning. For example, in 
two noteworthy articles that survey the contemporary philosophical dialectic on the 
meaning of life, he frames his discussion in the introductions of those pieces with the 
second question. In the 2002 survey article in Ethics, he begins by asking, “What, if 
anything, makes a life meaningful?” [emphasis added].6 In a subsequent 2007 survey 
article in Philosophy Compass, he begins in nearly the same fashion, “In this article I 
survey philosophical literature on the topic of what, if anything, makes a person’s life 
meaningful” [emphasis added].7 Interestingly, though, the respective titles of these pieces 
are, “Recent Work on the Meaning of Life,” and “New Developments in the Meaning of 
Life” [emphases added]. It is telling that in the respective titles of these works, the 
standard locution, the meaning of life, is used. What are we to make of this? Are the 
meaning of life and a meaningful life synonymous concepts? Is CT a case of unnecessary 
philosophical nit-picking? Both questions should be answered in the negative. 
                                                 
6 Thaddeus Metz, “Recent Work on the Meaning of Life,” Ethics 112 (July 2002): 781. 
 
7 Thaddeus Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” Philosophy Compass 2/2 (2007): 196. 
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 More evidence of a less explicit nature from Metz’s work is available in support 
of CT. For example, in his introduction to a special issue of Philosophical Topics in 
2005, he notes that the issue is devoted to the topic of “meaning in life,” which, in this 
context is synonymous with the locution a meaningful life. However, he then proceeds to 
use the phrase “. . . accounts of life’s meaning.”8 Again, in his 2001 article, “The Concept 
of a Meaningful Life,” in American Philosophical Quarterly, he enlists the following 
quote by John Updike on the meaning of life, “Well, my goodness, “What is the meaning 
of life?” you ask. What is the meaning of “meaning” in your question? And whose life? 
A worm’s?”9 He proceeds to talk of “. . . the question of life’s meaning . . .” in the first 
paragraph of the article10 But the immediate concern of the paper is a meaningful life. 
Importantly, Updike’s bewilderment in the quote is the kind of bewilderment that 
attaches to the original linguistic formulation of the question, “What is the meaning of 
life?” bewilderment that is not generally attached to the question, “What make a life 
meaningful?” The bewilderment-response is actually highly instructive, tracking 
important differences between the two requests. This response often accompanies the first 
question, but not the second. Metz and other philosophers who seemingly conflate the 
two requests, whether implicitly or explicitly, are failing to draw boundary markers 
where they are needed within the vast, often confusing territory of life’s meaning. 
 Now this all may seem like conceptual hair-splitting but this is precisely what is 
needed in order to more clearly chart the vague conceptual boundaries of the meaning of 
                                                 
8 Thaddeus Metz, “Introduction,” Philosophical Papers 34 (November 2005): 311. 
 






life. One cannot simply assume that the two questions, “What is the meaning of life?” 
and “What makes a life meaningful?” are making synonymous requests. And, conflating 
the two leads to further implausible consequences. For example, when one looks at the 
dialectic that has unfolded on the topic of life’s meaning, the kinds of questions and 
issues discussed generally fit within the context of the second request. Metz nicely 
summarizes the kinds of questions salient in this context, “What ought one most strive for 
besides achieving happiness and satisfying moral requirements? How can one do 
something worth [sic] of great esteem or admiration? What is particularly worthy of love 
and devotion?”11 He notes that these questions are generally answered within one of three 
broad metaphysical and normative paradigms: (i) supernaturalism, (ii) objectivist 
naturalism, and (iii) subjectivist naturalism. One of the shortcomings of this approach, 
however, is the implausible implication that questions and concerns clearly related to the 
meaning of life end up falling outside the dialectical parameters of the discussion on 
life’s meaning. Here, one thinks of questions like: Why does the universe exist? Why is 
there something rather than nothing? What is the deep explanation, context, or narrative 
from which to understand life? Why are we here? What is it all about? How is it all going 
to end? Any understanding of the meaning of life question that provides no conceptual 
room for such requests is deficient. 
 Enlisting the amalgam thesis, it is plausible to view the original and most basic 
formulation of the question (i.e., “What is the meaning of life?”) as the request in which a 
cluster of other distinct yet related requests are imbedded. Accordingly, the question, 
“What makes a life meaningful?” is one of a number of questions that fall within the 
broad territory of life’s meaning. The problem is that the discussion over life’s meaning 
                                                 
11 Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” 211. 
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has generally unfolded within a dialectical paradigm that largely views the most basic 
question as, “What makes a life meaningful?” But this already assumes too much; 
namely, that “What makes a life meaningful?” is synonymous to “What is the meaning of 
life?” The latter question, however, has important connotations that are in the 
neighborhood of life’s meaning and that are not captured on the formulation, “What 
makes a life meaningful?” “What is the meaning of life?” is a broader, more global, and 
more general request than “What makes a life meaningful? 
2.3.2 Against Synonymy  
 Though the meaning of life and a meaningful life are often taken to be 
synonymous, they possess importantly different connotations. Conflating them, then, has 
detrimental philosophical implications for how the ensuing discussions over life’s 
meaning are framed. How one first interprets and then answers the question about life’s 
meaning is importantly linked to how one asks it. The current ‘canonical’ discussions of 
life’s meaning where questions and considerations of value, worth, and purpose, among 
others, are those at the fore reside more naturally in contexts where the question, “What 
makes a life meaningful?” saliently frames the discussion. Unfortunately, such 
discussions leave out other important meaning of life questions and issues, those that are 
salient only on the original linguistic formulation of the meaning of life question, “What 
is the meaning of life?” Neither can the two questions be conflated, nor should the 
question of a meaningful life be considered the most relevant aspect of the original 
request. Though distinguishing between the two questions may seem prima facie suspect 
or ad hoc, there are two important considerations that support this distinction. Both of 
these considerations largely center on the notion of scope. The first is much broader in 
 51
scope than the second, an attribute that explains, among other things, the bewilderment-
response that attaches to the first question, but not the second. 
 First, the question, “What makes a life meaningful?” is more clearly a normative 
question whereby one seeks insight about how one ought to structure her life in order to 
secure a meaningful existence (e.g., in terms of ends pursued). In Metz’s terms, she is 
concerned with questions like: “What ought one most strive for besides achieving 
happiness and satisfying moral requirements? How can one do something worth [sic] of 
great esteem or admiration? What is particularly worthy of love and devotion?”12 Here, 
then, “meaningful” carries salient normative connotations, although the concept extends 
beyond the realm of normative ethical considerations. For example, many philosophers 
think we are inclined to judge a life that strives and attains for some ideal of moral 
perfection, but which for the person living it is fundamentally and pervasively unhappy as 
lacking meaningfulness.13 In this case meaningfulness will require a happiness-
component, though being irreducible to happiness alone. Most people’s intuitions militate 
against a happy serial killer leading a meaningful life. So, meaningfulness is a normative 
category that includes more than the ethical but not less, adding perhaps the aesthetic and 
other dimensions, while being reducible to none of these considered individually. 
 On the other hand, the question, “What is the meaning of life?” does not carry 
with it the same normative connotations as, “What makes a life meaningful?” at least not 
in the same sense. Part of the reason for this is that it is more general or, perhaps more 
vague. It does encompass normative territory, but it is not exhausted by the normative. 
                                                 
12 Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” 211. 
 
13 Though, historically, a philosopher like Plato would dispute that this is possible, as the pursuit of moral 
virtue and happiness are more intimately connected. There are debates of course about the precise claim 
Plato is making about the connection of virtue and happiness. 
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Within the interpretive parameters of the amalgam thesis, some of the supposed sub-
questions imbedded within the original request, “What is the meaning of life?” are 
normative, but not all. Pre-theoretically at least, the question, “What is the meaning of 
life?” seems to be, very often, about seeking a deep explanation or context or narrative 
for the entire global state of affairs (on pain of contradiction),14 especially the subset of 
this state of affairs that is part and parcel of the human predicament, those toward which 
we focus our existentially involved gaze. Though normative considerations and questions 
will be addressed by this deep explanation, context, or narrative, it is simply an 
explanation, context, or narrative that is being sought, and explanation qua explanation is 
not itself normative. 
 Second, and perhaps more relevant, the question, “What makes a life 
meaningful?” is a question about human life, and not about everything that exists in the 
universe, or in the rather crude, yet instructive, way that the question is often formulated, 
“ . . . about all of this” where “this” picks out everything, at least everything in the spatio-
temporal universe. However, as a matter of fact, the question of life’s meaning is often 
motivated out of more global and all-inclusive intuitions. These global intuitions are 
nicely captured in what should be viewed as a probable synonym of the question, “What 
is the meaning of life?”—What is it all [life, the universe, finite existence] about? Here, 
we are not simply asking a question about human life, but about everything in the 
observable universe. To be sure, many think the global question and the local question 
                                                 
14 For example, from what outside vantage point can one observe all-that-is sub specie aeternitatis? One 
may make a distinction between the spatio-temporal universe and the supernatural realm if one is a theist, 
claiming that, literally, the God’s-eye-perspective brings this deep context from which it all makes sense. 
This, too, faces criticism. Whether such criticism is surmountable is another issue. The work of Thomas 
Nagel on standpoints is helpful here. See his The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989). 
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about ourselves are related, such that an answer to the former will elucidate questions 
about our own lives as humans. As Karl Britton notes: 
One of the very odd things about ‘the meaning of life’ is that people commonly 
do not make a sharp distinction between a question about everything and a 
question about themselves. For the ordinary reflective person will go on: What is 
it all for? Why am I here? What is the point of it all? (And I suspect this often 
means: What is the point of it all for me?) It not only is a matter of wonder that 
there is this universe, but also that it contains me . . .15 
 
But these concerns are conceptually distinct. When phrased as, “What makes a life 
meaningful?” the question of life’s meaning is only about one particular aspect of the 
totality of observable existence—human life, yours and mine. Furthermore, its scope is 
further delimited to a particular aspect of human existence, the normative dimension of 
human existence. The problem is that this question fails to sufficiently capture those 
inescapably global intuitions from which the original question is asked, and which are 
captured in the formulation, “What is the meaning of life?” 
 To be sure, wondering what gives life purpose, what makes life valuable, or what 
makes life and the projects of life significant, within the horizon of human interests and 
concerns, is often part of the motivational history for asking the grand question, “What is 
the meaning of life?” However, none of the reformulated questions, and ipso facto the 
question, “What makes a life meaningful?” individually captures a distinguishing 
property of the original question, its global or all-inclusive nature. In investigating the 
concept of a meaningful life, one has not thereby exhausted the broad territory of life’s 
meaning. The terms “global” and “all-inclusive” are meant to capture the following 
sense: an existentially-infused perspective on the totality of human existence. 
Considerations of a meaningful life only center on more localized intuitions and sub-
                                                 
15 Karl Britton, Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 2-
3. 
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questions from which the original question is perhaps generated. None of them, 
considered singularly, captures the all-inclusive nature of their vague precursor where 
more (but not less) than merely the search for purpose, value, or significance motivates 
the question.16  
 In his book, Does Life Have a Meaning?, Milton Munitz helpfully notes that the 
question of life’s meaning is motivated by intuitions of “. . . relative depth or total 
scope.”17 This observation is perceptive. Indeed, in asking the question of life’s meaning 
there is a motive often more basic, comprehensive, and all-inclusive than our desire to 
discover how to secure a meaningful existence. Wondering how to secure a meaningful 
existence is surely a deep and basic motivating desire which partially prompts the 
question, but it is likely a secondary layer of a more foundational motive—the desire for 
a deep explanation, context, or narrative of the world that sufficiently addresses those 
areas of greatest existential import to rational, emotional, and self-reflective creatures 
such as us.18 This more basic desire, the desire for a particular kind of explanation of a 
particular sweeping scope, is evidenced by considering the multiplicity of contexts from 
which the question of life’s meaning emerges. Three such contexts are what can be called 
(1) Tolstoyan moments: arrests of life where one anxiously questions the value and worth 
                                                 
16 It is important to keep in mind that I am not disputing the descriptive claim that many do, in fact, 
interpret the question as “What is the purpose of life?” or “What makes life valuable?” I am arguing that 
there is actually a more appropriate way, philosophically, to view the question through a deeper analysis of 
its causal and motivational origins. Once one understands my analysis, I think it will become plausible not 
only why these common interpretations are used so readily, but additionally why my interpretation can still 
find a home for them while also doing a better job of accounting for intuitions and question-producing 
contexts unaddressed by the reformulated versions. 
 
17 Milton K. Munitz, Does Life Have A Meaning? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), p. 29. 
 
18 By “rational, emotional, and self-reflective” creatures I simply mean human beings. Also, the way in 
which I have framed this does not militate against those who do not or perhaps even cannot ask the 
question from leading meaningful lives. Remember that I introduced an important distinction between the 
questions What is the meaning of life? and What makes a life meaningful? in §2.3 of Chapter Two. 
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of life pursuits that, pre-theoretically are deemed valuable and worthwhile, especially in 
light of the impending reality of death (2) Metaphysical wonder: the salience and 
profundity of the fact that anything exists at all impinges itself at the fore of our 
consciousness, and (3) Pain and suffering: attempting to make sense of this ugly reality. 
These contexts and the questions that surface in each are multi-faceted such that no one 
question (e.g., “What is the purpose(s) of life?” or “What makes life worthwhile?” among 
others), except for the question, “What is the meaning of life?” captures all of them or 
unifies them in a single pass. 
We must not, however, think that the two questions are unrelated simply because, 
as is being argued, they can be conceptually distinguished and carry their own nuanced 
connotations. Britton is correct to note that “. . . people commonly do not make a sharp 
distinction between a question about everything and a question about themselves.”19 And 
while the distinction he refers to here is slightly different from the one emphasized in this 
section, it does show that the question has both global and local dimensions, dimensions 
that, at once, are both related and distinct. A substantial part of the reason for this follows 
from what Yuval Lurie calls, “The Psychological Context of the Question.” We often ask 
the question, not simply out of philosophical perplexity, but in the midst of 
psychologically weighty moments in life (e.g., suffering, questioning the value of a 
dominant feature of one’s life, etc.). The question is motivated in concrete human 
contexts, and so even though we might often be searching for some overarching 
explanation or context or narrative from which to view and around which to order our 
life, we think that this explanation, context, or narrative will speak to our needs 
(psychological, existential, rational, ethical, etc.) in virtue of our being a part of this 
                                                 
19 Karl Britton, Philosophy and the Meaning of Life, p. 2. 
 56
narrative with its particular elements, some of which are decidedly normative and will 
have normative implications for our lives. 
2.3.3 The Definite Article 
 That some philosophers confuse the two questions is evidenced in the criticism 
surrounding the use of the definite article in the meaning of life. Contemporary 
philosophers discussing the question have been quick to criticize the use of the definite 
article in the question’s most common and basic formulation, “What is the meaning of 
life?” For as Lurie notes, “The formulation of the question implies that there is but one 
meaning [of life], which is the sole meaning of all life and all lives.” But, it is often 
argued, this assumption should be rejected.20 Likewise, and especially if the original 
formulation is interpreted in terms of securing a meaningful existence, the use of the 
definite article is implausibly narrow. But this only follows if the two requests are 
synonymous. If we are in the context of a meaningful life, then surely there are many 
aspects of a meaningful life including relationships and valuable pursuits that can be 
person or context-relative, unless of course one is a skeptic or nihilist in this context. 
However, if these two formulations carry their own unique connotations, the first should 
not be viewed as making the same request as the second. Furthermore, the use of the 
definite article is appropriate within the context of the first request, though it is probably 
not within the context of the second request. The philosophical merits of the criticism are 
context-relative, and the fact that it is leveled at the question “What is the meaning of 
life?” is revelatory that contexts that should be seen as conceptually distinct have been 
conflated. 
                                                 
20 For example, see R. A. Sharpe, “In Praise of the Meaningless Life,” Philosophy Now 25 (Summer 1999): 
p. 15; and J. J. C. Smart, “Meaning and Purpose,” Philosophy Now 24 (Summer 1999): p. 16. 
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2.4 On Employing the Category of Narrative 
 In the next chapter I will employ the category of narrative, selecting conceptual 
resources from narrative theory in order to unpack and argue for my narrative 
interpretation of the meaning of life question. This requires me, then, to briefly discuss 
the salient features of narrative for my interpretation. Unfortunately, it seems as if the 
only consistency among narrative theorists is the lack of agreement upon precisely what 
distinguishes narrative from other modes of discourse. This, however, should not cast 
suspicion on my modest use of narrative in this dissertation. 
 Narrative theorists have found it exceedingly difficult to agree on a precise set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions distinguishing narrative from other forms of 
discourse. In spite of this impasse, there has been something of a “narrative turn in the 
humanities” as well as in law and science among other disciplines.21 This narrative turn 
has invited usages of the concept that many fear will result in it losing its meaning. To 
some, the so-called narrative turn signals that narrative is a fluid concept, such that 
explanations or theories can be called narratives, or at least narrative-like. Interestingly, 
narrative theorist Peter Brooks thinks that narrative’s growing ubiquity across academic 
disciplines tracks a deep propensity in human beings, “While I think the term has been 
trivialized through overuse, I believe the overuse responds to a recognition that narrative 
is one of the principal ways we organize our experience of the world – a part of our 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Ursula W. Goodenough, “The Religious Dimensions of the Biological Narrative,” 
Zygon 29 (December 1994): pp. 603-18 (Science); Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds. Law’s Stories: 
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), (Law); and Stanley 
Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, eds. Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf 
and Stock Publishers, 1997), (Theology). 
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cognitive tool kit that was long neglected by psychologists and philosophers.”22 So, 
although the concept of narrative is often stretched in ways that theorists consider 
illegitimate, its broad employment in a variety of explanatory contexts is likely a natural 
function of deep human proclivities. 
 One can think of territory delimited by narrative discourse in terms of two poles 
or in terms of concentric circles. At one pole or in the innermost circles reside 
representations that qualify as narrative in the strict or literal sense, and at the other pole 
or in the larger circles are representations that are only loosely or metaphorically defined 
instances of narrative. There are points along the continuum or within the region of 
concentric circles where the representation or discourse under consideration will be more 
towards the paradigmatic pole or the middle circles, and other points where it is more 
toward the non-paradigmatic pole or outside circles. David Herman offers a reason for 
this. Referencing the work of cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Eleanor Rosch,23 he 
notes that some of the categories with which we understand the world are gradient.24 That 
is, they are more-or-less as opposed to either-or. There will be paradigm cases of a given 
category along with cases that do not clearly fit into the category. Certain categories can 
exhibit membership gradience. So, for example, a Wren is more paradigmatically an 
example of a member of the category of birds, whereas an Ostrich is less so, even though 
it still belongs to the category in some sense. Category gradience is an additional kind of 
                                                 
22 Quoted in Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Narrative, ed. David Herman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 22. 
 
23 See George Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Presss, 1987); 
and Eleanor Rosch, “Principles of Categorization,” in Bas Aarts, David Denison, Evelien Keizer, and 
Gergana Popova, eds., Fuzzy Grammar: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 91-108. 
 
24 David Herman, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative,  p. 8. 
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gradience. Take for instance the categories “heavy rock” and “light rock”—where 
precisely is the line of demarcation between these categories? The fact is simply that such 
a line cannot be drawn. Like other discussions, vagueness is inherent here. Narrative is a 
kind of discourse to which these gradient distinctions apply. Therefore, a given instance 
of discourse can be more or less a central instance of the category of narrative, and less 
central instances will have elements that allow them to be partially merged into other 
categories of discourse (e.g., lists, descriptions, arguments, etc.). The Brothers 
Karamazov is a central or paradigmatic instance of the category of narrative, whereas a 
transcript from The CBS Evening News resides at the periphery of the category if at all. 
 This idea of gradience indicates that narrative can be employed literally (strictly) 
or metaphorically (loosely)—or, paradigmatically vs. non-paradigmatically. It is for the 
literal use that narrative theorists have attempted to define necessary and sufficient 
conditions.25 On metaphorical uses, “narrative” might be dissolved into “experience,” 
“interpretation,” “explanation,” “representation,” or even “content.”26 A metaphorical 
employment allows, for example, a text on evolution or the Big Bang to count as 
narrative, as well as other forms of discourse. In light of the fluidity of narrative and my 
use of narrative, it is necessary to say more about what distinguishes paradigm cases of 
narrative from non-paradigm cases. It remains to be seen whether my interpretation of the 
meaning of life question as narrative is a paradigmatic instance of narrative or whether it 
is simply metaphorical. Interestingly, the answer to this question will be a function of the 
fact that whether some particular meaning of life narrative is paradigm case of narrative 
                                                 





is worldview-relative. For example, theistic meaning of life narratives are more 
paradigmatically so than naturalistic ones.27 I will take up this discussion in Chapter Five. 
However, a more detailed discussion now of what constitutes a paradigmatic narrative 
will serve a fruitful purpose in this later discussion. 
 The ensuing proposal for what constitutes narrative is borrowed from Marie-
Laure Ryan’s “fuzzy-set”28 definition of narrative in her essay, “Toward a Definition of 
Narrative.” She proposes that narrativity is a function of how well some representation x 
satisfies eight conditions of narrativity. These eight conditions are subsumed under two 
broad dimensions: (i) Semantic and (ii) formal and pragmatic. The semantic dimension 
consists of spatial, temporal, and mental dimensions. Representations satisfying more of 
these conditions are prototypical or paradigmatic examples of narrative, whereas those 
satisfying fewer conditions are only marginally narrative. I have provided a detailed 
summation of the eight conditions below. 
Spatial Dimension (Semantic) 
   
  (1) Narrative must be about a world populated by individuated existents. 
 
 Temporal Dimension (Semantic) 
   
  (2) This world must be situated in time and undergo significant   
  transformations. 
 
  (3) The transformations must be caused by non-habitual physical events. 
 
  
                                                 
27 This is not meant to beg any questions against naturalism though. Naturalism still has a candidate 
meaning of life narrative to offer, even if only in the loose or metaphorical sense. For those naturalists who 
think naturalism offers a meaning of life in the literal narrative sense, they will have to answer the 
criticisms of Sartre and Derschowitz who emphatically say that life is not a dramatic narrative. I will 
discuss the Sartrian Objection in Chapter Five. 
 
28 Roughly, fuzzy-sets are characterized by elements who exhibit degrees of membership. That is, such sets 
are not assessed in bivalent terms according to a bivalent condition where a member either belongs or does 
not belong to the set. They exhibit both membership and category gradience. 
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Mental Dimension (Semantic) 
 
  (4) Some of the participants in the events must be intelligent agents who  
  have a mental life and react emotionally to the states of the world. 
 
  (5) Some of the events must be purposeful actions by these agents. 
 
 Formal and Pragmatic Dimension 
 
  (6) The sequence of events must form a unified causal chain and lead to  
  closure. 
 
  (7) The occurrence of at least some of the events must be asserted as fact  
  for the storyworld. 
 
  (8) The story must communicate something meaningful to the audience.29 
  
 Ryan notes that each of the above conditions militates against certain kinds of 
representation from being the “macro-structure” of a story. She thinks (1) eliminates 
representations of abstract entities and entire classes of concrete objects, (2) eliminates 
static descriptions, (3) eliminates enumerations of repetitive events, (4) eliminates one-of-
a-kind scenarios involving only natural forces and non-intelligent participants (e.g., 
weather reports), (5) (together with 3) eliminates representations consisting exclusively 
of mental events (e.g., interior monologue fiction), (6) eliminates lists of causally 
unconnected events such as chronicles and diaries, (7) eliminates recipes, and (8) 
eliminates bad stories.30 
 The above eight conditions offer a guide when asking whether some 
representation qualifies as narrative, or, where on the continuum of narrativity it falls. Of 
course, one may dispute Ryan’s taxonomy of conditions, but it remains useful even if we 
                                                 
29 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” p. 29. 
 
30 Ibid., pp. 29-30. Ryan admits that condition (8) is controversial, and is herself skeptical that it is a 
condition that needs to be met. 
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might argue about some of the points here and there. The important idea is that a given 
representation will satisfy certain conditions such that it more or less belongs to the 
category of narrative. For example, Ryan notes that some will consider satisfaction of 
conditions (1) through (3) sufficient to classify a representation as a narrative, and 
therefore view a text about evolution or the Big Bang as a narrative. Others, however, 
might think that (4) and (5) are essential, insisting that narrative be about human 
experience. Still others might think a chronicle qualifies as narrative, while others will 
object and take (6) as necessary. Finally, some will insist on (8), where others might think 
that a pointless string of utterances or a dull account of events can still exhibit basic 
narrative structure.31 
 Ryan’s fuzzy-set definition is relevant for my central thesis in this dissertation; 
namely, that the meaning of life is a narrative. It is not clear how many of the above 
narrative conditions the meaning of life narrative will satisfy, and thus it remains to be 
seen where it falls on the continuum of narrativity. Interestingly, what Jean-François 
Lyotard has called grand narratives or metanarratives,32 only qualify as narrative in a 
loose or metaphorical sense on the above definition, since they neither concern 
individuals (at least directly) nor create a concrete world.33 This is important given that 
my interpretation of the question of life’s meaning closely tracks the concept of a 
                                                 
31 One thinks here, for example, of Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. This raises deep questions though 
of whether representations intended to be anti-narrative or at least anti-dramatic narrative can themselves 
be narrative. 
 
32 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1985). 
 
33 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” p. 30. I disagree with Ryan, and think that some 
metanarratives can be narratives literally and robustly, especially many religious metanarratives. 
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metanarrative.34 The more conceptual fingers that the meaning of life narrative has 
extending into other forms of representation, the less philosophically plausible and more 
ad hoc my employment of the category of narrative may be. 
 For now, I will simply note that I think my general thesis is consistent with either 
a paradigmatic or non-paradigmatic employment of the concept of narrative, as long as I 
can properly motivate the concept of narrative’s fruitfulness in this context. My thesis is 
not undermined should we find that the meaning of life narrative turns out to exhibit 
significant membership gradience, whereby it overlaps into other categories of discourse 
such as non-narrative explanation. Interestingly, though, the degree of membership 
gradience that some candidate35 meaning of life narrative exhibits is a function of which 
candidate narrative is under consideration. That is to say, the naturalistic meaning of life 
narrative will exhibit greater membership gradience than will the theistic meaning of life 
narrative.36 I will discuss this implication in greater detail in Chapter Five, noting how it 
naturally intersects with assumptions generally present when the question of life’s 
meaning is asked. 
2.5 Summary 
 Having addressed these matters of prolegomena, I am now ready to provide a 
fuller motivation for and subsequent exposition of the narrative interpretation of the 
question, “What is the meaning of life?” One aim of this chapter has been to bring a 
greater measure of nuance to the discussion of the meaning of life. The primary area in 
                                                 
34 See Chapter Three for a fuller discussion of this point. 
 
35 I have not yet defined the concept of a candidate narrative, and do not do so until Chapter Three. For 
now it will suffice to note that a candidate meaning of life narrative is a narrative with the right formal 
properties, regardless of its material content. 
 
36 Cf. footnote 27. 
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which I noted this is when considering the two distinct yet related questions: What is the 
meaning of life? and What makes a life meaningful? The other aim was to briefly 
introduce the category of narrative in a way relevant to my central thesis in the Linguistic 
Project of this dissertation. In Chapter Three, I will highlight further conceptual resources 






The Meaning of Life as Narrative 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Having discussed preliminary issues relevant to my interpretation of the question, 
“What is the meaning of life?” in Chapter Two, I am now in a position to develop the 
narrative interpretation of the meaning of life question. According to the narrative 
interpretation, the meaning of life question is best understood as the request for a 
narrative that narrates across those elements and accompanying questions of life of 
greatest existential import to human beings. In this chapter I provide a detailed exposition 
of this claim. 
I begin by motivating the narrative interpretation, noting human propensities and 
pursuits that are closely akin to central theses of the narrative interpretation. Second, I 
briefly survey proposals in the meaning of life literature that mention something similar 
to my narrative interpretation, but which fall significantly short of fully explicating this 
interpretive approach. That such embryonic proposals exist is important, as it 
demonstrates that others have considered similar interpretive strategies, while not having 
developed them in any detail. Third, I note my reasons for employing the category of 
narrative and why I borrow from narrative theory in order to frame my interpretation. 
Fourth, I employ an analogy in which there is a request for the meaning of something 
                                                 
1 A significant portion of this chapter has been published under the title, “The Meaning of Life as 




where the use of the word “meaning” largely connotes what the word “meaning” 
connotes in the question, “What is the meaning of life?” Fifth, I utilize the fruits of the 
discussion in the previous two sections in order to develop and nuance my narrative 
interpretation. Here, I provide a detailed account of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the narrative interpretation of the meaning of life question. I conclude by 
exploring the close conceptual link between my narrative interpretation and the concept 
of a metanarrative. 
3.2 The Human Propensity for Explanation, Context, and Narrative 
 We humans want to explain things. At some point in our biological existence 
most of us reach a level of consciousness accompanied by a strong desire to acquire 
knowledge. Young children become uniquely adept at asking, “Why?” The child’s 
explanatory pursuits are a microcosm of the more general human propensity to desire 
explanation of the multifaceted nature of the universe of which we are a part. Indeed, the 
most fundamental human pursuits and institutions, especially religion, philosophy, and 
science are strongly correlated with the human desire to make sense of the world. While 
each has its own motivations, assumptions, and methodological parameters, all three 
seem to share more or less in this human propensity—the desire to explain, know, and 
live well.2 Asking, “What is the meaning of life?” is closely connected to these desires. 
 The theoretical pursuit of some scientists is relevant here. Interestingly, there is 
some correlation between viewing the meaning of life in terms of the desire for a deep 
                                                 
2 Of course, the human desire for explanation does not exhaust these pursuits. For example, the human 
propensity to worship, along with accompanying feelings of absolute dependence upon something larger 
than us, is as essential to many religions as is the desire to explain. Furthermore, at least in philosophy as 
classically conceived, the desire to live the good life is as much a driving motivation for philosophical 
inquiry as is the desire to explain. Such desires cannot be divorced. Living the good life likely presupposes 




and sweeping explanation of the universe and its various components and what physicists 
have come to call “theories of everything.” Roughly, a theory of everything is defined as 
“. . . a single all-embracing picture of all the laws of Nature from which the inevitability 
of all things seen must follow with unimpeachable logic. With possession of this cosmic 
Rosetta Stone, we could read the book of Nature in all tenses: we could understand all 
that was, is, and is to come.”3 Mathematical scientist John D. Barrow makes a strong 
connection between the motivations for the newly invigorated scientific pursuit of such a 
theory and similar pursuits among philosophers and theologians in the past. He identifies 
the question, “How, when, and why did the Universe come into being?” as an 
explanatory pursuit in which all disciplines have shared at various times.4 Of course, the 
disanalogies between a scientific theory of everything and the narrative interpretation of 
the meaning of life that I propose and defend are real. Such scientific theories are not 
meant to directly encompass elements of reality with strong links, for example, to 
rationality and intentionality.5 That is to say, there tends to be a reduction to 
mathematical explanation in such theories, whereas on the narrative proposal for life’s 
meaning, no such reduction occurs, at least not in this precise sense. And yet, the pursuit 
of such theories illustrates the inherent human propensity to seek deep, perhaps ultimate 
explanation of the world we inhabit. This human inclination is worth highlighting. In the 
following passage, Barrow notes the relationship between modern theories of everything 
and their mythical ancestors: 
                                                 
3 John D. Barrow, New Theories of Everything: The Quest for Ultimate Explanation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 1-2. 
 
4 Ibid., p. 1. 
 




 This modern urge for completeness had developed hand-in-hand with the desire 
 for a unified picture of the world. Where the ancients were content to create many 
 minor deities, each of whom had a hand in explaining the origins of particular 
 things, but might often be in conflict with one another, the legacy of the great 
 monotheistic religions is the expectation of a single over-arching explanation for 
 the Universe. The unity of the Universe is a deep-rooted expectation. A 
 description of the Universe that was not unified in its mode of description, but 
 fragmented into pieces, would invite our minds to look for a further principle 
 which related them to a single source. Again, we notice that this motivation is 
 essentially religious. There is no logical reason why the Universe should not 
 contain surds or arbitrary elements that do not relate to the rest.6 
  
 In addition, yet surely related to our inherent desire to seek explanation of the 
world is a desire to fit localized facts and phenomena into wider explanatory contexts. 
Such contexts serve a hermeneutical function as something through which we interpret 
and appraise something else.7 In a sense, contexts function as more robust, deeper, or 
wider frameworks that aid us in explaining individual features or localized clusters of 
features we find in the world. For example, scientific theories can plausibly be viewed as 
larger contexts through which to interpret empirical data. And although they are, in 
principle, revisable and falsifiable by that same empirical data, they serve as a framework 
through which to understand empirical phenomena encountered in the natural world. 
Empirical data alone, considered singularly without any explanatory link to other 
information, tell us far less about the world than is generally thought to be satisfactory.8  
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 8. 
 
7 The relationship of the context to its parts is a deep and complex hermeneutical question, the full 
elucidation of which falls outside the scope of this dissertation. Weighing in on this debate is not necessary 
for my more general appropriation of the idea of context as an interpretive construct through which to fit 
existentially relevant parts of life. 
 
8 In making these comments, I intend to remain neutral on the various views of the relationship between 
scientific theories and the actual space-time universe. I neither presuppose realism nor instrumentalism 
among others. Even an instrumentalist view of scientific theories continues to function as a way of 
“understanding the world” and, as such, a wider explanatory context, even though the instrumentalist does 





 Most of us desire, in addition to contextualizing the multifaceted facts we 
encounter, to situate our very lives within a wider context. This occurs on a number of 
levels. Scientifically, we desire to know how we are related biologically to other forms of 
life on this planet. Genealogically, we want to know who our great-grandparents were. 
Ethically, we seek a context to account for what we ought to do and refrain from doing. 
And, religiously, we pursue a context to explain our feelings of absolute dependence, awe 
at the brute fact that anything exists at all, why there is such a thing as pain and suffering, 
and other core existential longings that appear largely unaddressed through these other 
wider contexts.9 On this characterization of religion, a full-blown naturalistic narrative 
probably functions quasi-religiously. We are each part of the totality of what Is, and we 
want to know how and where we and those aspects of our lives of greatest existential 
import “fit” into the larger picture. Here, religion, philosophy, and science might, in fact, 
all submit part of the very deepest or widest context we seek in order to assess and live 
life. Asking, “What is the meaning of life?” then, is additionally strongly connected to 
requesting an explanatory context. Indeed, commensurate with the global intuitions 
driving the question,10 it is probably akin to asking for the widest or deepest possible 
context from which to view and live our lives. 
 This uniquely human desire for global explanation and contextualization is likely 
connected to our deep propensity for the employment of narrative as a primary strategy 
                                                 
9 Of course, there is a sense in which this begs the question given that many naturalists think that a 
scientific worldview does sufficiently account for the reality of pain and suffering. On naturalistic 
premises, pain and suffering are simply unfortunate (as deemed so by creatures that have developed the 
necessary level of consciousness to view states of affairs as unfortunate) byproducts of a physical world 
like ours. Historically, however, providing a framework through which to interpret “evil” in existentially 
satisfying ways has been the province of religion. 
 




for making sense of the world. The use of narrative to describe, interpret, and enjoy 
reality is a unique mark of the human mind, as narrative is a product of our rational, self-
reflective, and creative capacities.11 We should expect, then, that our often narratively-
infused way of participating in the world connects with our deep desire to know what it 
all means. H. Porter Abbott notes the pervasiveness of narrative to the human mind: 
 We make narratives many times a day, every day of our lives. And we start doing 
 so almost from the moment we begin putting words together. As soon as we 
 follow a subject with a verb, there is a good chance we are engaged in narrative 
 discourse. . . . Given the presence of narrative in almost all human  discourse, 
 there is little wonder that there are theorists who place it next to language itself as 
 the distinctive human trait. . . . The gift of narrative is so pervasive and universal 
 that there are those who strongly suggest that narrative is a “deep structure,” a 
 human capacity genetically hard-wired into  our minds in the same way as our 
 capacity for grammar (according to some linguists) is something we are born 
 with.12 
  
Peter Brooks agrees, remarking that “. . . narrative is one of the principal ways we 
organize our experience of the world – a part of our cognitive tool kit that was long 
neglected by psychologists and philosophers.”13 There can be little doubt that we invoke 
narrative in order to make sense of the world in which we inhabit, and, in some sense, 
this is an “essential” mark of what it means to be human.14  
 This claim is compatible with the two dominant metaphysical accounts of reality 
in the West that I consider in Part II of this dissertation, naturalism and theism, largely in 
                                                 
11 For example, see H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge 




13 Quoted in Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward a definition of narrative,” p. 22. 
 
14 Note that at this point I am using “narrative” very generally to make the following points: (i) as a unique 
mark of human beings, and (ii) that humans inhabit the world narratively in that we make sense of events in 
our lives, our lives themselves, as well as the world as a whole narratively. I have not yet nuanced how I 
am using the term “narrative” in regard to the meaning of life. My present goal is simply to highlight that, 
at a deep level, we are narrative creatures, and that this fact lends plausibility to the further claim that we 
should understand the meaning of life in narrative terms. 
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its Christian instantiation. On naturalism, the human capacity for narrative might be said 
to be genetically hardwired into our brains much like language seems to be.15 On the 
other hand, Christian theism might also maintain that narrative propensities are hardwired 
into us, as this is not logically inconsistent with the work of deity. Theists, though, will 
posit a personal God as ultimately responsible for our narrative capacities and 
propensities. A case can even be made on Christian theistic premises that our narrative 
capacities are part of the imago dei, whereby we dimly yet truly reflect aspects of our 
divine maker.16 The important claim in this section is that the search for explanation or 
context and the category of narrative are probably broadly interrelated. While not all 
explanations and theoretical contexts qualify as narrative in a robust sense, the kind of 
deep, comprehensive, and sweeping explanation or context that, I will argue, we seek in 
asking, “What is the meaning of life?” has a distinctly narrative quality, and, on certain 
worldviews, may itself be a narrative in the paradigmatic sense.17 
 My thesis may be consistent with a paradigmatic use of narrative, but it is not 
critical that I establish this. A non-paradigmatic use where narrative tracks explanation is 
likely sufficient, but with the caveat that certain issues germane to discussions of 
paradigmatic instances of narrative end up being quite relevant in the meaning of life 
                                                 
15 For example, see Kay Young and Jeffrey Shaver, “The Neurology of Narrative,” Substance 94/95 (March 
2001): pp. 72-84. 
 
16 The Christian theistic premises from which this claim can be argued are noteworthy. Foremost, God 
himself is said to have produced a narrative of His redemptive history as narrated in the Old and New 
Testaments. It has generally been the task of biblical theology to trace the unfolding of this unified yet 
diverse redemptive story. For a substantive discussions of biblical theology in general and the historical-
redemptive narrative of Scripture specifically, see Geerhardus Vos, Biblical Theology (Edinburgh, UK: The 
Banner of Truth Trust, 1975). 
 
17 Among others, Jean-Paul Sartre and Alan M. Dershowitz dispute claims like this. See Sartre’s Nausea 
(New York: New Directions, 2007), and Dershowitz’s “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative,” in Law’s 
Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 99-105. I will 
interact with their arguments in §5.4 – 5.6 of Chapter Five. 
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context, and especially for my narrative interpretation. My main motivation for importing 
the concept of narrative into discussions of the meaning of life is largely twofold: (i) it is 
both natural and plausible, a la Abbot, Brooks, and others, given that our project of 
making sense of the world (in various spheres) is often carried out narratively, and (ii) 
that at least one aspect of narrative theory is explicitly and deeply apropos to discussions 
of the meaning of life—the evaluative significance of narrative ending for broadly 
normative appraisals of narratives as a whole. 
 Though I will not in this chapter develop in any detail this intriguing idea that 
narrative ending links closely with the meaning of life, it is worth making some brief 
comments here.18 It is widely thought that the ending of a narrative, or the presence of 
closure, is especially important to broadly normative appraisals of the narrative as a 
whole.19 A narrative’s ending frequently possesses a proleptic power over the entire 
narrative. Indeed, it is thought that the way a narrative ends is often the most salient 
motivator in eliciting a wide range of broadly normative human responses on, possibly, 
emotional, aesthetic, and moral levels towards the narrative as a whole. For, as J. David 
Velleman notes: 
. . . the conclusory emotion in a narrative cadence embodies not just how the 
audience feels about the ending; it embodies how the audience feels, at the 
ending, about the whole story. Having passed through emotional ups and downs 
of the story, as one event succeeded another, the audience comes to rest in a stable 
attitude about the series of events in its entirety [emphasis added].20 
 
                                                 
18 See Chapter Seven for a fuller discussion of this issue. 
 
19 Ending and closure of course are conceptually distinct ideas. A narrative can end without closure. 
Perhaps it ends in a way that is unsatisfying, and thus the sense of closure we seek fails to obtain. 
 
20 J. David Velleman, “Narrative Explanation,” Philosophical Review 112 (January 2003): p. 19. 
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This is no small point, and it seems largely correct. The ending marks the “last word,” 
after which nothing else can be said, either by way of remedying problems or destroying 
felicities that have come about within the narrative. If the last word is that hope is finally 
and irreversibly dashed, then grief will probably be salient at the end; if the last word is 
that ambitions have been realized, then triumph will probably be salient at the end. 
Perhaps more importantly, one cannot backtrack into a narrative, for example, where the 
grief felt at a tragic ending is the final word, and expect that one’s emotional stance 
toward any specific event within the narrative will not now be affected, in some sense, by 
the ending of the narrative. The ending relevantly frames the entire story. 
Interestingly, this point, if plausible, provides a powerful account for why 
discussions of ending, death, and futility nearly always accompany considerations of the 
meaning of life. If the meaning of life is a narrative, a central thesis of this dissertation, 
then it is clear why we consider how life ends, both our own and the universe’s (speaking 
metaphorically of course), to be so important to whether life is meaningful or 
meaningless. Notice that I am not engaging the question of whether or not conclusions of 
futility derived from a putative “bad” ending to life’s narrative are themselves rational 
and warranted, but am only providing a rationale or framework for why it is that such 
conclusions are often thought to follow from the nature of life’s ending as it is construed 
on naturalism. 
3.3 The Narrative Interpretation: Hints in the Literature 
 There are only hints of a proposal akin to the narrative interpretation of the 
meaning of life question in the current philosophical literature. This is telling, as it 
indicates that some philosophers working on the topic are minimally aware that the desire 
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for global or all-inclusive explanation or narrative through which to view and live life 
partly motivates the question. However, such proposals have been given little to no 
sustained attention in the contemporary discussion. While most philosophers discussing 
the issue situate their arguments within the dialectical parameters I noted in Chapter One, 
there is some precedent for my proposal in the meaning of life literature as seen in the 
following suggestions.  
 For example, Garrett Thomson thinks that one might interpret the question, “What 
is the meaning of life?” as follows, “The idea to be examined now is that to know the 
meaning of life is to know a true metaphysical narrative about the human life in general 
that somehow makes sense of our lives. . . . In this sense, the meaning of life is a 
worldview or metaphysical view that shows the significance of our lives” [emphasis 
added].21 Thomson’s interpretive suggestion shares strong affinities to the narrative 
interpretation I propose in this dissertation. However, his narrative-like proposal receives 
only a seven page chapter in his book, On the Meaning of Life, and this discussion centers 
exclusively on the thought of Heidegger. Furthermore, he does not narrow the scope of 
this “true metaphysical narrative” as I will in this chapter. I will argue that such 
narrowing is crucial in order for the resulting narrative to be about the meaning of life as 
opposed to about some other topic. 
 In addition to Thomson, John Cottingham, most well-known for his work in early 
modern philosophy and especially Descartes, hints at the narrative approach in the 
opening of his book, On the Meaning of Life. “What are we really asking when we ask 
about the meaning of life? Partly, it seems, we are asking about our relationship with the 
                                                 




rest of the universe – who we are and how we came to be here. . . . The religious answer 
– one of several responses to the problem of life’s meaning to be examined in the pages 
that follow – aims to locate our lives in a context that will provide them with significance 
and value” [emphasis added].22 Like Thomson’s, Cottingham’s proposal shares close 
affinities with my own, as he connects the human desire for significance and value to a 
larger narrative or context that will ground these desiderata. Whereas the current popular 
interpretations of the question focus exclusively on such human desires, Cottingham 
introduces the construct of a deeper context through which to secure them, and associates 
this larger context with the meaning of life. While similar to my proposal, Cottingham 
does not draw from narrative theory in order to explain what such an interpretation 
involves. Additionally, much of his discussion appears to fall under the question, “What 
makes a life meaningful?” and not “What is the meaning of life?”23 
 Third, in a short piece titled, “The Meanings of the Questions of Life,” John 
Wisdom notes: 
. . . when we ask, “What is the meaning of all things?” we are not asking a 
senseless question. In this case, of course, we have not witnessed the whole play, 
we have only an idea in outline of what went before and what will come after that 
small part of history which we witness. . . . with the words, “What is the meaning 
of it all?” we are trying to find the order in the drama of Time.24  
 
Noteworthy, is Wisdom’s use of literary concepts in order to frame questions 
about life’s meaning. In this short, four page excerpt originally found in his Paradox and 
Discovery, Wisdom does not, however, explicate precisely what it means for the meaning 
                                                 
22 John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 2, 9. 
 
23 See Chapter Two, §2.3. 
 
24 John Wisdom, “The Meanings of the Questions of Life,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. Klemke (New 




of life to be about finding the order in the drama of Time. Again, there are some salient 
similarities between my proposal and Wisdom’s, but my interpretation moves beyond his 
in terms of specificity. I agree that finding the meaning of life may be partly connected 
with discovering the “order in the drama of Time,” but one will have to be clearer about 
precisely what this means. 
 Finally, Julian Young in his recent book, The Death of God and the Meaning of 
Life, offers the closest account to the narrative interpretation that I have uncovered in the 
meaning of life literature. In the introduction to his book, Young notes that talk of “the 
meaning of life” is noticeably absent from most of Western history primarily because 
people believed they were already in possession of something that made asking the 
question existentially superfluous. This something Young calls the “true world,” which is 
another aspect of reality over and above the temporality and physicality of the material 
world, and often identified with God, the transcendent, or the spiritual.25 Of this true 
world, he notes: 
 Since journeys have a beginning, a middle and an end, a true-world account of the 
 proper course of our lives is a kind of story, a narrative. And since true-world 
 narratives (that, for example, of Christianity) are global rather than individual, 
 since they narrate not just your life or mine, but rather all lives at all times and 
 places, they are, as I shall call them, ‘grand’ narratives.26 
 
In the remainder of the book, Young examines various true-world narratives followed by 
a consideration of responses to the threat of nihilism that ensued once such narratives lost 
some or even much of their traction in the modern world. Whereas Young makes notions 
                                                 
25 Julian Young, The Death of God and the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 1. I think 
Young’s sharp distinction between matter and physical existence on the one hand, and the transcendent, 
spiritual realm on the other fails to understand Christian doctrines like creation, anthropology, and 






like transcendence a requirement on a true world narrative, I do not. My interpretation 
merely requires a narrative that narrates across some existentially relevant threshold of 
life phenomena, events, and accompanying questions to which I will focus more detailed 
attention in the rest of this chapter. But Young is certainly correct in his implied claim 
that many people will be existentially and even rationally satisfied only with a certain 
kind of narrative, one that has “religious” elements at its core. I will consider this and 
related issues in Chapter Five.27 What Young does not offer, though, is a detailed account 
of the properties of true-world narratives that make them narratives so closely linked with 
the meaning of life. In other words, he does not discuss in detail the more general 
question of why any narrative might be a narrative about the meaning of life as opposed 
to something else.  
 From the preceding examples, it is clear that narrative-like proposals are present 
in the meaning of life literature. I have offered four such instances. What is lacking, 
though, is a sustained interpretive account that answers the following questions: (i) What 
does it mean for the meaning of life to be a narrative? (ii) Related, what does a meaning 
of life narrative need to narrate? (iii) Related, what conditions need to be met in order for 
some narrative x to be the meaning of life narrative? (iv) How and why does the narrative 
interpretation most plausibly account for the original linguistic formulation of the 
question? (v) How and why does the narrative interpretation best account for the cluster 
of intuitions and sub-questions from which the original formulation arises? and (vi) How 
might we assess the situation of there being multiple competing meaning of life 
                                                 
27 I will also discuss the issue of whether viewing the meaning of life narrative as paradigmatically 
narrative or non-paradigmatically narrative is worldview specific. For example, a naturalist who seeks to 
posit a meaning of life narrative which is a paradigmatic instance of a narrative (and not simply an 
employment of the concept that means little more than explanation) will have to address the challenges of 
Sartre and Derschowitz. 
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narratives? No discussion that I have found provides a sustained and substantive 
discussion of these questions, organized around a single interpretive paradigm. 
3.4 The Narrative Interpretation: An Analogy  
 Having argued in Chapter One that the locution, “What is the meaning of x?” can 
be applied naturally to non-linguistic phenomena, I will now offer an example that is 
particularly relevant to the narrative interpretation. Asking, “What is the meaning of 
life?” should be understood, at its core, as the request for a narrative that narrates across 
those elements and accompanying questions of life of greatest existential import to 
human beings. On this interpretation, this request is both more basic and more general 
than our desire to discover what makes life valuable, what makes life worthwhile, or 
whether our lives have a purpose. These, no doubt, are motivating desires in asking the 
question, but I think they should be viewed as subsequent layers added to a more 
foundational motivation for asking, “What is the meaning of life?” 
 The question, “What is the meaning of life?” is analogous to the question asked in 
the following scenario. Consider the case of a father who has left his two young children 
to play while he finishes some chores around the house. After a few minutes he hears 
screaming and yelling: a scuffle has broken out. He heads to the playroom and finds his 
children kicking and scratching each other. He raises his voice and demands, “What is the 
meaning of this?” What does the father request in asking this question? The short answer 
is that he desires an explanation as an interpretive framework through which to view the 
event he is observing—his children scuffling. This explanation will likely include, among 
other components, information about how the scuffle started. He will need access to such 
information if he is to make fuller sense out of the facts before him. From these 
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additional details, a narrative can be constructed, helping him to understand the scuffle 
he has witnessed.28 So, in asking for the meaning of the situation, he is in search of the 
narrative of his children’s scuffle, indeed an accurate narrative more robust than a mere 
description of kicking and scratching. Importantly, the accurate narrative is the meaning 
the father seeks. While it is natural to ask for the meaning of narratives in other contexts, 
in this case the meaning the father seeks is just the narrative itself.  
 Asking, “What is the meaning of life?” is analogous to the father asking, “What is 
the meaning of this [scuffle]?” Over the course of our existence, we encounter 
phenomena that give rise to questions for which we seek an explanation or larger context 
or narrative. In this sense, the existentially relevant constituents of the universe with 
which we are readily familiar and toward which we direct our existentially focused gaze 
are akin to the scuffle the father witnessed. And like the father’s desire to make sense of 
what he observes, we too seek to make sense of what we encounter in the world and those 
accompanying questions motivated by deep human longings for, among others, value, 
purpose, and significance. We need a framework through which to interpret the 
existentially weighty aspects of existence. Like the father, we lack important parts of the 
story, at least for a season, and we desire to fill the existentially relevant informational 
gaps in our understanding of the universe we inhabit. 
3.5 Nuancing the Narrative Interpretation  
 If the meaning of life just is a narrative, analogously to the meaning the father 
sought in the above example just being a narrative, then what kind of narrative is it? In 
                                                 
28 This narrative may be a narrative in a paradigmatic or non-paradigmatic sense. The father, at minimum, 





other words, what is it that stands in need of narration when it comes to the meaning of 
life? A “meaning of life” narrative will be unique given what it narrates. It will be a 
different kind of narrative than, say, a narrative about the migratory patterns of birds or 
one about the celestial history of the Milky Way galaxy. The latter narratives narrate 
features and accompanying questions of reality that are not directly relevant to the 
meaning of life question. Conversely, for any narrative to count as a meaning of life 
narrative, it must cross some relevant explanatory threshold consisting of those areas of 
greatest existential import to humans, the ones who ask the question of life’s meaning in 
the first place. 
So what are these existentially salient elements and accompanying questions of 
life that stand in need of narration, and which distinguish a meaning of life narrative from 
other kinds of narrative? I will call the elements and accompanying questions that give a 
meaning of life narrative its unique shape, ERQ (shorthand for existentially relevant life 
elements and accompanying questions). Furthermore, I will call a narrative that is sought 
through which to contextualize ERQ, an ERN (shorthand for existentially relevant 
narrative). An ERN constitutes a deep, ultimate narrative context from which to view the 
other existentially relevant elements and accompanying questions of life, ERQ. We need 
ERN in order to make sense of the cluster of concerns embedded within ERQ. 
 The narrative identified with the meaning of life, then, will track ERN. This 
narrative will contain narrative elements that directly address the cluster of existentially 
relevant facts and accompanying questions that most often surface in the context of 
discussions over the meaning of life. What might some of these be? In other words, how 
much does the meaning of life narrative need to narrate in order to be the meaning of life 
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narrative and not some other narrative? To answer this question, we must first populate 
the category of ERQ. Once this is done, we will ipso facto know what stands in need of 
narration and thus have in hand the formal properties of the meaning of life narrative (i.e., 
“That narrative which narrates across x, y, and z elements composing ERQ.”), ERN, even 
if not the narrative’s material content. 
3.5.1 Finding the Meaning of Life Narrative: The Formal Condition 
 So, the first condition to be met in order for a narrative to be a meaning of life 
narrative is merely formal. It has to narrate across the right stuff, and that stuff consists of 
the existentially weighty phenomena, events, and accompanying questions that populate 
human existence. Such features of human existence were aptly highlighted by Vatican II 
as part of the common human condition: 
 What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of human life? What is upright 
 behavior, and what is sinful? Where does suffering originate, and what end does it 
 serve? How can genuine happiness be found? What happens at death? What is 
 judgment? What reward follows death? And finally, what is the ultimate mystery, 
 beyond human explanation, which embraces our entire existence, from which we 
 take our origin and towards which we tend?  [emphasis added].29 
 
Vatican II here roughly captures what I mean by ERQ. Such elements compose the 
existentially salient and undeniable aspects of existence as recognized by the kinds of 
creatures that inquire into life’s meaning—humans. They are the cluster of phenomena 
that prompt in us probing questions, the answers to which we take to be especially 
relevant for leading life in a rationally and existentially satisfying way. When inquiring 
                                                 
29 Austin Flannery, ed. Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Dublin: 
Dominican Publications, 1975), p. 738. Notice that Vatican II includes the question of life’s meaning and 
purpose as a member within a larger cluster of questions found to be common to the human condition. On 
the interpretation I am proposing, the question of life’s meaning is a question whose answer is somehow a 
function of answers to this cluster of questions that Vatican II notes. One way this is possible, the way I 
adopt, is to make life’s meaning a narrative. 
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into the meaning of life, I submit that we ought to view ourselves as seeking a narrative 
that narrates across this cluster of phenomena and accompanying questions.  
 With the statement from Vatican II as a backdrop, I propose the following as 
more or less composing ERQ: 
 [1] Fact—something exists, we [humans] exist, and I exist / Question—Why  
  does anything or we or I exist at all? 
 
 [2] Question—Does life have any purpose(s), and if so, what is its nature  
  and source? 
 
 [3] Fact—we are often passionately engaged in life pursuits and projects  
  that we deem valuable and worthwhile / Question—Does the worth  
  and value of these pursuits and projects need grounding in something  
  else, and if so, what? 
 
 [4] Fact—pain and suffering are part of the universe / Question—Why?30 
 [5] Question—How does it all end? Is death final? Is there an    
  eschatological remedy to the ills of this world? 
 
[1] – [5] constitute the cluster of considerations that track discussions of life’s meaning, 
even though reasonable debate will exist about the details. Admittedly, there is a sense in 
which, for example, considerations [2] and [3] perhaps link more directly to the topic, but 
surely the question of life’s meaning has not thereby been exhausted in discussions where 
only [2] and/or [3] are considered. [1], which is related especially to [2] but not 
conceptually identical, is also often connected to questions of life’s meaning.31 I am 
happy to concede that [1], [2], and [3] are more closely aligned with the meaning of life 
question than [4] or [5]. This may or may not be true. However, [4] and [5] loom large, 
                                                 
30 I have in mind here, roughly, the problem of evil, especially in its philosophical instantiation, but also to 
an extent its emotional and existential dimension. 
 
31 Some even consider [1], or something nearby, to constitute the essence of the question of life’s meaning, 
especially if the question is one about final causation and not simply efficient causation. For example, see 




especially when death is connected to futility and one considers the threat this may bring 
to securing a valuable and worthwhile existence. Also, given that a narrative’s ending has 
been thought to take evaluative priority in broadly normative appraisals of the narrative 
as a whole, it becomes especially clear why death and futility are never far removed from 
discussions of life’s meaning. Considerations of death and futility fit naturally, then, 
within the narrative interpretation. 
 So, considerations [1] – [5] constitute more or less ERQ. Their status is a function 
of their being the existentially salient parts of existence, as recognized by humans, with 
which we are in immediate and undeniable contact, the parts that motivate us to inquire 
into life’s meaning. They are that which stands in need of elucidation, of narration. 
Therefore, when we ask about life’s meaning, we should view ourselves as seeking the 
narrative elements that narrate across the concerns and questions embedded within ERQ. 
That which fulfills this function is ERN. ERN constitutes the meaning of life proper, as it 
provides the context or framework through which to makes sense of ERQ. ERN is the 
meaning of life precisely because it brings the contextualizing narrative framework 
through which to understand and answer the cluster of issues and questions arising within 
the contexts that initially motivate the question of life’s meaning. 
 Why should we think that the elements I have chosen to populate the category of 
ERQ are the right ones? There are at least three considerations that lend plausibility to this 
choice. First, it has significant intuitive and empirical appeal. Most would recognize this 
cluster of issues as relating to the question of life’s meaning. Moreover, we know that 
contexts manifesting one or more of these considerations are also generally contexts 
where questions of life’s meaning are prevalent. Even if [1] – [5] do not quite capture all 
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of the territory related to life’s meaning, they are surely in the neighborhood. Second, the 
choice harmonizes with the issues identified with the meaning of life in the current 
philosophical discussion of the topic. In the literature, one will find discussions at some 
point on each of these topics. 
 Finally, these considerations significantly overlap with the central web of 
“concerns” for which worldviews are constructed to address. This is relevant given my 
employment of the concept of worldview in Chapter Four. In Chapter Four, I argue that 
the concept of a worldview and the narrative interpretation of life’s meaning amount to 
much the same thing.32 Briefly, though, here it is important to introduce the cluster of 
concerns that constitute that with which a worldview is enlisted to address. The Anglican 
Bishop of Durham and New Testament scholar, N. T. Wright, notes four distinct 
functions of a worldview that are relevant to my discussion: 
 First, . . . worldviews provide the stories through which human beings view 
 reality. Narrative is the most characteristic expression of worldview, going 
 deeper than the isolated observation or fragmented remark. . . . Second, from 
 these stories one can in principle discover how to answer the basic questions 
 that determine human existence: who are we, where are we, what is wrong, 
 and what is the solution? . . . Third, the stories that express the worldview, and 
 the answers which it provides to the questions of identity, environment, evil 
 and eschatology, are expressed . . . in cultural symbols. . . . Fourth, worldviews 
 include a praxis, a way-of-being-in-the-world.33 
 
Wright’s analysis of worldview is pertinent in more ways than one. His connection of 
narrative to worldview is interesting in itself. Indeed, he refers to worldviews as stories 
                                                 
32 Despite this near identity, however, I opt for the category of narrative primarily for reasons of 
expediency. Two important reasons are (i) the category of narrative more intuitively tracks the phenomena 
of life because life has a dynamic element that worldview does not seem to capture as nicely as does 
narrative, and (ii) an issue that relates to life’s meaning is how it all will end, and the notion of ending 
resides more naturally within narrative contexts. There is no reason, in principle, though, that a worldview 
cannot capture these elements. It just does not seem to do so as naturally or intuitively as narrative does. 
 
33 N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, Vol. 1, Christian Origins and the Question of 




that narrate answers to the basic existential questions of human existence. I take this to be 
nearly identical to my interpretive proposal in this dissertation, although Wright never 
links these worldview stories explicitly to the meaning of life as I am proposing.  
 Second, and related, Wright’s analysis of the function of worldviews largely 
tracks what I take to be the function of the meaning of life narrative. Such worldviews or 
narratives provide answers to important existentially motivated questions, and these 
narratives additionally motivate behavior and action. With respect to ERN, it is important 
to note that ERN possesses both an epistemic function as well as a function relating to 
praxis. This is not unlike a worldview. That is to say, the meaning of life is not merely 
about answers to questions on an intellectual level. We take these answers provided by 
the meaning of life narrative to have implications for how we lead our lives, or at least 
ought to lead them. For example, the putative facts of a candidate meaning of life 
narrative that provide the context and answers to questions about value and purpose will 
likely motivate us to courses of behavior and action commensurate with this portion of 
the narrative.34 
 While there may be a few additional elements constituting the category of ERQ 
that stand in need of narration via the meaning of life narrative, I take it that those I have 
provided will be generally recognized as landing on or near the mark. Perhaps it is not as 
important that we get near the mark as it is that we recognize that there is an existentially 
relevant mark of which the meaning of life narrative needs to narrate across. That mark is 
the threshold of phenomenon and accompanying questions out of which the question of 
life’s meaning is birthed. That the narrative needs to cross this threshold and precisely 
                                                 




where it lies are two different matters. Having said this, I think we can be reasonably 
confident that we know roughly where that threshold is. Considerations [1] – [5] above 
provide a good start. 
 The preceding discussion needs to be further nuanced in at least one way. Given 
the boundaries of the category of ERQ, one might think that the meaning of life narrative 
is minimal in terms of its content, perhaps too minimal to sufficiently ground praxis. This 
is the wrong conclusion to draw. To be sure, the narrative will be limited in scope (to 
those five issues plus possibly a few others), but limitation of scope does not indicate a 
lack of complexity or depth. One reason for this is that the meaning of life narrative, in 
order to sufficiently narrate across [1] – [5], will include numerous narrative elements 
that function in a larger framework, a framework where the individual elements are 
connected to each other in a coherent and intelligible way.35 That is to say, what it takes 
to sufficiently narrate across these elements might be quite extensive in terms of relevant 
narrative content. For example, Christian theism’s narration across ERQ [4] (Fact—pain 
and suffering are part of the universe / Question—Why?) will involve numerous narrative 
elements likely including, among others, something about pre-lapsarian divine 
knowledge and decrees, the fall, the tracing of redemptive history culminating in the 
incarnation, the suffering of God himself in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and the 
unfolding and eschatological culmination of God’s kingdom. Given this, it might even be 
plausible, on the Christian theistic narrative, to view the entirety of Scripture as the 
meaning of life, at least if one thinks it will take all of the content of Scripture to 
                                                 
35 The complexity of the narrative elements may be worldview specific. For example, the naturalistic 
narrative may have a simpler answer than Christian theism for one of the constituent elements. My use of 




adequately narrate across the category of ERQ. While certainly interesting, that need not 
be defended here. What is important for my purposes is that the meaning of life narrative 
needs to narrate across these elements, and that this process may involve considerable 
narrative complexity and depth. 
 And so a narrative that narrates across ERQ satisfies the first condition to be met 
by the meaning of life narrative. In narrating across these elements consisting both of 
existentially salient phenomena and accompanying questions, it becomes a candidate 
meaning of life narrative in virtue of its formal properties. It is a narrative composing the 
meaning of life as opposed to some other kind of narrative. With this in mind, a candidate 
meaning of life narrative can be defined as follows (CdMLN): 
(CdMLN) = A candidate meaning of life narrative is one that narrates across some 
existentially relevant threshold of life phenomena, events, and accompanying 
questions largely captured by the category of ERQ by adding ERN, the contextual 
narrative framework through which ERQ is understood and appraised. 
 
There will, of course, be multiple narratives that meet the conditions of this definition, 
certainly more than the two I consider in this dissertation. Additionally, there will be 
various degrees of overlap between elements in different ERN’s. For example, a narrative 
with a deistic deity will likely share certain elements with a narrative positing a theistic 
deity.36 Of importance for my discussion, though, is that both naturalism and Christian 
theism possess candidate meaning of life narratives. Admittedly, the category of narrative 
is a more natural fit for Christian theism than naturalism, but the latter, in principle, 
possesses the conceptual resources to offer a narrative that narrates across ERQ, and 
                                                 
36 Furthermore, there will even be multiple meaning of life narratives within, for example, Christian theism, 
although they will all share some important central elements. Perhaps it is better to say that the meaning of 
life narratives embedded within these instantiations of Christian theism are largely similar, whereas the 
larger theological narratives possess different elements. For example, compare Reformed theology to 




therefore offers a meaning of life narrative. Of any candidate meaning of life narrative, 
however, a second condition must be met, the truth condition. Only the candidate 
meaning of life narrative that is true can be the meaning of life. 
3.5.2 Finding the Meaning of Life Narrative: The Material Condition 
 My interpretation, tracking the original question’s employment of the definite 
article,37 presupposes that there can be only one narrative that is the meaning of life.38 
The meaning of life narrative will have the correct formal properties, as delineated above, 
and material content that corresponds with reality. This should not be too controversial if 
we remember the case of the father. In order for the narrative the father sought to 
appropriately link to his request, it had to be about his children’s scuffle (the right formal 
properties), and it had to be true (the right material content). If it fails to meet these 
conditions, it cannot be the meaning he sought. 
 Garrett Thomson remarks, with relatively little further consideration of the claim, 
that “. . . to know the meaning of life is to know a true metaphysical narrative about the 
human life in general that somehow makes sense of our lives . . .” [emphasis added].39 
Thomson’s proposal is more or less what I have advocated, although it lacks the nuance 
and specificity of my interpretation. I agree, though, with Thomson’s claim that the 
candidate narrative must be true to finally qualify as the meaning of life. A narrative that 
                                                 
37 Use of the definite article has prompted the off-repeated criticism that the question begs the question 
against there being multiple ways to secure a meaningful existence. One problem with this criticism though 
is that it reduces the question, “What is the meaning of life? to “What makes a life meaningful?” 
 
38 Note that I am not arguing that this prohibits a person from leading a meaningful life, in some sense, if 
she is not in contact with the meaning of life narrative. This is partly because I think one can and should 
distinguish between two conceptually distinct yet related questions: (i) “What is the meaning of life?” and 
(ii) “What makes a life meaningful?” Sorting through the connection between these is another 
philosophical project though, though I do address this issue briefly in Chapter Two (§2.3). 
 




narrates across the appropriate elements of life, while relevant and deserving of candidate 
meaning of life narrative status, will nonetheless fail to be the meaning of life if it is 
false.40 
 It is not uncommon in the philosophical literature to find criticisms of the 
formulation, “What is the meaning of life?” as begging the question because of its use of 
the definite article.41 It is argued that inclusion of the definite article presupposes that 
there is only a single meaning of life, and it is widely thought that this cannot be right. 
This criticism is perhaps accentuated when philosophers interpret the question in terms of 
value and purpose, as it then forces us to concede that there is only a single value or 
purpose in life, again, a conclusion that many find unnecessarily narrow and perhaps 
even an assault on human dignity. I submit, however, that this criticism reveals an 
equally questionable assumption on the part of those who advance it, namely, that to ask, 
“What is the meaning of life?” and “What makes a life meaningful?” involve identical 
requests. I argued in Chapter Two (§2.3) that, while sharing some conceptual territory, 
these questions should be viewed as largely making distinct requests. I do concede that 
the above criticism has force if it is employed within the context of the second question 
and not the first. Indeed, there certainly seems to be more than one way in which a life 
can be meaningful, as there are likely a rich variety of pursuits, activities, relationships, 
etc. that contribute to a meaningful life. But nothing for which I argue in this dissertation 
militates against this eminently plausible claim. 
                                                 
40 The rather basic way in which I employ the concept of narrative allows for truth conditions to be applied 
to it in the same way they are applied to individual propositions with truth values embedded within a larger 
set of propositions. In this context, I am not concerned with concepts like metaphorical truth, even though 
this, for example, would constitute part of the larger Christian theistic meta-narrative of reality. 
 
41 For example, see R. A. Sharpe, “In Praise of the Meaningless Life,” Philosophy Now 25 (Summer 1999): 
p. 15; and J. J. C. Smart, “Meaning and Purpose,” Philosophy Now 24 (Summer 1999): p. 16. 
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 In light of this distinction, the narrative interpretation is meant to be an 
interpretation of the first question. It relates directly to this request and only indirectly to 
the second. As such, it is both natural and plausible to see ERN as either being true or 
false. There is only one narrative that can be the meaning of life in this sense. False 
candidate narratives are simply not the meaning of life. The fact that the narrative 
interpretation proposes a concept that has a truth value fits nicely with the use of the 
definite article in the original and common formulation of the question. And I think we 
should work to understand the question on its own linguistic terms, exhausting our 
interpretive options before reformulating the question. Part of this task is taking the use 
of the definite article, along with the use of “meaning,” seriously. On my interpretation, 
the use of the definite article functions quite naturally. We are searching for the true 
narrative that narrates across the cluster of issues related to our common human 
predicament as the above document from Vatican II notes. No doubt there likely exist 
multiple narratives that narrate across the issues associated with this predicament, but we 
are in search of the one that corresponds to the way the world really is. A narrative that 
does not meet this condition may be a candidate meaning of life narrative, it may even be 
compatible with leading a meaningful life at some level and with some success, but it 
cannot be the meaning of life on the narrative interpretation.  
 For a narrative, then, to finally qualify as the meaning of life requires that it meet 
both the formal and material conditions. By combining these two requirements, I now 
offer the following definition of the meaning of life (ThMLN): 
(ThMLN) = the meaning of life is the true narrative that narrates across some 
existentially relevant threshold of life phenomena, events, and accompanying 
questions largely captured by the category of ERQ by adding ERN, the contextual 




3.6 Metanarratives and the Narrative Interpretation 
My interpretation of what the question, “What is the meaning of life?” asks is 
especially close to the concept of a metanarrative, perhaps even identical. Indeed, a 
metanarrative, or something very similar, is what we should view ourselves as seeking 
when asking the question.42 Importantly, my interpretation provides the resources for 
explaining precisely how metanarratives relate to the meaning of life. There is little doubt 
that, somehow, metanarratives are relevant to the meaning of life (because, for example, 
these sorts of narrative often narrate what the purpose(s) of life is and what makes life 
valuable, if anything does), but my interpretation of the question makes the connection 
more explicit. It is not simply that metanarratives contain an answer to a question that, in 
some way, relates to the question of life’s meaning; on my interpretation, a metanarrative 
just is a candidate meaning of life narrative, with one metanarrative actually being the 
meaning of life. A brief word about the nature of metanarratives will be helpful. 
Metanarratives or grand narratives are “. . . second-order narratives which seek to 
narratively articulate and legitimate some concrete first-order practices or narratives.”43 
They narrate how we are to understand the world and how we ought to live in the world 
of which we are a part. They are comprehensive in scope, and are, in the words of N. T. 
Wright, “. . . normative: that is, they claim to make sense of the whole of reality.”44 Such 
grand stories provide the narrative lens through which we view everything else. And 
                                                 
42 Indeed, in the remainder of the dissertation I will use the terms “meaning of life narrative” and 
“metanarrative” interchangeably. 
 
43 J. M. Bernstein, “Grand Narratives,” in On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, ed. David Wood 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 102. 
 




these metanarratives are primarily concerned with the cluster of issues I linked to the 
meaning of life earlier in this chapter—origins, purpose, value, evil, pain, and suffering, 
and ending. The narratives constructed to address this cluster of existentially relevant 
issues will provide the overarching framework through which we seek to orient our lives. 
There are multiple metanarratives, just as there are multiple candidate meaning of life 
narratives.45 
Few will doubt that metanarratives are closely tied in some way to the meaning of 
life. From that perspective, then, a mere connection between the two adds nothing new to 
the meaning of life discussion. My thesis does, however, break new philosophical ground 
given the way in which I delineate the connection between the meaning of life and a 
metanarrative. The connection between the two is not merely that a metanarrative 
contains somewhere within its narrative elements an element(s) that addresses a question 
or issue that, in some way, links to the meaning of life. Rather, I am arguing that 
metanarratives just are candidate meaning of life narratives, and that each should be seen 
                                                 
45 I do not share postmodernity’s (one must be careful about making postmodernity monolithic for it 
certainly is not, and its proponents will strongly resist this assertion) suspicion of metanarratives. Two 
related theses of many (but perhaps not all, although it may be all) postmodernists are those of relativism 
and anti-realism. Everyone has a take on ultimate reality, and each take is equally valid, according to 
postmodernity, largely because truth is constructed. But metanarratives are generally construed as making 
truth claims about what is ultimately real. Furthermore, metanarratives are generally construed as public 
truth. They are stories of the whole world and claim to be stories about the way things actually are. And, 
these grand stories contain many mutually exclusive narrative elements. Postmodernity, in general, is 
suspicious of these stories for this reason, along with the claim that such grand stories lead to pretensions of 
superiority giving rise to oppression and violence. As for the latter claim, I think certain metanarratives 
have built in narrative elements which are fundamentally at odds with a “use” of the narrative that 
terminates in oppression and violence. But I am not so much concerned with this issue here. I am more 
concerned with the metaphysical issues. The primary problem with postmodernity’s metaphysical 
suspicions of metanarratives (not their ethical suspicions) is that everyone, at least with some claims, is 
probably a realist at some point, even the postmodernist. The postmodernist says that everyone’s take on 
ultimate reality is relative, but it seems as though that claim (that everyone’s take on reality is relative) is 
itself relative, given the relativist thesis. But the assumption is that the relativist thesis itself is an accurate 
description of the way the world is. Even the postmodernist has a metanarrative with at least some elements 
claiming to describe the way things actually are. 
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as a putative instance of the meaning of life, even if, in the end, only one candidate 
metanarrative is, in fact, the meaning of life. 
3.7 Summary 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the question, “What is the meaning of life?” 
should be interpreted as the request for a narrative that narrates across those features of 
life of greatest existential import to human beings. I began by motivating my 
interpretation through a look at the human propensities that correlate with and lend 
plausibility to the narrative interpretation. Next, I presented hints of my proposal in the 
philosophical literature on the meaning of life, demonstrating precedent for the narrative 
interpretation, but also noting relevant ways in which my interpretation extends well 
beyond existing proposals. I then borrowed from narrative theory in order to frame my 
narrative interpretation. In the balance of the chapter, I explained in detail the narrative 
interpretation of the question as well as the connection between my interpretation and the 
concept of a metanarrative. In Chapter Four, I introduce ideas that lend further 
philosophical plausibility to my interpretation, and offer reasons for favoring the 













 In Chapters Two and Three I introduced and developed the narrative 
interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” After discussing important 
prolegomena in Chapter Two, I offered a detailed account of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the narrative interpretation. In this chapter, I have two primary aims: (i) to 
further motivate the narrative interpretation and argue for its general philosophical 
plausibility, and (ii) to demonstrate its superiority over the amalgam thesis. First, I will 
consider the global nature of the meaning of life question, arguing that the narrative 
interpretation nicely captures this global, all-inclusive property. Second, I will employ the 
concept of worldview to bring additional depth to my narrative approach. There are 
striking similarities between the concept of worldview and the narrative interpretation of 
life’s meaning. Indeed, I think the two concepts are nearly identical, but I choose the 
category of narrative for reasons of expediency that I will explain. Third, I will note 
several contexts out of which the question of life’s meaning is often asked. The fact that 
it is asked within a multiplicity of life-contexts is hermeneutically relevant in assessing 
the request being made, and lends further philosophical credibility to my interpretation of 
the question. Finally, I will bring my interpretation into dialogue with the amalgam 
thesis, arguing for the superiority of my own interpretation on several counts. 
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4.2 The Question’s Global Nature 
 Interpretations that consider the question, “What is the meaning of life?” to be 
making a request about purpose or value or significance are not entirely inaccurate, they 
are just truncated. To be sure, wondering what gives life purpose, what makes life 
valuable, or what makes life and the projects of life significant is often part of the 
motivational history for asking the grand question, “What is the meaning of life?” 
However, none of these reformulated questions, individually, captures a distinguishing 
property of the original question, its global or all-inclusive nature. I use “global” and “all-
inclusive” here to mean something like an existentially-infused perspective on the totality 
of human existence.1 These reformulations of the original center on more localized 
intuitions and sub-questions from which, I argue, the original is generated. None of them, 
considered singularly, captures the all-inclusive nature of their vague precursor where 
more (but not less) than merely the search for purpose, value, or significance likely 
motivates the question.2  
 In his book, Does Life Have a Meaning?, Milton Munitz notes that the question of 
life’s meaning is motivated by intuitions of “. . . relative depth or total scope.”3 This 
observation is perceptive. It seems to me that in asking the question of life’s meaning 
there is a motive often more basic, comprehensive, and all-inclusive than our desire to 
                                                 
1 This definition is meant to track my discussion of ERQ and ERN in Chapter Three (§3.5). “Existentially 
relevant” signals that the perspective is not so much concerned with, for example, how many blades of 
grass have ever existed or how many objects have been red. 
 
2 It is important to keep in mind that I am not disputing the descriptive claim that many do, in fact, interpret 
the question as “What is the purpose of life?” or “What makes life valuable?” I am arguing that there is 
actually a more appropriate way, philosophically, to view the question through a deeper analysis of its 
causal and motivational origins. Once one understands my analysis, I think it will become plausible not 
only why these common interpretations are used so readily, but additionally why my interpretation can still 
find a home for them while also doing a better job of accounting for intuitions and question-producing 
contexts unaddressed by the reformulated versions. 
 
3 Milton K. Munitz, Does Life Have A Meaning? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), p. 29. 
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discover whether our lives have a purpose(s) or what makes life valuable. The latter are 
surely deep and basic motivating desires which prompt the question, but they should be 
seen as layers of a more foundational motive, a motive encapsulated within the narrative 
interpretation—the desire for a narrative of the world that sufficiently addresses those 
areas of greatest existential import to rational, emotional, and self-reflective creatures 
such as us.4 This more basic desire, the desire for a particular kind of narrative that 
satisfies specific formal and material conditions, is evidenced by considering the 
multiplicity of contexts from which the question of life’s meaning emerges. We ask it 
because, at least for a season, we are in the dark on issues we consider to have immense 
existential import. And these issues are multi-faceted such that no one question (e.g., 
“What is the purpose(s) of life?”), except for the question, “What is the meaning of life?” 
captures all of them in a single pass. 
 We are frail. We are small compared to the vast cosmos we inhabit. Our lives are 
fleeting. We stand in awe at the beauty around us. We sometimes teeter on the brink of 
despair when faced with the suffering and evil around and within us. And we want to 
make sense of all this. This means, of course, that we want to know what makes life 
valuable, what makes life significant, what gives life purpose, and what makes life worth 
living if anything. But we also want to know why something exists at all rather than just 
nothing and how to make sense of pain and suffering. Surely, all of these questions come 
to bear on the meaning of life, not just one or a few. Therefore, a response to any one of 
these sub-questions without responses to the others is unsatisfactory, given that we will 
                                                 
4 By “rational, emotional, and self-reflective” creatures I simply mean human beings. Also, the way in 
which I have framed this does not militate against those who do not or perhaps even cannot ask the 
question from leading meaningful lives. Remember that I introduced an important distinction between the 
questions What is the meaning of life? and What makes a life meaningful? In Chapter Two (§2.3). 
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not have made sense of all that is deemed relevant to the meaning of life. Furthermore, 
one may not even be able to answer an individual, localized question associated with the 
meaning of life without the addition of numerous conceptual and explanatory layers 
provided by answers to other questions also associated with the meaning of life. For 
example, in attempting to elucidate the purpose(s) of life on the purpose-interpretation of 
life’s meaning, explanation will be sought as to where or from whom such purpose 
ultimately derives. The further one ventures into this project, the richer and more 
complex the explanatory framework will become, and consequently the more plausible 
the narrative-interpretation of life’s meaning becomes. The meaning of life narrative, on 
the narrative interpretation, is that which provides the deepest existentially relevant 
explanatory narrative framework through which to answer this existentially relevant 
cluster of questions. This narrative framework is what ultimately tracks what is being 
requested in asking, “What is the meaning of life?”5 
 This claim is further strengthened by considering the original question’s use of the 
term “life.” Unfortunately, this linguistic choice is an additional factor (in addition to the 
question’s use of the word “meaning”) contributing to the question’s vagueness. For 
example, does “life” in this context refer to an individual human life, to human life in 
general, or to all biological life? As a matter of fact, I think it is sometimes the case that 
“life” is being used in one of these ways. For example, someone might be asking the 
question of her own life, and what its meaning is. With others, one may wonder what the 
meaning is of human life in general. However, I think the term, often, is a marker for 
something much more general and basic than either a single human’s life, human life in 
                                                 
5 This deep explanatory narrative framework, however, must be understood in light of the distinctions 
introduced in Chapter Three (§3.5) between ERQ and ERN. 
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general, or even all biological life. To be sure, it is vague and perhaps ill-chosen when 
used in the following way, but I think more often than not the term “life” is a marker for 
everything that exists in the observable universe, including the universe itself. This claim 
is partially motivated by noting that a plausible substitute for the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” is “What is the meaning of all this?” where “all this” refers to 
everything we see as we look around at the multifaceted world around us. We want to 
know why things are as they are. We desire a rationale or explanation in order to 
understand the world around us and our place in it. This is a global, all-inclusive, and 
comprehensive request, not simply a local request for what makes life valuable or what 
gives life purpose. Yuval Lurie notes this salient feature of the question as it is asked by 
Leo Tolstoy: 
 . . . it is worth noting that it [the question, “What is the meaning of life?”] refers to 
 the meaning of life itself, rather than the meaning of anything that happens in life 
 or during the course of life. The broadly inclusive scope of the question, regarding 
 both what the term “life” and the term “meaning” denote, is very different from 
 the way we usually talk about the meaning of things or about the meaning of the 
 lives of various people.6 
 
This harmonizes well with those global, all-inclusive intuitions that are present when the 
question is asked even if such intuitions are sometimes only latent, and despite the fact 
that the resulting question, “What is the meaning of life?” takes semantic shape through 
an admittedly vague linguistic expression of a profound existential question. 
 It is important to note that though I appeal to the global, all-inclusive nature of the 
question of life’s meaning in order to motivate and lend plausibility to my narrative 
interpretation, the narrative interpretation is subtly different from interpreting the 
                                                 




question of life’s meaning as What is the meaning of all this? This is a question likely 
requesting the meaning of existence, and may be asking something similar to, “Why is 
there something rather than absolutely nothing?” A question such as this nicely captures 
the global or all-inclusive nature of the meaning of life question, but the narrative 
interpretation does not require this connotation to be attached to “global.” I emphasize the 
global nature of the question simply for the purpose of showing that the question is likely 
driven by a more general concern than merely a concern about purpose, value, or 
significance alone. The narrative interpretation is able to account for this all-inclusive 
aspect of the question, whereas reformulations that interpret the question as one about 
purpose or value alone cannot. For that matter, the amalgam thesis cannot account for this 
all-inclusive property of the question as well as the narrative interpretation. I will argue in 
more detail for this claim at the end of this chapter. 
4.3 The Question and Weltanschauung 
 There are striking similarities between my narrative interpretation of the question, 
“What is the meaning of life?” and the concept of Weltanschauung (worldview).7 In fact, 
the two are near synonyms, although for reasons of expediency noted later I favor 
referring to a certain kind of narrative of the world instead of worldview in interpreting 
the question of life’s meaning. Nonetheless, a more detailed look at worldview will shed 
important light and bring further plausibility to the narrative interpretation. A case can be 
made that worldviews are what provide answers to the meaning of life question. This is 
because the meaning of life centers around issues we consider to be of ultimate concern, 
                                                 
7 There are conceptual difficulties with Weltanschauung and how best to interpret it as well as how best to 
translate it into English. My use of the concept does not require entering this discussion. I am here only 
noting the broad similarities between my proposal and the notion of worldview. 
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and as it has been noted, “Wherever we find the ultimate concerns of human beings, we 
find worldviews.”8 Munitz is again instructive in this context. After noting the more 
localized contexts in which the question is often asked, he states:  
 . . . they [people] may say that what they are looking for [when asking the 
 question of life’s meaning] is an account of the “big picture” with whose aid they 
 would be able to see not only their own individual personal lives, but the lives of 
 everybody else, indeed of everything of a finite or limited sort, human or not. . . . 
 The expression of such a concern involves, at bottom, the appeal to a 
 “worldview” or “world picture.” This undertakes to give a description of the most 
 inclusive setting within which human life is situated, a statement of the most 
 fundamental beliefs and commitments on which a person may fall back in giving 
 his account of “the world,” “reality,” “existence,” or “being.”9 
 
Although Munitz does not explicitly state that this “big picture” intuition is most 
fundamental in driving the question, “What is the meaning of life?” I think it should be 
given interpretive priority. Something in the neighborhood of this “big picture” is what 
we seek in asking the question. Given that worldviews plausibly fulfill the role of 
comprehensive explanation or ultimate framework, which is similar, perhaps nearly 
identical, to the function of the meaning of life narrative, I will briefly consider some of a 
worldview’s more common formal properties. To do so, I will use the concept of 
worldview as defined by Wilhelm Dilthey and Sigmund Freud, as well as Wittgenstein’s 
“world picture” (Weltbild). 
4.3.1 Defining “Worldview” 
 The nineteenth century German philosopher and historian, Wilhelm Dilthey, 
considered a worldview to be a comprehensive reflection, and the attending concepts 
needed to do so, on the ultimate sense of our existence. In Rudolf A. Makkreel’s entry on 
                                                 
8 N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, Vol. 1. Christian Origins and  the Question of 
God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 122. 
 
9 Munitz, Does Life Have a Meaning?, p. 30. 
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Dilthey in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, worldview is defined as that which 
“. . . constitutes an overall perspective on life that sums up what we know about the 
world, how we evaluate it emotionally, and how we respond to it volitionally.”10 On 
Dilthey’s definition, then, a worldview has a cognitive/rational dimension, an affective 
dimension, and a dimension marked by praxis. Importantly, all of these dimensions are 
interconnected, though the precise nature of this relationship will be a complex causal 
matrix, the detailed characterization of which will be difficult. 
 Roughly a contemporary of Dilthey, the Austrian Sigmund Freud offers his 
thoughts on the nature of worldview: 
 “Weltanschauung” is, I am afraid, a specifically German concept, the translation 
 of which into foreign languages might well raise difficulties. . . . In my opinion, 
 then, a Weltanschauung is an intellectual construction which solves all the 
 problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, 
 which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that 
 interests us finds its fixed place.11  
 
In contrast to Dilthey, Freud’s own analysis of worldview here is largely one-
dimensional, focusing solely on the cognitive/rational dimension. In this definition, a 
worldview is a comprehensive hypothesis that provides a framework for interpreting the 
cluster of existentially relevant phenomena and accompanying questions that human 
beings ask.12 If one pays careful attention to the entirety of Freud’s lecture, “The 
Question of Weltanschauung,” though, it is clear that far from denying the affective and 
practical dimensions of a worldview, he understands that the religious worldview at least, 
                                                 
10 Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Dilthey, Wilhelm,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 236. 
 
11 Sigmund Freud, Lecture XXXV, “The Question of Weltanschauung,” in The Freud Reader, ed. Peter 
Gay (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), p. 783. 
 
12 I intend my phrase “cluster of existentially relevant phenomenon and accompanying questions” to be a 
synonym for Freud’s “everything that interests us.” 
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was “crafted” to aid humans, emotionally, in making it through life without succumbing 
to despair. Though Freud thought such religious worldviews to be little more than 
grandiose illusions built upon wishful thinking, he certainly viewed worldviews, religious 
ones at least, as having an affective dimension as well as a dimension that guided how 
one lived life.13 Indeed, of Weltanschauung, Freud notes, “. . . the possession of a 
Weltanschauung of this kind is among the ideal wishes of human beings.”14 The 
possession of a worldview was much more than a nice intellectual attainment according 
to Freud; it was something of profound existential importance around which people 
interpret and structure their very existence. 
 An idea akin to the concept of worldview as proposed by Dilthey and Freud can 
be found in various of Wittgenstein’s reflections in On Certainty,15 even though the 
philosophical parameters in which his comments occur are different from those in this 
dissertation. In this posthumously published book (based on written notes penned near 
the end of his life), Wittgenstein devotes considerable time to what he calls a “world 
picture” (Weltbild). A world picture is a groundless set of central beliefs that compose a 
rather fixed framework through which one understands the world.16 Against the skeptic, 
Wittgenstein maintains that we are not really in a position to doubt this groundless set of 
central beliefs. However, against the anti-skeptic, he notes that it is impossible to refute 
                                                 
13 So, for example, Freud states, “If we are to give an account of the grandiose nature of religion, we must 
bear in mind what it undertakes to do for human beings. It gives them information about the origin and 
coming into existence of the universe, it assures them of its protection and of ultimate happiness in the ups 
and downs of life and it directs their thoughts and actions by precepts which it lays down with its whole 
authority. Thus it fulfills three functions.” “The Question of Weltanschauung,” pp. 785-786. 
 
14 Ibid., p. 783. 
 
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1969). 
 
16 Ibid., pp. 91-105, 141-42, 225, 239-42, 247-48, 253, 262, 336, 608-12. 
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skepticism by pointing to absolutely certain propositions. The “certainty” of the 
propositions composing the central epistemic web of a world picture is merely a function 
of their indispensable, normative role in a language game.17 Indeed, part of this “world 
picture” is the very methodological program itself for justifying beliefs. As such, the 
world picture consists of beliefs, principles, and distinctions that serve as grounds for 
other beliefs. Given the strong hermeneutical function that a world picture plays, macro-
level change to the world picture cannot be effected by incompatible information, 
because any information encountered will be filtered through the already existing world 
picture. As such, change can only come through what Wittgenstein calls “persuasion,” (as 
opposed to refutation) an idea akin to conversion whereby one’s entire outlook 
encapsulated in the world picture is altered in a gestalt-like paradigm shift. The important 
point in this context is that Dilthey’s and Freud’s Weltanschauung and Wittgenstein’s 
Weltbild share relevant similarities with, and therefore shed important light on, the 
narrative interpretation of the meaning of life question. 
4.3.2 Relevant Features of Worldview that Intersect with the Narrative Interpretation 
 Three related features can be extracted from the above proposals on the nature of 
a worldview or world picture that connect to the narrative interpretation of the meaning 
of life question. First, worldviews function as the deepest, most comprehensive context, 
framework, or perspective from which to understand, evaluate, and live life. They are 
“big pictures,” “overall perspectives,” an “overriding hypothesis,” or a “set of central 
beliefs” through which the various phenomena of life are hermeneutically filtered. Of 
                                                 
17 Wittgenstein variously speaks of this world picture or language game as a “scaffolding,” “an unused 
siding,” or “a river bed” through which the thought of our language game flows. Ibid. I am not interested 
here in entering a philosophical discussion on the merits of Wittgenstein’s proposal. I am simply noting the 
similarities between a world picture and my narrative interpretation. 
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course, these terms are not entirely synonymous. For example, Munitz’s “big picture” is 
not altogether like Wittgenstein’s “set of central beliefs,” as the former is more 
comprehensive, but there is still a general thread both of universality and interpretive 
priority that is salient in them all. As Lurie notes, a worldview or world picture “. . . 
purports to reveal the nature of human life and its place within the existential scheme of 
things” [emphasis added].18 
 Second, a worldview includes a cognitive/rational explanatory dimension.19 It 
satisfies our desire to know the world of which we are a part. All four of the conceptions 
of worldview above capture this element to various degrees. A worldview is closely 
linked with giving a big picture account of the world (Munitz), summing up what we 
know about the world in an overall perspective (Dilthey), an overriding hypothesis that 
leaves no question unanswered (Freud), or a framework for understanding the world 
(Wittgenstein). I think these are all ways of stating the most fundamental motivation 
driving the meaning of life question.20 They each depict, again, and to various degrees, 
                                                 
18 Yuval Lurie, Tracking the Meaning of Life, p. 46. 
 
19 While I do not take any specific, rigorously articulated position on the relationship between a worldview 
and its individual elements, a few thoughts are warranted. First, if a worldview just is a comprehensive web 
of beliefs with some of those beliefs of greater and more central epistemic significance, is there any sense 
in talking of it as being something over and above those beliefs? Second, I think it is best to see the 
interaction of peripheral and central beliefs as being fluid, such that core parts of a worldview can be 
revised if enough relevant beliefs are revised which warrant the revision of a core worldview belief. Third, 
while I think Wittgenstein perhaps goes too far, there seems to be something correct in his thoughts on the 
hermeneutical function of a worldview (world picture for him). A worldview does serve a hermeneutical 
function in some sense, but I do not think it fully determines how additional information will be assessed 
within the worldview. As such, I agree with the, no doubt, controversial claim that there are brute facts. 
And, I think this is compatible with additionally claiming that a worldview does possess a hermeneutical 
function that is a large part of the story of how we understand the world around us. 
 
20 Of course, none of the reformulated questions in terms of value, purpose, or significance among others 
sufficiently capture this aspect. 
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the human pursuit of a deep explanation, framework, or narrative of the world that 
addresses our core areas of existential concern. 
 Finally, a worldview highlights the existentially relevant elements of life. While 
one might think of a complete worldview as that which literally explains everything, we 
generally do not require such detail of worldviews in order to consider them as sufficient 
maps of reality.21 A worldview can still function in its intended capacity even though it 
has not provided a complete elucidation of all the facts that can be known. What is 
important, however, is that a worldview elucidates those aspects of reality that we, as 
humans, deem or find important, especially to how we understand, appraise, and live our 
lives. This is what I mean by “existential,” though I am fully aware that it has other 
connotations historically. 
 It is Freud’s definition of worldview that appears to come closest to my narrative 
proposal for how to understand the question of life’s meaning. Recalling his definition, 
he states that a worldview “. . . is an intellectual construction which solves all the 
problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, 
accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us 
finds its fixed place” [emphasis added].22 While a complete worldview in the sense of a 
comprehensive elucidation of all facts could be identified with the narrative meaning of 
life, echoing my conclusions in Chapter Three, I do not think the narrative interpretation 
should be viewed this way. Rather, the worldview or narrative sought in securing the 
meaning of life need only cross some threshold of information about those things that 
                                                 
21 Recall here my discussion in Chapter Three (§3.5). 
 
22 Sigmund Freud, Lecture XXXV, “The Question of Weltanschauung,” p. 783. 
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“interest us” in Freud’s words.23 Again, we are in pursuit of an existentially relevant 
narrative (an ERN) which addresses those existentially weighty parts of existence with 
which we are readily familiar, not just any old narrative.  
 Whereas I have chosen to distinguish three salient features of a worldview, Yuval 
Lurie notes only two, even though they largely track what I have said here. His 
discussion is relevant, though. He claims that a sophisticated worldview contains two 
primary elements, and these are aimed at solving “the Riddle of Life,” a phrase in the 
semantic neighborhood of “the Meaning of Life.” One of these elements is primarily 
metaphysical or ontological; the other he says is ethical. I prefer the broader category, 
normative. A worldview’s metaphysical aspect functions in a descriptive capacity, 
explaining the nature of the world and life. Its ethical or more broadly normative aspect 
instructs us how we ought to live in light of the material content found in a worldview’s 
metaphysical theses. This is similar, but not identical, to the taxonomy I have given 
whereby the rational, explanatory dimension of a worldview is brought to bear on those 
aspects of life that are of greatest existential import. Many of these fall within or reside 
nearby a broadly normative category (What makes life valuable? What ends ought I to 
pursue in life? Is there any definitive solution to pain and suffering? etc.). 
 I think there is a deep urge within human beings that compels us to think that a 
worldview or narrative of reality should meet both the metaphysical and normative 
conditions, and that these two dimensions of a worldview cohere.24 We take the pursuit of 
                                                 
23 Cf. footnote 12. 
 
24 This latter condition is precisely why some theists and broad naturalists think that strict naturalists 
cannot secure a home for normative properties in their ontology. That is to say, it is thought that a strongly 
reductionist ontology will not allow normative properties, as well as consciousness and mental states, to be 
part of the deep ontological structure of reality. For a recent critical discussion of naturalism in general, see 
Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
 107
truth very seriously. Many consider pursuing truth to be an intrinsically valuable activity. 
But we also consider other inherent and core human longings to be serious as well, such 
that a narrative of reality should be explanatorily robust enough to sufficiently account 
for these other dimensions of life. Indeed, most hope that our most central desires, those 
that are profoundly and deeply engrained within us, are, in principle, capable of being 
satisfied. But naturalists and theists will disagree here. Freud, while disagreeing that such 
conditions must be met by a worldview, recognizes that as a matter of fact people 
generally require it to, “Believing in it [Weltanschauung] one can feel secure in life, one 
can know what to strive for, and how one can deal most expediently with one’s emotions 
and interests.”25  
 It is precisely here where Freud notes that a traditional religious worldview 
provides kinds of explanation (false in Freud’s view, however) that a fully scientific one 
fails to provide. “Science can be no match for it [religious worldview] when it soothes the 
fear that men feel in the dangers and vicissitudes of life, when it assures them of a happy 
ending and offers them comfort in happiness.”26 Much of what compels us to seek and 
formulate worldviews, then, requires elements only a religious worldview can provide. 
The problem though is that a purely empirical, naturalistic worldview is thought to be 
true by many in the contemporary world, and further, it does not possess many of the 
elements found in a religious worldview, at least in their more “robust” forms as found in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Company, 2008). For a critical discussion of strongly reductive forms of naturalism by philosophers who 
generally consider themselves non-reductive naturalists or are sympathetic to this variety of naturalism, see 
Mario de Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2008). 
 
25 Sigmund Freud, Lecture XXXV, “The Question of Weltanschauung,” pp. 783-84. 
 
26 Ibid., p. 786. 
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religious contexts. As Freud states, “It is true that science can teach us how to avoid 
certain dangers and that there are some sufferings which it can successfully combat; it 
would be most unjust to deny that it is a powerful helper to men; but there are many 
situations in which it must leave a man to his suffering and can only advise him to submit 
to it.”27 Regardless of the debate between religious and non-religious worldviews, the 
point to be made is that worldviews generally have both descriptive and normative 
dimensions, even if those dimensions are explicated differently in various worldviews. 
 In further considering the concept of worldview and how it links to the meaning 
of life, it will be helpful to consider a worldview metaphorically as a map. This idea 
captures something very important to the concept of a worldview and also picks out a 
driving intuition that relates to the meaning of life question. Part of the human 
preoccupation with the meaning of life centers around the desire to successfully navigate 
through life. Therefore, the map analogy is apt, for as Freud has noted, worldviews 
generally do not serve a merely cognitive, rational function, they also help one navigate 
through life without, among other things, succumbing to definitive and final despair. Put 
differently, they provide a cognitive means by which to get somewhere, where “get 
somewhere” is a rough marker for successfully navigating the road of life in a humanly 
flourishing way. 
 The idea that an overall picture or comprehensive view of something is generally 
accompanied by ease of navigation is very intuitive. For example, most of us have 
experienced the frustration and confusion that often results from attempting to navigate 
around a substantially sized city prior to knowing the roads and overall layout of the city. 
But as we begin to internalize a map of that city, which essentially amounts to having a 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
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comprehensive mental picture or God’s eye view of where everything is located, we can 
navigate more easily through the city. This occurs in countless other contexts, whether it 
is plumbing or auto-repair. And the more comprehensive and accurate our mental picture 
becomes of the domain under consideration, the more facility and success we have in 
navigating through particular situations that require this “map.” In the case of a 
worldview, something analogous seems to be the case. A worldview brings with it the 
necessary information to ease our navigation through life. On one level, having 
knowledge about Newton’s Laws aids us in understanding that we “ought” to get out of 
the way of oncoming cars if we want to avoid bodily injury. On another level, having 
knowledge of how happiness is secured and sustained contributes to our facility in doing 
our part (conceding the pesky problem of luck) to make this a reality in our lives. Just 
like a comprehensive and accurate engine-view will aid you in changing your sparkplugs 
and belts, so too will a comprehensive and accurate worldview aid you in living life.28 
4.3.3 Tightening the Conceptual Link Between Worldview and the Narrative 
Intrpretation 
  
 The above discussion of a worldview and its functions is apropos to the narrative 
interpretation of the meaning of life question. The narrative interpretation I have 
proposed of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is not substantively different, 
conceptually, from a worldview. Indeed, they both function as something akin to a map, 
aiding us as we navigate through life, and especially through the cluster of life-features 
that we deem to be especially important (i.e., ERQ). We seek a worldview or narrative 
that secures a coherent place for these existentially important elements, situating them 
                                                 
28 This claim is controversial, and is partly built upon the more foundational claim that reality is “stubborn” 
in that we will have to cooperate with reality and what it gives us and not vice-versa when it comes to 
living life. 
 110
within a deeper explanatory context. Despite this similarity, though, I have adopted the 
category of narrative largely, but not solely, for reasons of expediency. Narrative is 
accompanied by ideas that seem more intuitively connected with the meaning of life. 
First, narrative possesses dynamic connotations that track the phenomenon of life better 
than does a worldview, which seems more static in nature. Narratives are characterized 
by a temporal flow of events, with conflict and resolution. Life itself is like this. We tend 
to think of worldviews, however, as static explanatory frameworks that propositionally 
account for reality. Again, narratives of reality, especially if “narrative” is being used in a 
loose or metaphorical sense,29 can function identically to worldviews on this count, but 
we tend to think of narratives dynamically and not statically. In terms of utility, then, the 
concept of narrative is perhaps more intuitively applicable to life itself. 
 Second, I think a component of life’s narrative, not just individual narratives but 
more generally the universe’s narrative, that concerns us greatly is the way it will all end. 
Is death a definitive loss of all consciousness and identity? Will the universe itself come 
to final oblivion? Is postmortem survival part of life’s narrative? Will there be a new 
heavens and new earth? These questions are central motivators for the question of life’s 
meaning as can be clearly seen by the prevalence of considerations of death and futility in 
the literature, and while answers to them will have a place in most worldviews, the 
concept of ending functions more naturally within the context of narrative. So, the 
dynamic aspect of life together with preoccupation with how it will all end makes the 
category of narrative a better fit for interpreting the question, “What is the meaning of 
life?” in the way I am in this dissertation. However, the category of worldview along with 
                                                 
29 For a discussion of the definition of “narrative,” see Chapter Two (§2.4). 
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many of the capacities in which it functions, substantially tracks what I refer to as an 
ERN. As such, the fact that worldviews address the cluster of issues broadly related to the 
meaning of life lends plausibility to my narrative interpretation given its profound 
similarities to worldview.30 
 Thus far I have connected the narrative interpretation of the meaning of life and 
the concept of worldview by simply noting that they share similar features and functions. 
Some have argued though that worldviews themselves are metanarratives of the world. 
Regardless of whether, in Jean-François Lyotard’s words, “Postmodernism may be 
defined as incredulity towards metanarratives,” 31 historically such narratives have 
provided the deep theoretical and existential framework in which truth claims and praxis 
have been meaningfully grounded. In addition, such narratives themselves embody a 
worldview, such that the two cannot be separated. One need not look hard in order to find 
those who explicate the concept of a worldview using the category of narrative. A 
primary reason for the connection follows from the fact that, as I noted in Chapter Three, 
humans are inescapably narrative-creating creatures. It only makes sense, then, that we 
would “construct” metanarratives in order to aid us in making sense of and living life.  
                                                 
30 Julian Young’s claim in the introduction to The Death of God and the Meaning of Life is also relevant 
here. He claims that, in the West, prior to the Enlightenment and the gaining momentum of empirical-
mechanistic-naturalistic causal explanations, theistic worldviews were in place and that few ever asked 
about the meaning of life. He claims this was simply because folks thought they knew what it was, and this 
knowledge was directly tied to the religious worldview in place. However, as such worldviews begin to 
diminish, people because to probe into the meaning of life with greater anxiety and vigor (pp.1-2). Young’s 
claim strengthens my interpretation, in that it further connects the meaning of life to the possession of a 
narrative or worldview of some sort. 
 
31 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, xxiv. 
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 In his substantive work on the nature of worldview, Worldview: The History of a 
Concept, David K. Naugle posits a close relationship between worldview and narrative. 
He states: 
 . . . a worldview might best be understood as a semiotic phenomenon. Since 
 people are the kinds of creatures who make and manage signs, especially in the 
 form of words spoken or written, and since most if not all aspects of human 
 thought and culture are semiotically constituted, it seems plausible to include the 
 notion of Weltanschauung in this category and construe it as a system of signs 
 generating a symbolic world. In particular I . . . [a]lso propose that a worldview as 
 a semiotic structure consists primarily of a network of narrative signs that offers 
 an interpretation of reality and establishes an overarching framework for life. 
 Since people are storytelling creatures who define themselves and the cosmos in a 
 narrative fashion, the content of a worldview seems best associated with this most 
 relevant activity of human nature. Finally, I . . . [p]ropose that a worldview as a 
 semiotic system of world-interpreting stories also provides a foundation or 
 governing platform upon or by which people think, interpret, and know.32 
 
For Naugle, then, a worldview can be understood largely on three interconnected levels. 
First, it is a semiotic construction in which humans create meaningful signs. Second, 
these meaningful signs are structured narratively;33 this narrative structure motivated 
primarily out of the fact that we are narrative-creating beings. And, third, the resulting 
narrative provides the deepest framework through which to interpret and live life in a 
meaningful way.   
 Naugle’s thoughts on the nature and function of worldviews are echoed by N. T. 
Wright: 
 . . . [w]orldviews provide the stories through which human beings view reality. 
 Narrative is the most characteristic expression of worldview, going deeper than 
 the isolated observation or fragmented remark. . . . [f]rom these stories one can in 
 principle discover how to answer the  basic questions that determine human 
 existence: who are we, where are we, what is wrong, and what is the solution? All 
                                                 
32 David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2002), p. 291. 
 
33 N. T. Wright notes that the symbols and praxis of a worldview are anchored in a “controlling story,” a 
story that invests them with wider significance. The New Testament and the People of God, pp. 124-25. 
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 cultures cherish deep-rooted beliefs which can in principle be called up to answer 
 these questions. All cultures (that is) have a sense of identity, of environment, of a 
 problem with the way the world is, and of a way forward—a redemptive 
 eschatology, to be more precise—which will, or may, lead out of that problem.34 
 
Like Naugle, Wright sees a close link between narrative and worldview. Accordingly, 
worldviews “provide” interpretive stories and, even stronger, themselves are said to be 
expressed in and through these stories that provide a narrative framework through which 
to understand and assess the “basic” questions of human existence. In a sense, narrative is 
a way of imposing order on what may be described, pre-narratively, as chaos, where 
“chaos” signifies disjointed and fragmented states of affairs with no real connecting 
thread weaving them together into a coherent and understandable “product.” It is this 
narrative activity that the narrative interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of 
life?” highlights as constituting the search for an answer to the question of life’s meaning. 
 If worldviews just are metanarratives with unique, well-defined formal properties, 
then my thesis is compatible with claiming that we are seeking a worldview when we ask, 
“What is the meaning of life?” This finding is relevant for the plausibility of my 
interpretation, given the profound similarities between the concept of a worldview and 
the narrative interpretation. Reflection upon the nature and function of a worldview is not 
the only consideration that lends plausibility to the narrative interpretation though. A 
closer look at those situations and circumstances out of which the question of life’s 
meaning is often birthed reveals that what we seek in asking the question is more 
comprehensive than an answer merely to a question about purpose or value or 
significance alone. 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 123. 
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4.4 A Further Look at the Contextual and Motivational Origins of the Question 
 Questions about the meaning of life naturally emerge in certain existentially 
salient circumstances and situations of life. These contexts are, by and large, co-extensive 
with the cluster of issues and questions that I identified as ERQ. Recall that ERQ consists 
of life phenomena, events, and accompanying questions around which we seek to build a 
narrative. These elements, then, function as the pre-philosophic impetus for asking the 
question of life’s meaning. I note the pre-philosophical status of this impetus due to the 
fact that without any philosophical reflection whatsoever, the elements composing ERQ 
are considered to be of profound existential importance, in a sense, by definition. It might 
be said that we pick them out and baptize them as the existentially relevant aspects of life. 
It is relevant, then, that there is more than one situation, circumstance, or life context out 
of which the question of life’s meaning arises. 
 In Chapter Three, I argued that asking, “What is the meaning of life?” is 
analogous to a father walking in on his children’s scuffle and demanding, “What is the 
meaning of this?” Here, the father is in search of an explanation, context, or narrative in 
order to make sense of what he has observed. He has seen very little, and lacks sufficient 
information required to understand the situation and subsequently appraise it. This fuller 
narrative he seeks will determine, among other things, his normative evaluation of the 
situation. Life itself is like this; we encounter all sorts of phenomena of which we want to 
know, “What is the meaning of this?” which is only a step or so removed from the more 
global question, “What is the meaning of life?” The former questions lead to the latter 
insofar as we think that it will take an existentially relevant all-inclusive narrative in 
which to situate the cluster of life phenomena and events that prompt meaning-questions. 
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 It is telling that the question, “What is the meaning of life?” does not emerge 
solely in contexts where we begin to question what makes life valuable, what makes life 
worthwhile, or what the purpose of life is. Importantly, there exist other question-
producing contexts. For example, Milton Munitz notes that preoccupation with the 
question of life’s meaning often accompanies critical times in the life of an individual, 
periods where suffering and death are salient, and in the midst of secularization and the 
loss of a spiritual paradigm.35 While correct in this assessment, Munitz has not exhausted 
the range of contexts in which the meaning of life question surfaces. 
 When one begins to see the variety of contexts in which the question of life’s 
meaning is birthed, a relevant question to ask is, why? Is it simply because the question is 
an amalgam of diverse, yet related questions? Or is something more at work here? I think 
the latter reason is the case. Our explanatory, contextual, and narrative propensities “kick 
in” at certain existentially relevant portions of life, baptized as such in quasi-Kripkean 
fashion, prompting us to inquire into life’s meaning. These moments cause us to want to 
know what it is all about. They possess special existential import that prompts in us an 
insatiable desire to know how everything fits together and how we and the events of our 
lives find a home within that larger framework. Importantly, I do not think we should 
understand the question as making fundamentally different requests in these different 
contexts. I submit that it should be interpreted as the request for a narrative that 
sufficiently addresses the feature of reality under consideration as well as all others (that 
is, all others constituting ERQ, and thereby can be said to be the meaning of life in 
general), even though, at any time, one’s existential gaze may be directed on a localized 
portion of the narrative. 
                                                 
35 Munitz, Does Life Have a Meaning?, pp. 19-29. 
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 §2.2 of Chapter Two (“Descriptive Issues, Prescriptive Issues, and a 
Philosophically Sufficient Interpretation”) is relevant here. In that section I noted that 
desiderata for any philosophically plausible interpretation of the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” should include: (i) that it sufficiently harmonize with the pre-
philosophic intuitions from which the question is generated along with what people, in 
fact, take themselves to be asking, and (ii) that it meet the analytic philosophical 
requirements of clarity and coherence. In this section I will consider descriptive features 
of the question (i.e., from what contexts it naturally emerges), and then draw certain 
prescriptive conclusions that move beyond this data.  
 Descriptively, individuals ask the question in a number of different life-contexts; I 
think this is instructive and should factor substantively into a proposal for how we ought 
to interpret the question, namely, in terms of a narrative of life that will encompass each 
of these contexts in which the question is asked. This interpretation is not only 
philosophically plausible, but I think even those who have interpreted the question 
differently would recognize this as a natural construal that ends up addressing the cluster 
of issues associated with the meaning of life in a compelling way.  
 Three salient contexts that prompt questions about life’s meaning are what I call 
(i) Tolstoyan moments, (ii) times of metaphysical wonder at the fact of being, and (iii) 
considerations of evil, pain, and suffering.36 I think it is telling that the question of life’s 
meaning is linked to a diverse range of generating or motivating life situations. This 
shows a deficiency in extant interpretations that address only singular contexts, making 
                                                 
36 These three contexts actually encompass the five elements constituting ERQ. This is so because (i) 
questions about value, worth, and purpose all populate Tolstoyan Moments contexts, as does death, and (ii) 
questions about how it all will end populate both Tolstoyan Moment contexts as well as contexts involving 
evil, pain, and suffering. 
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the question entirely coextensive with that context (e.g., purpose, value, or worth). I think 
the question’s inherent vagueness actually demonstrates that it should not be viewed as 
entirely coextensive with considerations unique to any one context in which it is asked. 
That is to say, interpreting the question in terms of purpose, for example, addresses part 
of what the question of life’s meaning is all about, but not all of it. Of course, the 
amalgam thesis is proposed to address this. However, the amalgam thesis suffers from 
what I view as the disadvantage of not being able to sufficiently account for the global, 
all-inclusive nature of the question under a single, unifying construct. Indeed, I think the 
question’s vagueness, a vagueness that partly motivates the amalgam thesis, actually 
lends greater philosophical plausibility to the narrative interpretation. The narrative 
interpretation nicely accounts for the empirical reality of the question’s multiple 
connotations and contextual origins, as it secures a home for the concerns of each context 
within a wider explanatory framework.  
4.4.1 Tolstoyan Moments 
 One of the most historically indelible discussions of the meaning of life comes 
from the nineteenth century Russian novelist, Leo Tolstoy. A man of great attainment, 
known for such literary classics as War and Peace and Anna Karenina, Tolstoy 
underwent a deep existential crisis in mid-life in which he vigorously questioned the 
meaning of life. Given its historical noteworthiness, I will quote a large excerpt from 
Tolstoy’s profound autobiographical account of his struggle for meaning. 
 So I lived, but then something strange began to happen to me. I began to 
 experience moments of perplexity where life “froze,” as though I did not know 
 what to do or how to live, and I felt lost and became dejected. But this passed, and 
 I went on living as before. Then these moments of perplexity began to reoccur 
 more and more frequently, and invariably took the same form. When they came, 
 the same questions kept coming to my mind: “Why? What is it for? What does it 
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 lead to?” . . . While thinking about the management of my household and estate, 
 which greatly preoccupied me at that time, the question would suddenly occur: 
 “Well, you have five thousands [sic] acres of land, and three hundred horses—
 What then? So what?” I was absolutely muddled up inside, and did not know 
 what to think. When thinking about how best to educate my children, I would ask 
 myself: “What for?” Or when thinking about how best to promote the welfare of 
 the peasants, I  would suddenly say to myself: “But what does it matter to me?” 
 And when I thought about the fame that all my literary works would bring to me, 
 I would say to myself: “Very well, I will become famous. So what? What then?” . 
 . . My question—that which at the age of fifty brought me to the verge of 
 suicide—was  the simplest of questions, a question lying in the soul of every 
 person. It was a question without an answer to which one cannot live, as I had 
 found by experience. It was: “What will come of what I am doing today or 
 shall do tomorrow? What will come of my life? What is life for?” Differently 
 expressed, the question is: “Why should I live, why hope for anything, or do 
 anything?” It can also be expressed thus: “Does my life have any meaning that 
 death cannot destroy?”37 
 
During the season of his crisis, Tolstoy was clearly asking more than a single question. 
He was making multiple, yet related requests about his life and life in general which 
seem to center on two broad issues: (i) securing a meaningful “grounding” for life and the 
projects of life, and (ii) shuddering at the seeming threat that death poses for a 
meaningful life. As for (i), Tolstoy has come to a place where he begins to question why 
it is he pursues those activities he does, and whether and how these activities and pursuits 
are meaningful. Pre-philosophically, he has always viewed them as valuable and 
meaningful, but now, in his arrest of life moment, he questions whether, why, and how 
they are meaningful. He is seeking a grounding or justification for their value or meaning. 
With respect to (ii), he harbors the thought that death somehow brings with it a veto 
power, the ability to negate the seeming value and meaningfulness of those activities that 
populate human life, thus rendering them and life itself irredeemably futile.38 
                                                 
37 Leo Tolstoy, “A Confession” in Spiritual Writings (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006), pp. 46-48, 51. 
 
38 A case can be made that one finds a similar intuition in play in various parts of Ecclesiastes. 
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 It is as if Tolstoy’s self-reflective capacities became more fully alive during his 
arrest of life moment. Presumably, he stepped back from his active engagement in life 
and began to critically reflect upon living. Activities and pursuits that he previously 
thought valuable all of a sudden seem to be anchored to nothing, and yet Tolstoy believes 
some deeper anchor is needed in order for them to be valuable or meaningful.39 This is no 
small point. Human beings can take the Nagelian viewpoint, and this makes us different 
from other species of animal. This means we can and often do ask why-questions about 
our lives and the activities that fill them as reflective spectators, and so view life sub 
specie aeternitatis. Some of us may only casually and periodically ask these questions; 
others, like Tolstoy, may become paralyzed by them, entering into a genuine existential 
crisis. Tolstoy sought a deeper explanation in order to make sense of those activities and 
aspects of life that are generally deemed important, among them, work, family, and 
accomplishment. It was not enough for him simply to engage in these activities and 
pursuits; he needed to know why and for what purpose he ought to continue in them, and 
perhaps, too, why he should value them. Is there some deeper reason or rationale that can 
ground them as meaningful? 
 A second salient feature of a Tolstoyan moment is the idea that the reality of 
death looming on the horizon for each of us carries with it a significant, perhaps 
insurmountable, threat to a meaningful life. Tolstoy seemed to think that death, viewed as 
the final and definitive cessation of human consciousness, carried with it the power to 
render life’s activities meaningless, a thought certainly shared by many others. At least 
one reason why this is thought to be so is that a construal of death as the final and 
                                                 
39 Thomas Nagel’s discussion of the notion of absurdity, as well as the view from nowhere, is particularly 
relevant here. 
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definitive cessation of consciousness somehow renders the activities that populate 
conscious existence futile. I will leave further discussion of this common claim to the last 
chapter of this dissertation. For now it is sufficient to note that considerations of death are 
salient moments in which the question of life’s meaning is asked. 
 And so a Tolstoyan moment is a rough marker for either (i) contexts where we 
take a predominantly self-reflective, spectator-dominated stance toward activities in life 
in which we are usually fully engaged without that reflective, evaluative component, or 
(ii) contexts where the reality of death becomes salient for one reason or another. With 
respect to (i), we consider something we have, up to this time, taken for granted, only to 
now ask why we do it, why it is important, and whether and how it is meaningful. That is 
to say, we seek a deeper and more foundational footing for things like familial 
relationships, work, accomplishments, recreation, and so on. In a Tolstoyan moment we 
feel the need to secure and anchor these things down by connecting them to something 
deeper, something more foundational, something that can secure their value and meaning. 
As for (ii), many find death to be a threat to meaning. This is often largely assumed, or if 
reasons are given they are generally tied to the notion of futility and how it is supposed to 
follow from a certain conception of death, a naturalistic conception where death has the 
final word so to speak.40 
4.4.2 Metaphysical Wonder  
 Asking the question of life’s meaning is not confined to Tolstoyan moments. It is 
also closely linked to situations where, for whatever reason, the salience and profundity 
of existence itself is at the fore of our minds. For me, autobiographically speaking, these 
moments can emerge in seemingly trivial circumstances, for example, watching cars 
                                                 
40 I will spend considerable time on this claim in Chapter Seven. 
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drive down the highway. They can also come from more profound situations, like 
watching a beautiful sunset. In these moments, we may be compelled to ask a progressing 
series of why-questions like, “Why are there cars driving down the road?” “Why are there 
even cars at all?” “Why are there people who drive cars?” “Why am I here asking this 
question?” “Why does anything exist at all?” “What is the meaning of life?” In these 
situations we come to reflect on the universe’s and our own radical contingency, the fact 
that our existence is not metaphysically necessary.41 As we reflect upon this staggering 
reality, we desire a reason or rational or account for why we and the universe do in fact 
exist when we might not have.  
 Of course, some philosophers take this progression of questions to be an only 
slightly more sophisticated, but nonetheless, equally nonsensical explanatory pursuit as 
that of the child whose why-questions about, for example, objects eventually terminate 
with the request, “What is larger than the largest of all objects?” This is an absurd 
question, but so too, it is argued, is a question about why anything exists at all. While I 
think this challenge can be plausibly answered,42 my primary concern in this context is 
simply to demonstrate that this is one circumstance in which the question of life’s 
meaning often arises. 
 What I have here identified as only one of a number of question-producing 
contexts has been advanced by others as the primary context in which the question of 
life’s meaning is generated and out of which the question is most naturally understood. 
                                                 
41 I concede that for some naturalists the universe, or at least the most basic state of affairs from which the 
universe arises, is metaphysically necessary. For a defense of the claim that the universe, or at least 
something (though not necessarily personal), had to exist, see Bede Rundle, Why There is Something 
Rather than Nothing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). 
 
42 I briefly address this in Chapter Six (§6.2.1.2). 
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Karl Britton notes that such questions can be asked with two different scopes in mind: 
personal and global. Despite the differences in scope, both questions center on the why of 
existence. Furthermore, we often proceed straight from the personal question to the 
global one or vice-versa. Britton remarks: 
 One of the very odd things about ‘the meaning of life’ is that people commonly 
 do not make a sharp distinction between a question about everything and a 
 question about themselves. For the ordinary reflective person will go on: What is 
 it all for? Why am I here? What is the point of it all? (And I suspect this often 
 means: What is the point of it all for me?) It not only is a matter of wonder that 
 there is this universe, but also that it contains me: Why am I here? And, of course, 
 this connects with the question: What am I? And since there is this universe and it 
 includes me, what was the point of including me? Is it possible to discover in such 
 reflections what is the point of it all for me? There seem to be two questions, one 
 about the universe and one about me. Question One: Why does the universe exist? 
 Why does something exist rather than nothing? Why the things we actually 
 discover and not other possible things? Question Two: Why do I exist? Do I 
 exist for some purpose, and, if so, how am I to discover it?43 
 
What Britton here identifies as synonyms of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” 
I take to be contexts where the question is generated. We are the kinds of creatures who 
desire to know why anything exists. Answering this question is a large component in 
figuring out the meaning of life. But it is not all of it. We still want to know what makes 
life valuable, what the purpose(s) of life is, and how to make sense out of pain and 
suffering. Plumbing the meaning of life is not solely a product of addressing the 
metaphysical question of why we and the universe even exist at all. This is just one of the 
myriad of contexts in which the question is asked. Of course, on the narrative 
interpretation I am proposing, the narrative will provide a framework in which to situate 
all of these question-producing contexts. 
                                                 
43 Karl Britton, Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 2-
3. 
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4.4.3 Pain and Suffering 
 Finally, the experience and contemplation of evil, pain, and suffering is a 
prominent motivating context for asking, “What is the meaning of life?” I think there are 
at least three primary features to the problem of evil relevant here: (i) the intellectual, 
theoretical, or philosophical problem, (ii) the existential problem, and (iii) the 
eschatological “problem.” Likely, considerations of all three come to bear upon the issue 
of life’s meaning. The first aspect of the problem, the intellectual, I largely identify with 
the dialectic in Western philosophical history centered on whether evil is compatible with 
the existence of an omnicompetent God.44 One thinks here of Hume’s famous dictum in 
the mouth of Philo, a fictional character in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
“Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not 
able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both 
able and willing? Whence then is evil?”45 The narrative associated with the meaning of 
life will have something to say about this, even if one takes, for example, a skeptical 
theistic approach, claiming that agnosticism, in part, about God’s purposes in allowing 
certain instances of pain and suffering is a salient element of the meaning of life 
narrative.46 
 The second aspect of the problem of evil, what I call the “existential” feature, is 
the human experience of evil as creatures capable of feeling pain and suffering 
                                                 
44 By “omnicompetent” I mean the classical theistic conception of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and 
omnibenevolent. 
 
45 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 108-109. 
 
46 This is important, and highlights the fact that a narrative can possess a narrative element that narrates that 
we do not know. That is to say, the narrative can possess negative narrative claims in addition to positive 
narrative claims. They are still elements of the narrative and narrate part of the world, even if they merely 
inform us of a cognitive limitation. 
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physically, and perhaps more importantly, psychologically. While this cannot be divorced 
from the intellectual problem centering on philosophical explanation and the 
compatibility of theistic propositions, it is distinct, and, as Alvin Plantinga has remarked, 
the one suffering is in as much need of pastoral counseling as she is in need of 
informational elucidation, even though the latter certainly has relevance for the former.47 
One thinks here of the despairing cry of the afflicted Job, “Why did I not die at birth, 
come out from the womb and expire? . . . Why is light given to him who is in misery, and 
life to the bitter in soul, who long for death, but it comes not, and dig for it more than for 
hidden treasures . . .?” (Job 3:11, 20-21).48 Again, life’s narrative will speak to this aspect 
of the problem of evil, as it does the philosophical aspect. 
  Finally, there is a future-oriented side to the problem of evil in that many 
individuals hope for a future state of affairs where they exist and evil, pain, and suffering 
are eradicated forever. Within this context, every fiber of our being demands the eventual 
defeat of evil. With the prophet Habakkuk, we cry, “O Lord, how long shall I cry for 
help, and you will not hear? . . . Why do you make me see iniquity, and why do you idly 
look at wrong?” (Habakkuk 1:2a, 3a). I think all three dimensions of the problem of evil 
are quite relevant to the issue of life’s meaning such that all will need to be addressed in 
any account of life’s meaning. They are certainly salient contexts in which questions 
about life meaning come to the fore. 
                                                 
47 See Alvin Plantinga, “Epistemic Probability and Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel 
Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 69. 
 
48 Unless otherwise noted, all Scriptural citations will be from the English Standard Version of the Bible, 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Bibles, 2001). 
 125
4.4.4 The Contextual and Motivational Origins of the Question: Conclusions 
 I want to draw two important conclusions from the preceding discussion of these 
question-producing contexts. First, I think this lends evidence to my claim that global and 
all-inclusive intuitions are a large part of the question’s motivational history. That is to 
say, the meaning of life question is not one asked only in a particular context or about a 
singular feature of life. And even if individuals cannot give a philosophically rigorous 
account for why they are asking this question in a multiplicity of contexts, I think 
philosophers need to offer an interpretation that harmonizes with the fact that people do 
ask it in a variety of circumstances. My second conclusion follows from this.  
 In each of these contexts part of what we desire is an explanatory framework in 
which to answer the question that we are posing. We might want to know what grounds 
the meaning or value of our raising a family. Perhaps we want to know why we exist. Or, 
when it comes to pain and suffering, we might want sufficient explanations for the three 
aspects of the problem of evil, even if the explanation has, for example, strong 
undercurrents of skeptical theism. Hence, when we combine these question-producing 
contexts and ask why it is that the question of life’s meaning is often asked in each of 
them, we should see ourselves in asking the question as searching for a narrative of 
reality that provides a deep framework for understanding and assessing these existentially 
relevant portions of existence. They are the salient parts of life, the parts that cause us to 
ponder existence, the parts that make us feel the immensity of reality, the parts that make 
us recognize our own finitude and mortality, and the parts that strike us as profound. We 
want the rest of the narrative that brings some sense to these elements and rationally and 
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existentially glues them all together.49 We are familiar with some elements, and we are in 
search of others we think will shed light on the ones with which we are already in contact 
but around which remain gripping and weighty questions concerning how to understand 
them. 
 When we consider these contextual origins of the question of life’s meaning we 
see that the kind of narrative I am here proposing as how we ought to interpret the 
question serves this function. Not only is the pursuit of such a narrative a natural and 
plausible way of understanding the request, “What is the meaning of x?” it serves as a 
single, unifying construct that addresses the cluster of issues associated with the meaning 
of life. This stands in contrast to the amalgam thesis, which largely argues that 
fundamentally different questions are being asked in different contexts. And while I do 
not dispute that this is sometimes the case, I do not think it sufficiently accounts for 
certain unarticulated intuitions highlighting the global and all-inclusive nature of the 
question. The narrative interpretation nicely accounts for these intuitions. I will now turn 
to a more detailed comparison of the narrative interpretation with the amalgam thesis. 
4.5 The Philosophical Advantages of the Narrative Interpretation over Extant 
Interpretations and the Amalgam Thesis 
 
 Philosophers have too quickly moved from the property of vagueness 
characterizing the question to the re-formulation project embodied by the amalgam 
thesis. The range of interpretations that retain the original linguistic formulation of the 
request for life’s meaning have not been exhausted. We should work diligently to try and 
secure an interpretation that does justice to the language of the question, even though that 
language is admittedly vague. The narrative interpretation that I have developed in the 
                                                 
49 Of course, pessimists like Schopenhauer and Camus think this desire is ultimately folly. For that matter, 
so does Thomas Nagel. 
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last three chapters is one such interpretive option. While some who ask the question of 
life’s meaning may not, initially, identify a narrative as what they are seeking, once the 
narrative interpretation is explained, I think individuals will recognize something natural 
and compelling about the interpretation. Most prominently, they will see that it secures 
everything we generally seek when inquiring into life’s meaning under one unifying 
construct, the construct of a narrative of the world that crosses some existentially relevant 
threshold in terms of its specificity in accounting for the universe and our place within it.  
 In §1.3 of Chapter One (“Interpreting the Question: The Amalgam Thesis”) I 
noted that many philosophers currently writing on the topic of the meaning of life operate 
within the parameters defined by the amalgam thesis, considering the question, “What is 
the meaning of life?” as largely ill-conceived and little more than a placeholder for a 
cluster of related requests.50 This cluster of requests consists of questions like, “What is 
the purpose(s) of life?” “What makes life valuable?” or “Is life ultimately worthwhile or 
is it irredeemably futile?” On the amalgam approach, seemingly little effort is made to 
interpret the original question on its own linguistic terms, as the question is quickly 
morphed into what is taken to be another more manageable form. It has been recognized, 
though, that none of these interpretations individually captures everything to be captured 
about the meaning of life. The meaning of life is not merely about purpose or value or 
worth or significance alone. This observation has led Thaddeus Metz to note that, “. . . 
[t]here is no single idea that unifies all the diverse views that have been deemed to be 
                                                 
50 So, for example, “They [meaning of life questions] are amalgams of logically diverse questions, some 
coherent and answerable, some neither.” R. W. Hepburn, “Questions about the Meaning of Life,” p. 262. “. 
. . the field has found it difficult to reduce this question to a single basic idea. . . . this question is associated 
with a variety of closely related but not entirely overlapping questions . . .,” Thaddeus Metz, “New 
Developments in the Meaning of Life,” Philosophy Compass 2 (2007): p. 211. “The problem is that it 
[“What’s it all about?” or “What is the meaning of life?”] is vague, general, and unclear. It is not so much a 
single question but a place-holder for a whole set of questions . . .,” Julian Baggini, What’s It All About?, 
Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 1. 
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about the meaning of life . . .”51 The amalgam thesis cannot account for what unifies the 
cluster of considerations surrounding the meaning of life, even though it provides a 
generally plausible account of the question’s vagueness. 
 To be sure, the amalgam thesis has philosophical merit. It accounts for a salient 
fact, namely, that the question is variously interpreted in terms of purpose, value, worth, 
significance, etc. In addition, it explains the vagueness present in the original question, 
even if only through linguistic reformulation. However, I think those who hold something 
like the amalgam thesis have surrendered too quickly. Indeed, the amalgam thesis implies 
that there is no philosophically respectable interpretation of the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” that interprets it on its own linguistic terms while also capturing the 
questions highlighted in each of the reformulated versions. It seems to me that this is 
mistaken. I have proposed a narrative interpretation that secures the following desiderata: 
(i) the original formulation of the question is interpreted without morphing it into another 
question(s),52 and (ii) the interpretation is able to unify the questions enumerated by the 
amalgam thesis under a single concept, thus making them more explicitly about the 
meaning of life as opposed to, for example, value or purpose only. Related to its failure to 
satisfy these desiderata, the amalgam thesis suffers in three important areas. 
 First, the amalgam thesis fails to interpret the question on its own linguistic terms. 
Contrary to what the amalgam thesis implies, use of the term “meaning” need not signal 
irredeemable confusion. In fact, it tracks a natural employment of the term that highlights 
                                                 
51 Thaddeus Metz, “Recent Work on the Meaning of Life,” Ethics 112 (July 2002): p. 802. 
 
52 I take (i) to be a desideratum of any interpretation of the question largely because I think the use of 
“meaning” is not primarily an indicator of confusion, but a legitimate marker (arguably vague) of what it is 
people seek when inquiring into the meaning of life. That which is being sought is not reducible to a 
question about purpose or value or worth alone. 
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the cluster of issues connected with the meaning of life. The question in its original form, 
then, is not ill-conceived as some have claimed. The reason people consistently employ 
“meaning” is because it connotes what people seek in asking the question, namely, a 
narrative that narrates across an existentially relevant threshold of life phenomena and 
accompanying questions, much like the narrative the father sought. It seems to me that an 
interpretation which retains the original question while making its request philosophically 
plausible is better, ceteris paribus, than those that do not. The narrative interpretation 
meets this condition, and provides a plausible reason for why so many people initially 
employ this form of the question as opposed to some reworked formulation. The problem 
with the reformulation project is that salient intuitions and sub-questions latent in the 
original fail to be captured by any one reformulation. The narrative interpretation nicely 
secures a place for all of this under a single, unifying interpretation. 
 Second, there is something global or all-inclusive about the question of life’s 
meaning for which the amalgam thesis fails to adequately account. Indeed, sometimes it 
is meant to be a question about everything. At minimum, however, it should be seen as a 
question whose scope is broader than simply about purpose or value or worth considered 
individually. To be sure, the reformulated questions posited by the amalgam thesis are 
existentially weighty and closely aligned with the meaning of life, but individually, they 
are only local and mere subsets of the meaning of life question. Milton Munitz correctly 
notes that the question of life’s meaning is motivated by intuitions of “. . . relative depth 
or total scope.”53 None of the reformulated questions in terms of value or purpose 
captures this sweeping nature of the original question. In fact, the amalgam thesis would 
                                                 
53 Milton K. Munitz, Does Life Have A Meaning?, p. 29. 
 
 130
have us understand the question, “What is the meaning life?” as little more than the 
disjunctive question, “’What is the purpose of life’? or ‘What makes life valuable’? or 
‘What makes life worthwhile’? or x?” The primary problem with this, though, is that 
these questions are about purpose and value and worth rather than about the meaning of 
life. We ought to look for ways to make them more directly about the meaning of life. 
The narrative interpretation functions in this capacity to unify all of them under a single 
interpretive construct, making each about some aspect of the meaning of life. This 
interpretation offers an explanatorily powerful, semantically faithful, and logically 
coherent way of understanding the question on its own terms that addresses everything 
centrally and peripherally related to the topic of life’s meaning under a single unifying 
construct that is then identified as the meaning of life. 
 Third, the amalgam thesis makes room for death and futility in the meaning of life 
context only indirectly via conversations surrounding the potential threat death poses for 
leading a valuable or worthwhile life. I do not think this is misguided, only truncated. 
Indeed, I think there is a deeper reason why issues of death and futility are often part and 
parcel of discussions about the meaning of life, and this reason fits naturally and 
compellingly within the narrative interpretation. The general point is that the ending of a 
narrative is especially important to various kinds of broadly normative appraisals of the 
narrative as a whole. This is why a “bad” ending might ruin a narrative for us. Given that 
the ending of a narrative is often thought to have such power, how our lives end along 
with how the universe itself ends seems especially important to whether we appraise the 
antecedent portions of the meaning of life narrative as valuable and worthwhile or 
irredeemably futile. Therefore, our emotional, aesthetic, and moral evaluations of 
 131
candidate meaning of life narratives will be closely intertwined with their endings. On the 
narrative interpretation, then, it becomes especially clear why death has been thought to 
be so relevant to the meaning of life. 
4.6 Summary 
 My aim in this chapter has been to further motivate and strengthen the plausibility 
of the narrative interpretation of life’s meaning. This consisted of four broadly related 
tasks: (i) noting the question’s global or all-inclusive aspect, (ii) demonstrating the link 
between the concept of worldview and the narrative interpretation and why this is 
relevant, (iii) discussing the situations, circumstances, and life-contexts out of which the 
question of life’s meaning is birthed, and (iv) more narrowly, to show the philosophical 
advantages of the narrative interpretation over extant interpretations and the amalgam 






The Metaphysical Project 
 
 
It would be wonderful to find in the laws of nature a plan prepared by a concerned 
creator in which human beings played some special role. I find sadness in doubting that 
we will. There are some among my scientific colleagues who say that the contemplation 
of nature gives them all the spiritual satisfaction that others have found in a belief in an 
interested God. Some of them may even feel that way. I do not. 
 
      ~Steven Weinberg (1992, p. 256) 
 
 
And so, I profess my Faith. For me, the existence of all this complexity and awareness 
and intent and beauty, and my ability to apprehend it, serves as the ultimate meaning and 
the ultimate value. The continuation of life reaches around, grabs its own tail, and forms 
a sacred circle that requires no further justification, no Creator, no superordinate 
meaning of meaning, no purpose other than that the continuation continue until the sun 
collapses or the final meteor collides. I confess a credo of continuation. 
 
      ~Ursula Goodenough (2000, p. 171) 
 
 
. . . you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you. 
 
      ~Augustine of Hippo (1998, p. 3) 
 
 
What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there was once in 
man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace? This he 
tries in vain to fill with everything around him, seeking in things that are not there the 
help he cannot find in those that are, though none can help, since this infinite abyss can 
be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself. 
 







Theism, Naturalism, and the Meaning of Life Narrative 
 
 
5.1 Shifting Contexts: From the Linguistic Project to the Metaphysical Project 
 In Chapters One through Four, my aims were broadly linguistic and interpretive. 
Here I introduced, developed, and defended an interpretation of the question, “What is 
the meaning of life?” whereby the question is viewed as the request for a narrative of the 
world that sufficiently addresses those areas of greatest existential import to rational, 
emotional, and self-reflective creatures such as us. I nuanced this general interpretation 
with more precise definitions; these I called CdMLN (Candidate Meaning of Life 
Narrative) and ThMLN (The Meaning of Life). CdMLN picks out narratives with the 
correct formal properties, whereas ThMLN additionally requires the correct material 
content, thus picking out the unique narrative that is the meaning of life. There will be 
numerous candidate meaning of life narratives satisfying the formal condition; there will 
be one and only one narrative that satisfies the formal and material conditions. 
 The remaining chapters (Chapters Five through Seven) will be largely 
metaphysical in orientation. The ‘Metaphysical Project’ of these chapters will 
substantially overlap into philosophical territory subsumed under metaphysics and 
philosophy of religion, as discussions of reductionism, teleology, ultimate explanation, 
God, evil, and eschatology, among others, will occupy a prominent place. In these 
chapters, I will introduce and compare theistic and naturalistic narratives on the category 
of ERN, highlighting key points of divergence. This portion of the dissertation will be 
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largely exploratory, and even though my proclivities will become clear as to which 
narrative I think is most satisfying intellectually and existentially, I will not engage in 
sustained argumentation for any particular conclusion. My aims primarily are to show 
how my interpretation can be utilized in order to compare and contrast relevant narrative 
elements of the meaning of life from the two dominant metaphysical narratives in the 
West, namely, theism and naturalism. In turn, there is then a compelling reason to see 
how discussions largely carried out on different philosophical fronts (e.g., metaphysics 
and philosophy of religion) are equally, and perhaps more importantly, discussions about 
the meaning of life. 
The material in this chapter functions as prolegomena for Chapters Six and Seven. 
Here, I discuss foundational issues for the Metaphysical Project. I begin by discussing 
important definitional considerations surrounding naturalism and theism. I compare strict 
and broad naturalism, and note that, for example, where one sides on the debate over 
ontological reduction will have normative implications in the realms of purpose and 
value, realms that directly link to the meaning of life. Next, I introduce a distinction 
between restricted and expanded theism, followed by a presentation of the central 
contours of a version of expanded theism—Christian expanded theism. After providing 
brief taxonomies of the naturalistic and theistic positions I will later compare, I consider 
how well the concept of narrative is able to map onto entire metaphysical systems like 
naturalism and Christian expanded theism. I note the natural fit between Christian 
expanded theism and the category of narrative, as instantiations of classical theism are 
embodied in stories. Finally, I discuss Sartrian-type criticisms against life being anything 
like a dramatic narrative, and argue that such criticisms do not undermine the narrative 
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interpretation because (i) the narrative interpretation is compatible with reducing some 
candidate meaning of life narratives to explanations of a certain scope, and (ii) these 
criticisms, essentially, are simply objections against traditional instantiations of classical 
theism.1  
5.2 Defining Naturalism 
 In a recent book on the topic, naturalism has been defined as the view that, “. . . 
everything that exists is a part of nature and that there is no reality beyond or outside 
nature.”2 Yet, like most “isms,” naturalism is far from monolithic. Beyond the common 
credo that super-natural entities have no place in a completed ontology, there is much 
divergence within the naturalist camp. As Barry Stroud writes, agreement upon what 
constitutes the naturalist philosophical view is hard to find even among self-avowed 
naturalists: 
“Naturalism” seems to me . . . rather like “World Peace.” Almost everyone swears 
allegiance to it, and is willing to march under its banner. But disputes can still 
break out about what it is appropriate or acceptable to do in the name of that 
slogan. And like world peace, once you start specifying concretely exactly what it 
involves and how to achieve it, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach and to 
sustain a consistent and exclusive “naturalism.” There is pressure on the one hand 
to include more and more within your conception of “nature,” so it loses its 
definiteness and restrictiveness. Or, if the conception is kept fixed and restrictive, 
there is pressure on the other hand to distort or even to deny the very phenomena 
that a naturalistic study—and especially a naturalistic study of human beings—is 
supposed to explain.3 
 
                                                 
1 That is to say, if a traditional instantiation of theism like Jewish, Christian, or Islamic theism is true, then 
life is very much like a dramatic narrative, where the author, God, is purposefully guiding life to a point of 
eschatological culmination. The Sartrian objection has merit if metaphysical naturalism is true. This, 
however, does not undermine my thesis, given that “narrative” can be employed metaphorically in the case 
of the candidate naturalistic meaning of life narrative. 
 
2 Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2008), p. 6. 
 
3 Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. De Caro, Mario and David 
Macarthur (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 22. 
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Stroud’s point is relevant to my interpretation of the meaning of life question. There will 
be more than one candidate naturalistic meaning of life narrative given that naturalistic 
narratives will differ in some of their ERN. Of course, each and every naturalistic 
narrative will have the denial of God and other supernatural entities as a constituent 
narrative element. The similarities, however, will run out. 
The divergence within naturalism, then, is worth tracing, for the way in which one 
explicates naturalism has important implications for candidate naturalistic meaning of life 
narratives. For example, strong reductive forms of naturalism will have different 
narrative elements than non-reductive forms of naturalism; the latter allow for irreducible 
mental properties, normative properties, and teleological explanations of events in the 
deep structure of reality, the former do not. In addition, some naturalistic narratives will 
have as an element that one cannot be mistaken about what is valuable (subjectivists) 
because there is no truth of the matter, whereas other naturalistic narratives will have as 
an element the claim that one ought to order her life around intrinsically valuable states 
of affairs and ends that are objective features of reality (objectivists). It will be helpful, 
then, to briefly define and discuss the general contours of these two approaches to 
naturalism. There are other intramural debates among naturalists besides the debate on 
the ontological front. I will also consider divergence among naturalists on what I call the 
existential front (pessimistic vs. optimistic naturalism) later in this chapter, and the 
normative front (subjectivist vs. objectivist naturalism) in Chapter Six, as such 
discussions fit more naturally in other contexts. 
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5.2.1 Strict Naturalism 
 Strict or “scientific” naturalism is a construal of naturalism that centers on two 
important themes: (i) Ontological: the commitment to an exclusively scientific 
conception of nature, and (ii) Methodological: the reconception of the traditional relation 
between philosophy and science according to which philosophical inquiry is conceived as 
continuous with science.4 Within these broad themes, Mario de Caro and David 
Macarthur define three specific varieties (though not mutually exclusive given that 
scientific naturalism is often viewed comprehensively to include all three) of scientific 
naturalism: ontological scientific naturalism, methodological (or epistemological) 
scientific naturalism, and semantic scientific naturalism. Ontological scientific naturalism 
maintains that the only genuine entities that exist are those posited by acceptable 
scientific explanations.5 Methodological or epistemological scientific naturalism 
maintains that genuine knowledge is secured only through the empirical methods of a 
posteriori inquiry as embodied in the natural sciences.6 Finally, semantic scientific 
naturalism maintains that the only genuine concepts we have are those that are either (i) 
employed by the natural sciences or (ii) capable of reinterpretation through scientifically 
respectable concepts.7 So, scientific naturalism has three dimensions, ontological, 
methodological or epistemological, and semantic. In addition, many naturalists add a 
                                                 
4 Mario de Caro and David Macarthur, “Introduction,” in Naturalism in Question, p. 3. More simply, one 
could state the first two theses as follows: (1) Ontological: everything that exists is a part of nature, and (ii) 
Methodological: something is a part of nature if and only if it is describable and explainable in an ideal, 
complete science or, more specifically, a completed physics. 
 







causal-closure thesis, whereby nature is conceived of “. . . as a causally closed 
spatiotemporal structure governed by efficient causal laws—where causes are thought of, 
paradigmatically, as mind-independent bringers-about of change or difference.”8  
 The above theses correlate closely with another defining feature of strict or 
scientific naturalism: strong ontological reduction. Reductionism, roughly, says that for 
some entity x that is reducible to y, x still exists, but that x is no longer thought be what 
some theory s says it is, but is actually reducible to being y. So, for example, scientists 
used to believe that when a body grows hot, the increase in temperature was due to it 
receiving heat, and heat was understood as a subtle, weightless, invisible fluid known as 
caloric. Today, however, scientists believe that there is no such thing as caloric; instead, 
heat has been reduced to the vibration of molecules. Note that heat was not eliminated (a 
stronger ontological claim), but only that what heat was first thought to be, x (caloric), 
has been reduced to being y (vibration of molecules). Under the rubric of this general 
reductionism, one can identify two specific versions: (i) strong ontological reduction 
(SOR) and (ii) weak ontological reduction (WOR). It is important to note that (i) is more 
closely aligned with strict naturalism, whereas (ii) is more closely aligned with broad or 
liberal naturalism. Indeed, weak ontological reduction is likely consistent with a broad 
naturalist who thinks, for example, that consciousness and normative properties are both 
irreducible and part of the fundamental ontology of the world, even if they are causally 
dependent upon physical states of affairs and properties. I will discuss WOR in the next 
section on broad naturalism. 
 The strong ontological reduction (SOR) thesis may be defined as follows: 
 (SOR) = strong ontological reduction occurs when some entity, state of  
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 10. 
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 affairs, or event x is reduced to some entity, state of affairs, or event y in a  
 way that entails that x is identical to y. 
 
Strongly reducing an entity, state of affairs, or event x to an entity, state of affairs, or 
event y entails that, what are thought to be, two putatively distinct entities are actually 
one and the same entity. For example, in the case of strongly reducing the mental state 
and accompanying phenomenal experience one has while observing a beautiful sunset, 
the mental state and phenomenal experience are said to be identical to a certain 
configuration of neural firing in the brain and central nervous system. The mental state 
and phenomenal experience just is or is nothing more than whatever it is that is going on 
electrochemically in the physical brain and central nervous system. 
 Strict, scientific naturalism, and the accompanying tendency towards strong 
ontological reduction, at least with respect to persons, has been aptly depicted by Francis 
Crick in his The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul: 
The Astonishing Hypothesis is that “You,” your joys and your sorrows, your 
memories and your ambitions, your sense of identity and free will, are in fact no 
more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated 
molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice may have phrased it: “You’re nothing but a 
pack of neurons.” This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people alive 
today that it can be truly called astonishing [emphasis added].9 
 
For Crick and other strict naturalists, ultimate reality is reducible to matter in motion, and 
the postulation of mental, normative, and, more absurdly, spiritual properties and entities 
is, at best, superfluous. An exhaustive account of reality can be given at the level of 
physical, scientific descriptions.10 
                                                 
9 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: Scribner, 
1994), p. 3. 
 
10 Barry Stroud has noted that many take naturalism to entail strict naturalism, “Naturalism is widely 
understood to imply that no evaluative states of affairs or properties are part of the world of nature. On that 
assumption, either evaluative thoughts and beliefs take as their “objects” something that is not to be found 
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5.2.2 Broad Naturalism 
 Broad or liberal naturalists,11 no less than strict naturalists affirm an ontological 
view of the world devoid of finite and infinite spiritual beings (i.e., God, angels, etc.). 
Apart from this, though, there is substantial disagreement about what should be included 
in a fundamental ontology of what is real. For the broad naturalist, things like 
consciousness and normative properties, among others, are fully natural and yet are not 
fully reducible to physics or chemistry. For that matter, they cannot, in principle, be the 
proper objects of study, even for some future, completed, and exhaustive physics. 
Consciousness and normative properties, while fully natural are not the kinds of things 
that can be exhaustively accounted for by physics and chemistry. Generally, broad 
naturalists desire to fit consciousness, value, and teleology within a purely naturalistic 
ontology without reducing these things to something more basic and purely physical. 
Indeed, they acknowledge the reality of consciousness and normative properties, both 
non-moral normative properties (e.g., the goodness of truth and beauty) and moral 
normative properties (e.g., the goodness of benevolence and patience).12 
 Broad naturalists reject strong forms of reductionism, while holding a 
metaphysical view that is consistent with a weaker form of reductionism than SOR. In 
contrast to SOR, weak ontological reduction (WOR) does not require identity relations, 
and is consistent with both ontological emergence and ontological supervenience. The 
weak ontological reduction thesis (WOR) may be defined as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the natural world at all, or their contents are equivalent to something that is true in that world, so they are 
not really evaluative.” “The Charm of Naturalism,” p. 30. 
 
11 I use the term “liberal” in accordance with the introduction of the term in Naturalism in Question to 
define a loosely-connected cluster of emerging viewpoints within the naturalist camp (p. 1). 
 
12 Goetz and Taliaferro, Naturalism, p. 71. 
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(WOR) = weak ontological reduction occurs when some entity, state of affairs, or 
event x is reduced to some entity, state of affairs, or event y in that x is said to be 
caused by or explained by or dependent on y. 
 
Again, WOR is a much weaker metaphysical thesis than SOR. To see the difference, 
consider the following case. Wetness may be said to be weakly reducible to the molecular 
structure of a group of water molecules in that this structure is what causes and explains 
wetness. In an instance of SOR, the wetness of the group of H2O molecules would be 
considered identical to or nothing more than the molecular structure of this group of 
molecules. In an instance of WOR, on the other hand, the wetness of the group of 
molecules might be said to be supervenient on or emergent from that molecular structure. 
That is to say, the property of wetness is different from, even if causally dependent upon, 
the physical molecular structure of the group of water molecules. 
 As noted, WOR is consistent with both emergence and supervenience. Roughly, 
emergence is the metaphysical thesis that complex systems or states of affairs can give 
rise to emergent properties (or substances), and that these emergent properties (or 
substances) are not directly traceable (metaphysical intraceability, not epistemic 
intraceability) to the system’s components,13 but rather to the interaction of the system’s 
components. In the case of emergent properties, the whole really is greater than the 
parts. Emergentism, though, is still consistent with a naturalistic ontology, given that 
emergent properties are still dependent upon physical properties and a matrix of complex 
physical interactions in physical systems and states of affairs. 
                                                 
13 I refer here to metaphysical intraceability and not epistemic intraceability. The former is a stronger 
concept. Emergentism requires the stronger metaphysical intraceability thesis, given that one could 
envision a situation where some property, in fact, is metaphysically traceable even though it is not 
epistemically traceable. Metaphysical intraceability entails epistemic intraceability, but epistemic 
intraceability does not entail metaphysical intraceability. 
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 Contentions and aims of broad naturalism as well as WOR are also consistent 
with various supervenience theses. Supervenience picks out a kind of dependency 
relationship between that which supervenes, and the supervenient base upon which it 
supervenes. While there are weak and strong versions of the supervenience thesis, a 
single, general definition will suffice in this context. I will call it (SV): 
(SV) = A set of properties A is said to supervene on a set of properties B, if and 
only if any two objects x and y which share all properties in B (are “B-
indiscernible”) must also share all properties in A (are “A-indiscernible”).  
 
SV means that A-properties supervene on B-properties if being B-indiscernible entails 
being A-indiscernible. Put simply, if two things differ in their supervenient properties, 
then they must differ in their supervenient base. Here is an example. If mental states (e.g., 
being in pain) supervene on physical or brain states (or central nervous system states), 
then any two persons who are physically (brain stately) indistinguishable must also be 
mentally indistinguishable.14 Note, however, that SV (the way I have defined it) means 
that the supervenience relationship is not symmetrical. That is to say, even if being the 
same physically entails being the same mentally, two persons can be the same mentally 
yet different physically. This is in line with the common view that mental properties are 
thought to be multiply realizable in divergent supervenient bases (e.g., human brain, 
Martian brain, etc.). 
 Considerations of emergence and supervenience are important, as they 
demonstrate that metaphysical strategies employed by broad naturalists to account for 
reality allow one to hold that higher level properties and phenomena like consciousness 
and normative properties depend, ultimately, upon physics without being committed to 
                                                 
14 Again, I am referring to metaphysical indistinguishability and not epistemological indistinguishability. It 
is a variation of the same distinction introduced in footnote 13. 
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the view that one can study those higher level phenomena simply by doing physics. 
Moreover, this will likely have implications for one’s conclusions on whether a 
meaningful life can be secured in a naturalistic world, or, at minimum, what one thinks 
grounds a meaningful life. Is a meaningful life grounded in properties or features of 
existence that objectively obtain or is it grounded subjectively in fiat creations of the 
human will based solely in what an agent desires? Furthermore, if ideas like libertarian 
freedom or some strong version of freedom and a substantial, enduring self are nothing 
more than phenomenal illusions, can one even secure a meaningful existence? Depending 
upon one’s ontological commitments and one’s view of the reductionism project, these 
questions will likely be answered differently, and different options will be available to 
strict and broad naturalists. 
 It is not just theists who criticize the strong reductionism of strict naturalism. 
Thomas Nagel summarizes his pessimistic thoughts on the project of strict naturalism: 
The reductionist project usually tries to reclaim some of the originally excluded 
aspects of the world, by analyzing them in physical—that is, behavioral or 
neurophysiological—terms; but it denies reality to what cannot be so reduced. I 
believe the project is doomed—that conscious experience, thought, value, and so 
forth are not illusions, even though they cannot be identified with physical 
facts.”15 
 
The debate over what naturalism entails, especially in terms of the metaphysical content 
of the naturalistic worldview is important for my project in this dissertation as the stage is 
being set for a comparison of naturalistic and theistic candidate meaning of life 
                                                 
15 From Thomas Nagel, “The Fear of Religion,” The New Republic (October 23, 2006) as quoted in 
Timothy Keller, The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Dutton, 2008), pp. 91-92. 
Interestingly, Nagel has also said, “I am talking of . . . the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, 
being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true. . . . It isn’t just that I don’t believe in 
God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to 
be a God: I don’t want the universe to be like that. . . . I am curious whether there is anyone who is 
genuinely indifferent as to whether there is a God—anyone who, whatever his actual belief about the 
matter, doesn’t particularly want either one of the answers to be correct.” The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 130. 
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narratives. Given the divergence within the naturalist camp, there is no single naturalistic 
candidate meaning of life narrative. What is important, though, is that certain key 
differences in candidate naturalistic meaning of life narratives will partially track the 
distinction between strict and broad conceptions of naturalism. 
5.3 Restricted Theism vs. Expanded Theism 
 Up to this point in the dissertation, I have spoken of theism in general. By 
“theism,” I refer to the view that an omnicompetent (omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnibenevolent) personal God exists who is both transcendent and immanent, and who is 
responsible for the universe, where such responsibility is thought to entail God’s creation 
of the universe. “Theism,” or classical theism, is generally taken to be shorthand for 
monotheism. It is the view of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Leibniz, Edwards, and many 
others, both historically and in the contemporary world, and has a rich and venerable 
pedigree. These theologian-philosophers or philosopher-theologians affirmed more, 
doctrinally, than simply the existence of an omnicompetent God, but they at least 
affirmed this. 
Significant philosophical debates in the philosophy of religion, where discussions 
of the merits or demerits of theism are at the fore, have generally focused on a generic 
sort of theism that abstracts certain metaphysical theses about the nature of God from 
their historical-religious contexts. Relevantly, back in the mid-1980’s, William Rowe 
introduced an important distinction into discussions of the evidential problem of evil 
between restricted theism and expanded theism. He states: 
 Let’s call standard theism any view which holds that there exists an omnipotent, 
 omniscient, omnigood being who created the world. Letting ‘O’ abbreviate ‘an 
 omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being’, standard theism is any view which 
 holds that O exists. Within standard theism, we can distinguish restricted theism 
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 and expanded theism. Expanded theism is the view that O exists, conjoined with 
 certain other significant religious claims, claims about sin, redemption, a future 
 life, a last judgment, and the like. (Orthodox Christian theism is a version of 
 expanded theism.) Restricted theism is the view that O exists, unaccompanied by 
 other, independent religious claims.16 
 
Whether this distinction is able to advance philosophical discussions of the problem of 
evil past the long-standing dialectical impasse between theists and non-theists is unclear. 
More importantly for my aims is the general claim that theists ought to avail themselves 
of all relevant theological resources in their worldview, whether that be in the context of 
the problem of evil or the meaning of life. Christian, Jewish, and Islamic instantiations of 
theism posit much more, theologically, than the minimalist affirmation of the existence of 
an omnicompetent deity, and these additional theological commitments will have 
relevance to certain philosophical issues. 
 Within the context of the problem of evil, Marilyn McCord Adams has noted her 
own concern of the perceived failure to move beyond general discussions of the 
compossibility of God and evil only with the resources provided by a generic theism: 
 My own nutshell answer [to the question of why discussions on the problem of 
 evil had stalled] is that the debate was carried on at too high a level of abstraction. 
 By agreeing to a focus on what William Rowe came to label “restricted standard 
 theism,” both sides avoided responsibility to a particular tradition; neither took 
 care—whether in arguments for the incompossibility of God and evils, or in their 
 rebuttals—to construe the value-premisses and attribute-analyses as that tradition 
 does; neither felt any pressure to explore its distinctive resources or to admit its 
 peculiar liabilities. In fact, Christian theism embraces a richer store of valuables 
 than secular value-theories recognize, while some versions of Christianity 
 countenance worse evils as well.17  
 
                                                 
16 William Rowe, “Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra,” in The Problem of Evil, eds. 
Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 161. This 
article originally appeared in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16 (1984): pp. 95-100. 
 
17 Marily McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), p. 3. 
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By and large, I agree with Adams’s assessment. For this reason, among others,18 I will 
approach those remaining portions of my discussion of the meaning of life where theism 
is relevant from the viewpoint of a specific instantiation of theism—Christian theism.19 I 
am fully aware that there are other deeply historically rooted versions of theism; 
however, I will operate within the specific theistic parameters with which I am familiar 
and of which I am a part. No less than with the problem of evil, a theistic discussion of 
the meaning of life that fails to appropriate resources from a rich and robust theologico-
historical narrative will likely be truncated and impoverished.  
5.3.1 Christian Expanded Theism: Broad Contours 
 Moving from generic, minimalistic theism to Christian theism, although it more 
tightly circumscribes the conceptual territory, still leaves one with a staggering range of 
theological options. One need only be casually acquainted with Church history and 
historical theology to know that there is no consensus on numerous doctrinal affirmations 
of Christian theism. The diversity within Christian theism is often highlighted, though, 
without appreciating the significant doctrinal agreement among Roman Catholic, 
Orthodox, and Protestant Christians. One way of defining Christian theism, then, is to 
isolate the core of agreement between these different groups.20 Indeed, one will find 
substantial agreement, especially centering on the creedal affirmations encapsulated in 
                                                 
18 An additional reason is that a restricted, bare-bones theism does not provide a sufficient number of 
narrative or explanatory elements to answer all of the questions associated with the meaning of life. 
 
19 There will be a few places, however, where theism in general will suffice. 
 
20 Although, even here there will be debate. Some groups that find themselves outside of “orthodox” 
Christian belief and practice as defined by, for example, the Apostle’s and Nicene Creeds, will think that I 
have already defined Christian theism too narrowly. There is really no way to avoid this. The line of 
demarcation must be drawn somewhere, and that will likely always exclude some views. Furthermore, this 
dissertation is not an apologetic for any particular instantiation of Christian expanded theism. I select a 
version with which I am familiar, and explore the kind of candidate meaning of life narrative that it offers. 
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Nicene Orthodoxy and as expressed in the Apostles’ and Nicene creeds, among 
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Edwards, Wesley, and many others.21 
Defining Christian theism, then, may involve saying that one means by “Christian 
theism,” what these theologians meant by “Christian theism” in the core theological 
affirmations that unite them. Sorting through their similarities and differences, though, is 
too cumbersome and unnecessary for my aims in the dissertation. 
 Probably the most helpful way of explicating Christian theism at the service of 
my goals in this dissertation, and as inclusively as possible given my own theological 
commitments, is to trace the broad contours of the narrative to which nearly all Christian 
theists assent, even if only in some broad sense. It is the narrative built around the themes 
of creation-fall-redemption-consummation (CFRC). No doubt, Christian theists within 
diverse theological traditions will disagree over precisely how these themes of CFRC are 
understood and what they entail, but there will be general agreement on the broad 
contours. For example, most Christian theists will affirm (i) that God exists as a personal, 
transcendent agent,22 (ii) that this being is causally responsible, ultimately, for the 
existence of the universe, (iii) that there is some sort of “problem” in the universe 
requiring remedy, (iv) that God has enacted a plan to remedy this problem, and (v) that 
this plan will eventually culminate in a good and blessed ending. Recognizing that not all 
who label themselves as Christian theists will be comfortable with (i) through (v), I will 
simply stipulate that this how I intend to employ Christian theism in this dissertation. I 
                                                 
21 Of course, one will also find disagreement among these theologians on the nature of epistemic and 
religious authority within the context of debates over the relationship of Scripture and tradition, the 
doctrine of justification, and ecclesiology, among others. 
 
22 Those within the process theology tradition, for example, will already disagree. But again, my aim is not 
nor can it be to provide a definition that allows each and every view that someone thinks should fall under 
the rubric of Christian theism to be represented. 
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have been as inclusive as possible, but exclusion, at some level, is unavoidable whenever 
one advances positive theses about the nature of reality. In §5.5 (“Christian Theism and 
the Category of Narrative”) I will provide a fuller relevant presentation of CFRC along 
with the narrative built around these themes. 
5.4 Candidate Meaning of Life Narratives and Narrative Category Gradience 
 In Chapter Two, following David Herman, I noted that the category of narrative 
exhibits gradience.23  Therefore, a given instance of discourse can be more or less a 
central instance of the category of narrative, and less central instances will have elements 
that allow them to be merged into other categories of discourse (e.g., explanations, 
descriptions, lists, etc.). That the category of narrative is characterized by gradience 
invites both paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic uses of the category. On non-
paradigmatic uses, “narrative” might be dissolved into “experience,” “interpretation,” 
“explanation,” “representation,” or even “content.”24 A non-paradigmatic employment 
allows, for example, a text on evolution or the Big Bang to count as narrative, as well as 
other forms of discourse. An example of a narrative in the paradigmatic sense would be 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace or, possibly, my grandfather narrating his involvement in the 
Battle of the Bulge or the Battle of Hürtgen forest in World War II. 
 My narrative interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is 
consistent with both paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic employments of the category of 
narrative. Recall the analogy I introduced in §3.5 of Chapter Three (“The Narrative 
Interpretation: An Analogy”) of the father walking in on his children’s scuffle and 
                                                 
23 David Herman, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge 





demanding, “What is the meaning of this?” The resulting answer to the father’s request 
may be a narrative paradigmatically or it might be an explanation that fails to bear all the 
marks of a paradigmatic case of narrative. It is plausible to think, though, that the ensuing 
answer offered by the children will bear many distinct marks of a narrative, thus pushing 
it closer to an instance of a paradigmatic narrative. Once the children say, “Well, this is 
how it started,” there is no reason to think that what follows will not be a story in the 
robust sense, even though the ensuing instance of discourse could also be viewed as an 
explanation that fails to fully qualify as a narrative. It is not really that important for my 
purposes that we resolve this issue. 
Whether or not a candidate meaning of life “narrative” is a narrative 
paradigmatically or only in a loose sense is a question, the answer to which is worldview 
specific. For example, a naturalistic candidate meaning of life narrative will likely lack 
elements needed to qualify it as a paradigmatic narrative, whereas Christian theistic 
candidate meaning of life narratives will be examples of paradigmatic narratives. This 
does not mean that naturalism lacks a putative answer to the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” as it provides an explanation across all those elements of ERQ of which 
I argued a candidate meaning of life narrative needs to narrate. Even if naturalism cannot 
produce a narrative that is an instance of narrative discourse paradigmatically, this 
remains an important claim that separates my interpretation of the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” from others. The reason for this is that the meaning of life explanation 
provided by naturalism, even if not a full-blown narrative, is different and more 
comprehensive than an answer to any one of the cluster of questions associated with the 
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meaning of life. That is to say, it is not the same explanation as the explanation of what 
the purpose of life is or what makes life valuable. 
The lesson here is that certain candidate meaning of life narratives will be 
narratives in the full sense, while others will not. Therefore, Sartrian-type criticisms 
against viewing our lives as participating in some larger dramatic narrative are not 
directly relevant to my thesis. Neither the linguistic project nor the metaphysical project 
of this dissertation requires a candidate meaning of life narrative to be a narrative in a 
robust sense. An important point here is that Sartrian objections against life being 
anything like a dramatic narrative are themselves worldview specific. If naturalism is 
true, I would argue that Sartre and others are correct. However, if theism, or some other 
religious narrative of reality is true then Sartrian objections have little merit. I will 
consider the Sartrian objection in more detail later in this chapter. 
So, the narrative interpretation is not undermined by the fact that some candidate 
meaning of life narratives do not qualify as paradigmatic narratives. The fact that some 
do and others do not is instructive, though, and reveals important assumptions and 
dynamics surrounding the meaning of life question that I will discuss at the end of this 
chapter. This divergence is entirely consistent with the narrative interpretation which 
posits that in asking the question of life’s meaning, we should view ourselves as 
searching for a narrative, paradigmatically or non-paradigmatically construed, that 
crosses the explanatory threshold constituted by ERQ. The ensuing instance of discourse 
may be little more than the conjunctive explanation consisting of individual answers to 
the questions emerging from the category of ERQ.
25 This conjunctive explanation would 
                                                 
25 This conjunctive explanation view would accurately describe a candidate  naturalistic meaning of life 
narrative. Although, one should not take the presence of this mere conjunctive explanation to entail that an 
 151
be the meaning of life. On the other hand, the ensuing instance of discourse may be, 
robustly, a narrative in the paradigmatic sense, with the presence of appropriate bridges 
(e.g., temporal, causal, teleological) between each answer to a question embedded in the 
category of ERQ. In the next two sections, I will discuss relevant implications for whether 
a candidate meaning of life narrative is so in a paradigmatic or non-paradigmatic sense 
that follow from whether it is naturalism or Christian theism that is under consideration. 
A candidate meaning of life narrative’s status as a narrative is undoubtedly fluid, 
and a given candidate narrative will reside somewhere on a narrative continuum between 
paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic uses, or among concentric circles with paradigmatic 
instances of narrative in the center and less paradigmatic instances radiating outward. 
That a candidate meaning of life narrative is a fluid concept is partly a function of (i) that 
such candidate narratives are essentially what Jean-François Lyotard, and others, have 
called metanarratives, and (ii) that metanarratives are themselves fluid constructions not 
always instantiating a narrative in the paradigmatic and robust sense. 
As noted in §3.6 of Chapter Three (“Metanarratives and the Narrative 
Interpretation”), metanarratives or grand narratives are “. . . second-order narratives 
which seek to narratively articulate and legitimate some concrete first-order practices or 
narratives.”26 They are overarching “stories” about where and who we are, among other 
things.27 A metanarrative is largely defined by its scope; it has grand, universal 
                                                                                                                                                 
answer to one question revolving around an element in ERQ is entirely unrelated to another answer. This 
will not be the case, even on the naturalistic meaning of life narrative which is a narrative only in a 
metaphorical sense. 
 
26 J. M. Bernstein, “Grand Narratives,” in Paul Ricouer: Narrative and Interpretation, ed.  
David Wood (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 102. 
 
27 Ibid., p. 103. 
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pretensions. What kind of universe do we live in? Is it the product of a personal, 
intentional being? Is there an irreducible teleological element to the rationale of 
existence? What is our place in the universe that does exist? What kind of creatures are 
we? Are we merely electro-chemical machines, where all semblances of genuine, 
irreducibly teleological difference-making agency and personal identity are nothing more 
than phenomenal illusions? Are we electro-chemical agents who, while giving rise to 
higher-order, non-reducible properties like consciousness, nonetheless, will cease to exist 
upon the irreversible biological demise of our electro-chemical parts? These and other 
basic questions are what metanarratives “narrate.” Some of them do so with a story that is 
more paradigmatically an instance of narrative, where the “story” narrated by other 
metanarratives is less story-like. The Christian theistic metanarrative will be more story-
like, whereas a naturalistic metanarrative will be less story-like and more explanation-
like. It is to this issue that I now turn. 
5.5 Christian Theism and the Category of Narrative 
 The category of narrative bears a prominent relationship to Christian expanded 
theism.  This close connection largely follows from the character and shape of Scripture 
itself, an historical-theological-literary document that many Christian theists consider to 
be, in some sense, an instance of divine revelation.28 Scripture instantiates a theo-drama, 
                                                 
28 I use and highlight “document,” as opposed to “narrative” or “story,” to call attention to the fact that 
Scripture consists of a diverse series of discourse types that compose the whole. This fact, of course, leads 
to much debate about issues of thematic and theological unity, and whether there can even be said to be 
unity among the books composing the so-called “canon.” These debates themselves cannot be divorced 
from more foundational metaphysical, epistemological, and theological discussions surrounding the 
authority of Scripture, specifically, whether the books composing Scripture ultimately are theopnuestos 
(breathed out by God) or solely the product of man. Note well, though, that the claim that Scripture 
ultimately originates in the Divine intention and comes to fruition through a God-ordained process does not 
rule out a relevant and important place for the creative activities of man. To reject the human element of 
Scripture is little more than biblical doscetism, paralleling views whereby it was thought that the second 
person of the trinity did not really “take” a human body to himself in the incarnation. 
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a drama where CFRC, or some story closely akin, is narrated. However, the presence of a 
theo-drama in and around Scripture, does not entail that sola narratione, as a biblical-
theological view, is sufficient to capture the varieties of discourse found from Genesis to 
Revelation. One can affirm, though, the central place of the narrative that permeates 
Scripture without being committed to the stronger claim that Scripture just is a narrative 
and nothing more. Narrative is only one among many biblical genres and theological-
literary types including, among others, poetry, legal documentation, letters, parables, 
wisdom, law, prophecy, songs, prayers, moral instruction, propositional doctrinal 
reflection and so on.  
 Despite the diversity of literary genre-types, narrative functions centrally within 
the canon of Scripture,29 and takes relevant priority in some sense. Emphasizing the 
narrative quality of Scripture has rich historic ancestry, as one can find relevant 
discussions in Irenaeus, Augustine, and Aquinas. More recently the redemptive-historical 
approach to Scripture rooted in Calvin and given sustained and rigorous treatment in the 
work of Geerhardus Vos and Herman Ridderbos, has been influential within Reformed 
theology.30 In contemporary mainstream theology, paralleling the narrative turn in other 
academic disciplines, discussions of narrative are at the fore; this is evidenced in the 
                                                 
 
29 This claim is neutral with respect to the debate between Protestant Christian theists on one side and 
Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christian theists on the other regarding the material content of the 
canon of Scripture. 
 
30 See, for example, Geerhardus Vos, Biblical Theology, and Herman Ridderbos, When the Time Had Fully 
Come: Studies in New Testament Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1957), Redemptive History and 
the New Testament Scriptures, trans. H. DeJongst; rev. R. Gaffin (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing, 1988), and The Coming Kingdom, trans. H. DeJongst (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian 
and Reformed Publishing, 1962). 
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work of, among others, Craig Bartholomew, Gabriel Fackre, Stanley Hauerwas, Gerard 
Loughlin, George Stroup, and N. T. Wright.31 
 The sense in which narrative takes priority over, or is more fundamental to, other 
literary genres in Scripture has been nicely articulated by several biblical scholars. Sidney 
Greidanus notes, “Of all the biblical genres of literature, narrative may be described as 
the central, foundational, and all-encompassing genre of the Bible. The prominence of the 
narrative genre in the Bible is related to the Bible’s central message that God acts in 
history. No other genre can express that message as well as narrative.”32 Michael 
Williams makes a similar point, “It [Scripture] is a storied revelation. This fact suggests 
that the unifying, insight-producing feature that gives the Bible its coherence as 
revelation is the story it tells. Indeed, the Bible as a whole is best understood as a story or 
drama” [emphasis added].33 According to Williams, it is the deep redemptive narrative 
pervading Scripture that provides the unifying construct for the literary, thematic, and 
theological diversity of the Bible, “But what holds all of it [various elements of Scripture] 
together; what makes it a unified revelation is the storyline, what theologians often call 
the drama of redemption. The nonnarrative pieces fit into and make sense only within 
                                                 
31 Craig Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen, The Drama of Scripture: Finding Our Place in the Biblical 
Story (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007); Gabriel Fackre, “Narrative Theology from an 
Evangelical Perspective,” in Faith and Narrative, ed. Keith Yandell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), pp. 188-201; Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Stanley Hauerwas and L. G. Jones, eds. Why Narrative? 
Readings in Narrative Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989); 
Gerard Loughlin, Telling God’s Story: Bible, Church, and Narrative Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); George Stroup, The Promise of Narrative Theology: Recovering the Gospel in the 
Church (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981); and N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God. 
Vol. 1. Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). 
 
32 Sidney Greidanus, The Modern Preacher and the Ancient Text (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2000), p. 188. 
 
33 Michael D. Williams, Far as the Curse is Found: The Covenant Story of Redemption (Philipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 2005), x. 
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their appropriate contexts in the biblical storyline.”34 James Barr makes much the same 
point as Williams: 
. . . in my conception all of the Bible counts as ‘story.’ A people’s story is not 
necessarily purely narrative: materials of many kinds may be slotted into a 
narrative structure, and this is done in the Hebrew Bible. Thus legal materials are 
inserted and appear, almost entirely, as part of the Moses story. In this case they 
are incorporated into the narrative. Others are more loosely attached: songs and 
hymns of the temple and of individuals, mostly collected in the Book of Psalms 
but some slotted into the narratives as in Samuel, Kings and Chronicles. It does 
not matter much what weight we place on the ‘Solomonic’ authorship of Wisdom 
books: whether because they came from Solomon, or because they were general 
lore of Israel, they are part of the story also. 
 
In the New Testament, the letters of great leaders and an apocalyptic book like 
Revelation form part of the story, along with the more strictly narrative writings. 
Thus in general, although not all parts of the Bible are narrative, the narrative 
character of the story elements provide a better framework into which the non-
narrative parts may be fitted than any framework based on the non-narrative parts 
into which the story elements could be fitted.35 
 
In accord with Greidanus, Williams, Barr, and numerous others, Scripture can be 
compellingly viewed as instantiating a “sprawling, capacious story”36 through which all 
of the other non-narrative modes of discourse found in Scripture find their literary, 
thematic, and theological place.  
 Scripture, then, provides the narrative raw materials for the construction of a 
grand metanarrative, the kind of which postmodernism is incredulous according to Jean-
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 James Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1999), p. 356. 
 
36 Craig Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen, “Story and Biblical Theology,” in Out of Egypt: Biblical 
Theology and Biblical Interpretation, vol. 5, Scripture and Hermeneutics Series (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2004), p. 161. 
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François Lyotard.37 Postmodernity may be suspicious of metanarratives, but historically 
such narratives have provided the deep theoretical and existential framework in which 
truth claims and praxis have been meaningfully grounded. Interestingly, the philosopher 
Julian Young has argued that there is a striking correlation between the disintegration or, 
at minimum, diminution of supernatural or religious metanarratives and the rise of 
anxiety-laden searching for the meaning of life. He states, “For most of our Western 
history we have not talked about the meaning of life. This is because we used to be quite 
certain that we knew what it was.”38 He proceeds to note that the meaning of life was 
secured through what he calls a “true-world narrative:”  
Since journeys have a beginning, a middle and an end, a true-world account of the 
proper course of our lives is a kind of story, a narrative. And since true-world 
narratives (that, for example, of Christianity) are global rather than individual, 
since they narrate not just your life or mine, but rather all lives at all times and 
places, they are, as I shall call them, ‘grand’ narratives.39  
 
However, Young remarks that such all-encompassing narratives, due to the rise of 
experimental science fueled partly by Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, lost much of 
their traction in the modern world. With this diminution of grand religious metanarratives 
in the West, people began to question the meaning of life more vigorously, primarily 
because constitutive narrative elements that closely linked to the meaning of life had 
supposedly lost intellectual plausibility in a world where science was supplanting 
                                                 
37 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Theory and History of 
Literature, Vol. 10. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985), xxiv. 
 





teleological-theological explanations with mechanistic-naturalistic ones.40 Of course, the 
diminution of religious metanarratives did not mean the loss of metanarratives 
simpliciter, as various naturalistic metanarratives were birthed.41 Interestingly though, 
and apropos to my concerns here, is that teleological-theological explanations are the 
kinds of explanations that can merge naturally into narratives in a paradigmatic and 
robust sense, whereas naturalistic explanations cannot, and the resulting “narratives” built 
around such explanations will count as narratives only in a non-paradigmatic, minimalist 
sense. 
Whether one is skeptical of metanarratives or not, the text around which Christian 
expanded theism is largely built clearly offers one.42 Those operating broadly within the 
Reformed theological paradigm view this metanarrative emerging from Scripture as 
centering around the unfolding themes I previously introduced of creation-fall-
                                                 
40 Rollo May makes a similar point. Although he speaks of myth, the concept functions in much the same 
way as metanarrative. “A myth is a way of making sense in a senseless world. Myths are narrative patterns 
that give significance to our existence. . . . Myths are like the beams in a house . . . they are the structure 
which holds the house together so people can live in it. . . . We in the twentieth century are in a [s]ituation 
of “aching hearts” and “repining.” Our myths no longer serve their function of making sense of existence, 
the citizens of our day are left without direction or purpose in life, and people are at a loss to control their 
anxiety and excessive guilt feeling.” The Cry for Myth (New York: Norton, 1991), pp. 15-16. Christian 
theists may not be comfortable with labeling the historical-redemptive narrative as myth for good reason, 
but this narrative functions similarly to Rollo’s myth. 
 
41 And, despite postmodernity’s suspicion of all metanarratives as catalysts of oppression and the like, it is 
not at all clear that any view can escape making ultimate assertions about the way the world actually is. For 
example, a postmodernist who might claim that all knowledge claims are conditioned social constructions 
and therefore cannot correspond with the way the world actually is, has himself asserted a proposition that 
he takes to reflect the way the world actually is. The question, then, is not so much whether we indwell 
some grand metanarrative, but which one we indwell. 
 
42 For that matter, naturalism, no less than various instantiations of classical theism, offers its own 
metanarrative complete with a naturalistic account of origins, a naturalistic account of humanly created 
purpose, a naturalistic account of what makes life valuable, a naturalistic account of why pain and suffering 
are features of the universe, and a naturalistic account of how it will all end, both for individuals and the 
universe in general. 
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redemption-consummation (CFRC).43 Even a brief look at these themes reveals a 
narrative whose focus links naturally and powerfully to the cluster of concerns (ERQ) I 
introduced in Chapter Three, and around which the meaning of life narrative is built. 
Indeed, CFRC contains both ERQ and ERN, the contextual narrative framework through 
which ERQ are understood and appraised. More strongly, it is not simply that the 
narrative built around CFRC contains a narrative framework through which to understand 
ERQ, it actually centers on this cluster of concerns. Within the biblical-theological 
narrative centering on CFRC, one will find explanations of (i) origins, (ii) purpose, (iii) 
value, (iv) pain, suffering, and evil, and (v) ending.  
Additionally, the narrative centering on CFRC, and providing explanations of (i) 
through (v), is a narrative in a paradigmatic and robust sense. Indeed, the explanations of 
each (i) through (v) will exhibit, among others, causal, spatial, temporal, and teleological 
continuity between them, as each is imbedded within the same larger narrative. In this 
larger narrative, there exists an overarching progression moving from (i) – beginning or 
origins to (v) – narrative ending in a way that is meant to resolve a fundamental problem 
introduced into the narrative. The explanations are each narratively related to each other 
and occupy significant places in the narrative as a whole. The primary reason for this 
continuity among the explanations of (i) through (v) on the Christian theistic meaning of 
life narrative follows from the Christian theistic ontological claim that a divine purposive 
agent exists who created the world, who is working in the world to solve the chief 
                                                 
43 I will move fluidly between the concepts of CFRC and the historical-redemptive narrative of Scripture. 
Technically, however, the historical-redemptive narrative of Scripture is the narrative that narrates these 
themes. Also, Christian theists outside the Reformed theological paradigm assent to CFRC. 
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“problem,” and who is guiding states of affairs toward a felicitous end.44 In terms of a 
paradigmatic employment of narrative this is important, as it provides a teleological 
reason (as opposed to merely an efficient causal reason) for why we exist, it notes a 
problem that needs to be solved and has been solved by this same purposive agent, it 
highlights the remedy to this problem enacted by this purposive agent, and it shows, even 
if only in outline form, how it is that this portion of the story (post-lapsarian, yet pre-
eschatological consummation) is going to come to a felicitous ending through the 
direction of this purposive agent. It is this story that is being told in the Christian theistic 
narrative centering around the themes of creation-fall-redemption-consummation, and it 
is a narrative in the paradigmatic and robust sense. 
5.6 Naturalism and the Category of Narrative 
 Not all metanarratives or candidate meaning of life narratives will qualify as 
narratives in a paradigmatic sense. This, however, need not stop us from using the label 
“narrative” to describe them. In Chapter Two, I noted that narrative can be broadly 
construed such that many different modes of representation can qualify as narrative, even 
if only loosely. I also noted that the concept of a metanarrative is fluid to allow for grand 
“narratives” of reality that are either robustly or non-robustly narrative. Candidate 
naturalistic meaning of life narratives will fall into the latter category. Surely, though, a 
naturalistic candidate meaning of life narrative will have a “story” to tell, the kind of 
story metanarratives narrate, beginning with the Big Bang, ending with the “death” of the 
                                                 
44 I call attention to “guiding” given that this has implications for debates over God’s omniscience and 
providence. Guidance can be construed on a continuum from comprehensive to minimalistic. Different 
theological paradigms fall at different places on the continuum; some holding a comprehensive view of 
God’s providential control, whereas others hold a much less comprehensive view. However, Christian 
theists of all theological persuasions will affirm God’s guidance in some sense, even though substantial 
disagreement exists over the details. 
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universe, and filling in the details in between about why we exist, what makes life 
valuable, and how we can secure a worthwhile existence, if we can, in light of the 
hardships of life. While this may not be a narrative in the strict sense that a Christian 
theistic candidate meaning of life narrative is, it is sufficient to count as an answer to the 
question, “What is the meaning of life?” as it provides an overarching framework through 
which to answer the cluster of questions associated with the meaning of life. My narrative 
interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” does not require a candidate 
meaning of life narrative to be a narrative in a paradigmatic and robust sense. Some 
candidate meaning of life narratives will be narratives paradigmatically while others will 
not. 
 In her insightful article, “Toward a definition of narrative,” Marie-Laure Ryan 
tells a story that is relevant here. She explains that after delivering a lecture in which she 
presented her definition of narrativity, she asked the audience whether the following text 
adapted from Brian Greene’s The Elegant Universe, in which he “recounts” the first 
moments of our universe’s history, counts as narrative: 
The universe started out as cold and essentially infinite in spatial extent. Then an 
instability kicked in, driving every point in the universe to rush rapidly away from 
every other. This caused space to become increasingly curved and resulted in a 
dramatic increase of temperature and energy density. After some time, a 
millimeter-sized three-dimensional region within this vast expanse created a 
superhot and dense patch. The expansion of this patch can account for the whole 
of the universe with which we are now familiar.45 
 
Ryan notes that, initially, most in the audience did not think that the piece of text from 
Greene counted as narrative. However, a few days later she received a phone call from a 
                                                 
45 Adapted from Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions and the Quest for 
the Ultimate Theory (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 362, and quoted in Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward 
a definition of narrative,” in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative, ed. David Herman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 31-2. 
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man who had changed his mind, now inclined to call the above example a narrative. Ryan 
uses this account to illustrate that the boundaries between narrative and non-narrative are, 
in the end, fuzzy. This observation, no less, will apply to candidate meaning of life 
narratives. The naturalistic metanarrative will be a “story” that may be little more than a 
conjunctive explanation consisting of the individual explanations of each of the members 
of the class of ERQ.
46 This observation does not, however, mean that naturalism fails to 
produce a metanarrative, or at least a narrative in which to imbed its unique way of 
accounting for all of reality (i.e., empirical science). As Georgetown theologian John 
Haught notes: 
. . . the naturalistic dismissal of the cognitive (as distinct from emotive) function 
of story, a denial that undergirds much contemporary academic life, is itself borne 
aloft on the wings of a firmly established cultural narrative of its own. It is 
empowered by the myth that trustworthy consciousness came into the world only 
with the birth of objectifying scientific method during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth Centuries. It is a story laced with abundant accounts of heroic 
explorers and their own struggles toward the light. All over the world initiates to 
objectifying consciousness imbibe the myth of science’s ascent and its exalted 
ethic of knowledge. Nothing provides clearer evidence of the inescapability of 
story than the modern attempt to escape it.47 
 
Quite separate from Haught’s claim, highlighting the notion of category gradience that 
characterizes narrative neutralizes the Sartrian objection against there even being any 
naturalistic candidate meaning of life narratives, an objection to which I will now briefly 
turn. 
                                                 
46 Again, viewing a candidate meaning of life narrative as a conjunctive explanations does not undermine 
the narrative interpretation, however. Of importance is that the conjunctive explanation is the meaning of 
life, and this is different from any one explanation to individual questions about purpose, value, or worth. 
 
47 John Haught, Is Nature Enough? Meaning and Truth in the Age of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 47. 
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5.6.1 The Naturalistic Meaning of Life Narrative and Sartrian Objections 
 In La Nausée, through the musings of the character Antoine Roquentin, the 
French existentialist atheist, Jean-Paul Sartre, argues that life is nothing like a dramatic 
narrative. Dramatic narratives are infused with teleology, order, and meaningful 
connection among narrative elements, where narrative elements are purposefully linked, 
often at the service of some final end. Life, says Sartre, is nothing like this, even though 
humans are pre-disposed to think it is. In fitting life into dramatic narrative form, we do 
nothing more than impose, retrospectively, an ad hoc, illusory meaningful order onto 
events which do not inherently possess such order. Life itself, then, is not like humanly-
authored stories. There is no teleological progression in life from the outside as it were. A 
mixture of randomness and necessity (stemming from natural laws) is what characterizes 
life. Therefore, life cannot be referred to as a dramatic narrative. This I will call the 
Sartrian objection. In this brief section, I want to further present the objection through a 
short piece by Alan Dershowitz, and explain why the objection is not an objection to my 
narrative interpretation but only an objection to a naturalist who thinks her candidate 
meaning of life narrative is a paradigmatic, robust instance of narrative. 
 Alan Dershowitz, in his intriguing essay, “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative,”48 
forcefully presents and defends the Sartrian objection. He begins his piece with a fictional 
account that invokes the advice of Anton Chekhov, the great nineteenth-century Russian 
short-story writer, to the writer, S. S. Schovkin, “If in the first chapter you say that a gun 
hung on the wall, in the second or third chapter it must without fail be discharged.”49 The 
                                                 
48 Alan Dershowitz, “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative,” in Law’s Stories: Narrative and  Rhetoric in the 
Law, eds. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 99-105. 
 
49 Chekhov as quoted in Dershowitz, “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative,” p. 100. 
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point of this illustration is to call attention to the fact that, in dramatic narratives, there is 
a meaningful, teleological connection between the various elements of the narrative. 
These elements each mean something, as they are connected meaningfully to a larger, 
purposeful literary creation. In a dramatic narrative, then, there are no meaningless 
elements.  
Many think this same principle applies to life; that the multifaceted elements of 
life, her joys, sorrows, and tribulations, are all connected in some grand dramatic 
narrative. They are thought to all mean something in that each is part of a purposeful 
whole. Dershowitz observes that “. . . many literary, biblical, and even constitutional 
scholars live by a rule of teleology that has little resonance in real life—namely, that 
every event, character, and word has a purpose.”50 But, he argues, life is precisely not like 
this: 
But life does not imitate art. Life is not a purpose narrative that follows 
Chekhov’s canon. Events are often simply meaningless, irrelevant to what comes 
next; events can be out of sequence, random, purely accidental, without purpose. 
If our universe and its inhabitants are governed by rules of chaos, randomness, 
and purposelessness, then many of the stories—if they can even be called 
stories—will often lack meaning. Human beings always try to impose order and 
meaning on random chaos, both to understand and to control the forces that 
determine their destiny. This desperate attempt to derive purpose from 
purposelessness will often distort reality, as, indeed, Chekhov’s canon does.51 
 
Despite, as Dershowitz notes, our propensity to apply Chekhov’s canon in courts 
of law and to life itself, doing so, he argues, is replete with errors. He observes that often, 
in courts of law, there is a tendency to craft a narrative where facts thought to be relevant 
to the guilt of person x are coherently infused into a dramatic narrative, but where, 







probabilistically, those facts provide no compelling reasons, by themselves, to establish a 
conclusion of guilt. This might work if events in life always follow Chekhov’s canon; the 
problem, however, is that they often do not. In dramatic narratives, there is a teleological 
progression from one event to another. But life does not always fit this and other patterns 
found in dramatic narratives. Real life is “. . . filled with coincidences, randomness, and 
illogic . . .”52 Imposing a dramatic narrative form onto some subset of events often 
grossly distorts reality, and yet we are prone to do so.  
Arranging elements in life into dramatic narrative form is likely one of many 
heuristic strategies or schemas that we humans use to make sense out of our lives and the 
world, and with which we navigate through life without becoming paralyzingly entangled 
in the complexity of things. The problem is that heuristics and schemas, while sometimes 
helpful, can be misleading.53 Given our propensity to interpret events through dramatic 
narrative form (i.e., Chekhov’s canon), we are accustomed to viewing all elements in a 
subset of events as being teleologically and meaningfully related to one another. 
However, that such events are so related is not always the case. Empirically, we know 
that if a man murders his wife, then abuse is likely part of the past story. However, if a 
man abuses his wife, then it is not likely that the remainder of the story will include 
murder.54 The conditional does not run both ways, even though in dramatic narratives, 
and unfortunately oftentimes in courts of law, our dramatic narrative proclivities are 
exploited in such a way that this truth may be lost. 
                                                 
52 Ibid., p. 103. 
 
53 Applications of heuristics can also cause us to misperceive. For example, in one study subjects are asked 
to describe the offices of professors and graduate students. Nearly all of the participants claimed there were 
books in the office when in fact there were none. This misperception largely follows from a heuristic or 
scheme that informs us that teachers’ offices are filled with books. 
 
54 Even though the abuser may be more likely to murder his wife than the non-abuser. 
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 I think Dershowitz is correct in his discussion of how the Chekhovian canon is 
often misapplied to various subsets of events in life. He goes on to argue that no less than 
in the context of the courtroom, applications of the canon to life itself are equally suspect. 
If the ontological thesis of metaphysical naturalism is true, whether broadly or narrowly 
construed (but especially narrowly construed as by strong reductive forms of naturalism), 
I agree with both Sartre and Dershowitz that life simply cannot be anything like a 
dramatic narrative. The events of life that occur are only a mixture of chance and 
necessity; there is no over-arching teleological order to the grand scheme of things. One 
could, of course (on broad, non-reductive forms of naturalism), construe human 
intentional agency, even in a naturalistic world, to allow for one’s individual life to form 
a kind of humanly constructed dramatic narrative where one is working towards self-
perceived meaningful ends. However, this is a different claim from the stronger claim 
that there is some grand purpose infused into life from without. That is the claim to which 
Sartre and Dershowitz so strongly object, and I think their objection is correct if the 
central ontological theses of metaphysical naturalism are true. 
Their objection, though, does not undermine the narrative interpretation of the 
meaning of life question. First, given that the concept of narrative is construed less than 
paradigmatically in the case of candidate naturalistic meaning of life narratives, the 
interpretation does not require that a candidate naturalistic meaning of life narrative be a 
dramatic narrative in the paradigmatic and robust sense. The Sartrian objection would 
undermine my interpretation only if my interpretation required a candidate meaning of 
life narrative to be so robustly. And second, the objection is largely just an objection to 
theism. Both Sartre and Dershowitz cannot see how this universe is purposeful, and so 
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able to be construed in dramatic narrative fashion. If the theistic God does not exist, then 
my intuitions are with them, and life is not a dramatic narrative.  
However, if the theistic God exists, and more specifically, this God is as expanded 
Christian theism claims, then life is probably very much like a dramatic narrative. The 
Sartrian objection probably works if naturalism is true and life really is nothing more than 
“one damn thing after another.”55 On the other hand, it is deeply suspect if naturalism is 
false and something like Christian expanded theism is true. If naturalism is true, then our 
projection of plot and story unified by an imagined ending is just that, a projection, but, if 
Christian theism is true, then, as Paul Fiddes notes, the 
. . . emplotment of history has not been understood by Christians as a mere 
projection of a concord fiction [introducing plot, story, and the unification of an 
ending on the mere successiveness of history], but as the discovery of relations 
between events which have been plotted by the divine Logos into a scheme of 
promise and fulfillment, and which are sustained in their coherence by the 
presence of the Logos. History is regarded as God’s story, and when the story has 
been revealed to us through the Bible, we can make sense of history.56 
 
But, on the other hand, if the true “story” of the world is one in which the theses of 
naturalism obtain, Sartre is probably correct, and those who desire to live in a story in a 
robust sense, are trying to situate their lives in “. . . the kairos of farce rather than [in] the 
chronos of reality . . .”57 As Fiddes notes, we are prone perhaps even “programmed” to “. 
. . project concord-fictions onto the scene of our personal history and world history. To 
                                                 
55 Though, it is important to note that naturalism is likely not a necessary condition for the success of the 
Sartrian objection. One could conceive of other metanarratives or worldviews that would likely preclude 
life as a whole being a dramatic narrative. 
 
56 Paul S. Fiddes, The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 
p. 9. 
 
57 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a New Epilogue (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 51. Kairos is distinguished from chronos in that the former is nothing 
more than (i) the “tick-tock” of the clock, (ii) the successive moments of history, or (iii) just one damn 
thing after another, whereas the latter refers to “. . . points of time filled with the significance of being part 
of a larger fulfillment.” Paul Fiddes, The Promised End, p. 9. 
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make sense of the mere successiveness of history (‘just one damn thing after another’) we 
give it a plot, a story, which is unified by its ending.”58 Let me be clear about what I am 
claiming here. I am not arguing that naturalism is false and Christian theism is true, and 
therefore that the Sartrian objection fails. Rather, I am arguing for the following 
conditional: if Christian theism is true, or some other metanarrative for that matter with 
the right metaphysical resources is true, then the Sartrian objection likely fails.59 
I want to close Chapter Five by discussing two important issues relevant to the 
question of life’s meaning: (i) how religious assumptions often factor heavily into asking 
the question of life’s meaning, and (ii) how leading a meaningful life connects to my 
narrative interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” With respect to (i), 
I will argue that religious assumptions are very often salient in the very asking of the 
question, and discuss how these assumptions reveal similarities and differences among 
and between theists, pessimistic naturalists, and optimistic naturalists. With respect to 
(ii), given that the questions, “What is the meaning of life?” and “What makes a life 
meaningful?” are importantly related, even if distinct, any interpretation must be able to 
explain how a meaningful existence can be secured, if it can be secured at all. I will 
provide an account of this, working within the parameters set by the narrative 
interpretation. 
                                                 
58 Paul Fiddes, The Promised End, p. 9. 
 
59 And, if one continues to press a Sartrian objection against a Christian theistic metanarrative, arguing that 
the metanarrative is meaningless, we have then moved back into our question of the relationship between 
“What is the meaning of life?” and “What makes a life meaningful?” The further objection falls under the 
second question, and therefore is not an objection to my claims in this section about life being very much 
like a dramatic narrative if Christian theism is true. 
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5.7 The Meaning of Life and Religious Assumptions 
A compelling case can be made that many who ask, “What is the meaning of 
life?” do so out of religious intuitions and assumptions. That is to say, they already have 
in mind the kind of answer that is required in order for the question to be answered 
sufficiently, and that answer is either overtly religious, or has ostensibly religious 
elements in it. Now I have argued, in previous chapters, that naturalism can produce a 
candidate meaning of life narrative precisely because it can narrate across the 
existentially relevant threshold of life events, phenomena, and accompanying questions 
(ERQ) that any narrative must narrate across in order to be a candidate meaning of life 
narrative as opposed to some other kind of narrative (e.g., a narrative about the migratory 
patterns of birds). However, this discussion becomes more complicated when we shift 
focus to the question, “What makes a life meaningful?”  
I have argued that, while conceptually distinct, a robust consideration of life’s 
meaning will need to address both questions (“What is the meaning of life?” and “What 
makes a life meaningful?”), as they are related (see §2.3 of Chapter Two, “The Meaning 
of Life vs. A Meaningful Life”). Considering one without also considering the other will 
cause one to neglect at least some of the common intuitions and sub-questions from 
which the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is generated, one being, “Is (or can) 
my life be meaningful?” Any philosophically sufficient discussion, then, must address 
both. In light of this, it is interesting to observe that many, perhaps most, individuals at 
least partly analyze what I have called the meaning of life in terms of what they think is 
required to live a meaningful life. More specifically, there exists a widespread 
assumption that only elements found in some sort of religious metanarrative will make a 
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meaningful life within reach. Thus, in asking what the meaning of life is, people are often 
looking for an answer(s) that looks suspiciously religious in nature. Albert Einstein once 
said that “to know an answer to the question “What is the meaning of human life?” means 
to be religious.”60 
 In seeking the meaning of life, many are often in pursuit of something that 
requires transcendent intentionality and teleology above and beyond the material world 
that nonetheless comes to bear within the material world. This is revealed, for example, 
in re-formulations of the question where people ask, “What is the purpose of life?” 
Formulating the question in such a way, often presupposes that the universe and human 
life is given purpose from a source outside the universe (or at least an intelligent source 
originating outside of human intentionality), and this purpose is discovered rather than 
created by human desires and intentionality. Those who ask the question about life’s 
meaning are often operating with conceptual baggage from worldviews rooted in the 
ancient world, worldviews where transcendence, deity, and non-natural teleology 
grounded in “other-worldly” intentionality occupy prominent roles. 
 Among others,61 Julian Young has noted that inquiring into the meaning of life is 
a peculiarly modern phenomenon. He notes: 
 For most of our Western history we have not talked about the meaning of life. 
 This is because we used to be quite certain that we knew what it was. We were 
 certain about it because we thought we knew that over and above this world of 
 doubtful virtue and happiness is another world: a world Nietzsche calls 
 (somewhat ironically) the ‘true world’ or, alternatively expressed, ‘God’.62 
                                                 
60 Albert Einstein, Mein Weltbild (Amsterdam: Querido, 1934), trans. S. Bargmann, Ideas and Opinions by 
Albert Einstein (New York: Crown), p. 11. 
 
61 For example, see chapter five, “A Modern Question” in Yuval Lurie’s Tracking the Meaning of Life, and 
chapter one, “Looking for the blueprint” in Julian Baggini’s What’s It All About? 
 




Prior to the modern period, life was positioned within the context of some such true-
world narrative, of which Young states: 
 Since journeys have a beginning, a middle and an end, a true-world account of the 
 proper course of our lives is a kind of story, a narrative. And since true-world 
 narratives (that, for example, of Christianity) are global rather than individual, 
 since they narrate not just your life or mine, but rather all lives at all times and 
 places, they are, as I shall call them, ‘grand’ narratives.63 
 
Living within the interpretive confines of a grand “religious” metanarrative, individuals 
possessed the relevant narrative elements, ERN, to bring sufficient intelligibility to ERQ 
that were also viewed as existentially satisfying. I submit that people generally did not 
ask about the meaning of life in the pre-modern world precisely because the cluster of 
sub-questions and intuitions motivating the question in modern contexts were addressed 
and satisfied within some grand religious metanarrative or other. These metanarratives 
had recourse to concepts of transcendence, deity, non-natural teleology, heaven, and the 
like. 
 In the western world, with the shift away from authority (e.g., tradition, Scripture, 
etc.) as epistemologically foundational to unaided reason and science, the increasing 
triumph of mechanistic theories in science, and the accompanying death of God, grand 
religious metanarratives populated with the concepts prevalent in the pre-modern world 
began to lose rational respectability in the minds of many as guides to the nature of 
reality. Correlated with these shifts is the growing ubiquity of the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” although it is perhaps impossible to pinpoint the genesis of this trend. It 
is a question that began to surface as the grand metanarratives by which people 
interpreted and lived life lost some of their rational and existential traction in Western 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
 171
culture. And asking, “What is the meaning of life?” presupposes more than mere rational 
curiosity, since people started asking it as the global stories in which life itself was 
interpreted and grounded became rationally suspect. As Terry Eagleton notes: 
 If you are forced to inquire on a large scale into the meaning of existence, it is a 
 fair bet that things have come unstuck. . . .Meaning-of-life queries, when 
 launched on a grand scale, tend to arise at times when taken-for-granted roles, 
 beliefs, and conventions are plunged into crisis. . . .To ask about the meaning of 
 human existence as such, however, suggests that we may have collectively lost 
 our way, however we happen to be faring as individuals.64 
 
There appears, then, to be a close connection between the relative dethronement of 
religious metanarratives and the rise and anxiety-laden urgency of questions about life’s 
meaning. 
 For my purposes here, it is important to note that there is an interesting tension 
revealed in this correlation. It appears safe to say that modernity, and the accompanying 
view of metaphysical naturalism, is a large motivator in the modern saliency of the 
question of life’s meaning, and yet the question is largely asked with assumptions and 
intuitions at odds with modernist and naturalists views of the world. The modern world 
increasingly dominated by metaphysical naturalism has no place for Young’s “true-world 
stories” or religious metanarratives, and yet those who inquire into the meaning of life 
find it very difficult to escape the assumptions of the metanarratives that used to make 
asking the question of life’s meaning “unnecessary.” At least one reason for this is, as 
John Cottingham notes, “Religious faith does not form an isolated corner of our 
conceptual map that can be torn off without affecting the main picture; instead (to change 
the metaphor) it lies at the centre of a vast web of beliefs and attitudes and feelings that 
                                                 
64 Terry Eagleton, The Meaning of Life, pp. 31-34. 
 
 172
are all subtly interconnected.”65 Even in a world where increasing critical reflection is 
directed toward religious systems and their doctrines, our ways of thinking about and 
referring to reality are still profoundly shaped by assumptions imbedded deeply within 
our religious heritages. And despite the objections and argument of naturalists who think 
a meaningful life can be secured in the absence of grand religious narratives, many think 
only religious elements can secure a robustly meaningful existence.66 
 If this last claim is accurate, then perhaps when many ask the question, “What is 
the meaning of life?” this request is as much an expression of bewilderment as it is a 
genuine question to which one seeks an answer. That is to say, it gives voice to the 
perceived absurdity of securing a meaningful existence in a world devoid of finite and 
infinite spiritual realities. In the modern world, people feel the tension of operating, at 
some level, within divergent metanarratives (e.g., naturalism and theism), and perhaps 
while feeling the weight of what naturalism means for religious metanarratives, continue 
to ask the question, “What is the meaning of life?” out of intuitions and assumptions that 
require the same kind of answer as before, one that is incompatible with the metaphysical 
theses of naturalism. It is as if people cannot quite believe the naturalistic metanarrative, 
and so, out of the religious intuitions and assumptions that naturalism largely rejects, 
continue to look for a religious answer. 
5.7.1 Religious Assumptions, Pessimistic Naturalism, and Optimistic Naturalism 
 A look at the religious assumptions often lurking in asking the question, “What is 
the meaning of life?” provides a helpful way of comparing three views on whether it is 
                                                 
65 John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 13. 
 
66 This is a salient part of the story of why certain atheists have adopted conclusions of meaninglessness in 
light of the so-called death of God. Camus is an example. 
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possible for one to secure a meaningful life: the religious view (of which theism is one 
example), the pessimistic naturalist view, and the optimistic naturalist view.67 These 
distinctions are not on the level of ontology, rather they are existential and relate to what 
needs to be the case (or what is perceived as needing to be the case) in order for one to 
have a meaningful life.68 It is important to note that even naturalists who inquire about 
life’s meaning may operate on religious assumptions. It will be helpful, then, to briefly 
delineate three basic options on the question, “How is a meaningful life possible?”69 
 Roughly, the religious view maintains that God’s existence along with 
“appropriately relating” to God is both necessary and sufficient in order for a meaningful 
life to be secured, although different accounts can be given as to the nature of this 
relationship. Among countless others, historic representatives of the religious view in the 
Near-Eastern ancient world and the West are Qoheleth, Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, 
Edwards, Pascal, and Tolstoy. The religious position can be plausibly viewed as 
possessing three distinct yet related dimensions. Metaphysically, it is argued that God’s 
existence is necessary in order to ground a meaningful life because, for example, things 
necessary for securing a meaningful existence like objective value are only plausibly 
grounded in God. John Cottingham sums up this dimension of the religious view, “. . . the 
idea is that God is the source of genuine value, and that orienting ourselves towards that 
                                                 
67 I have already compared different views within the naturalist camp on what I called the ontological front. 
Here, I compared strict and broad naturalism. 
 
68 Others invoke their own vocabulary for what I have called “pessimistic” and “optimistic” naturalism. For 
example, John F. Haught refers to the positions as “sunny” and “sober” naturalism. Is Nature Enough? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 10. 
 
69 There are other options, though. For example, some might believe that God exists, but that his existence 
is not necessary for one to lead a meaningful life, or that one need not believe in his existence to lead a 
meaningful life. One may also think that God exists, but that his existence is not sufficient to lead a 
meaningful life, or that believing in his existence is not sufficient to leading a meaningful life. 
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source bestows meaning on our human existence and enables us to find true 
contentment.”70 In addition to the metaphysical dimension, the religious view generally 
requires that one be both epistemically and relationally related to the God who exists in 
some meaningful sense. I will leave further discussion of these claims to the next section 
of this chapter, as they fit naturally within that context. 
 Interestingly, the pessimistic naturalist view is grounded in the same assumption 
as the religious view, namely, that God must exist in order for life to be meaningful. The 
pessimist parts ways with the religious believer, though, by maintaining that God does 
not exist. On one reading of the text,71 Qoheleth, the dominant voice in Ecclesiastes, has 
been viewed as a provisional pessimist, and his voice is joined by many others including 
Schopenhauer, Camus, and possibly Bertrand Russell.72 Schopenhauer’s powerful 
presentation of what I will call the march toward nothingness thesis in his classic, “On 
the Vanity of Existence,” aptly illustrates the pessimistic view: 
That human life must be some kind of mistake is sufficiently proved by the simple 
observation that man is a compound of needs which are hard to satisfy; that their 
satisfaction achieves nothing but a painless condition in which he is only given 
over to boredom; and that boredom is a direct proof that existence is in itself 
valueless, for boredom is nothing other than the sensation of the emptiness of 
                                                 
70 John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 37. 
 
71 It is a reading that I, for exegetical and theological reasons, do not adopt. 
 
72 For example, see his “A Free Man’s Worship,” in Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on 
Religion and Related Subjects (New York: Touchstone, 1957), “Amid such a world [a world devoid of the 
supernatural], if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That man is the product of causes 
which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his 
loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no 
intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the 
ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are  destined to 
extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must 
inevitably  be buried beneath the debris of a  universe in ruins . . . Only within the scaffolding of these 
truths, only in the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely 
built” (p. 107). 
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existence. . . . Whenever we are not involved in one or other of these things [e.g., 
intellectual activity, sensual pleasure, etc.] but directed back to existence itself we 
are overtaken by its worthlessness and vanity . . .73 
  
If the observable world filled with pain, suffering, and an existence that inevitably 
marches toward death is all there is, then pessimistic naturalists think it is impossible to 
secure a meaningful existence. While no naturalist in any robust sense, John Hick sides 
with the pessimists in thinking that naturalism, “. . . is very bad news for humanity as a 
whole.”74 
 Like the pessimistic naturalist view, the optimistic naturalist view finds no place 
for God in its ontology; however, ironically, like the religious view posits that a 
meaningful life is within reach of human beings. In the contemporary literature, one will 
find discussions and defenses of optimistic naturalism by Ursula Goodenough, Michael 
Martin, and Erik J. Wielenberg, among many others.75 These naturalists see no tension in 
thinking that a meaningful life can be secured in a world devoid of finite and infinite 
spiritual realities.76 In his reflective essay, “Religion and Respect,” Simon Blackburn 
expresses the optimistic naturalist position: 
But there is another option for meaning . . . which is to look only within life itself. 
This is the immanent option. It is content with the everyday. There is sufficient 
                                                 
73 Arthur Schopenhauer, “On the Vanity of Existence,” in Essays and Aphorisms (London: Penguin Books, 
2004), pp. 53-54. 
 
74 John Hick, The Fifth Dimension: An Exploration of the Spiritual Realm (Oxford: Oneworld Press, 1999), 
p. 22. 
 
75 See Ursula Goodenough, “Emergent Religious Principles,” in The Sacred Depths of Nature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 166-74; Michael Martin, Atheism, Morality, and Meaning; and Erik J. 
Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
76 Optimistic naturalism is closely related to secular humanism. Secular humanists desire to define their 
view based upon what they affirm (i.e., humanity, human potential, human creativity, human progress, 
human flourishing, etc.) rather than what they deny (i.e., the existence of a supernatural realm beyond the 




meaning for human beings in the human world—the world of familiar, and even 
humdrum, doings and experiences. In the immanent option, the smile of the baby, 
the grace of the dancer, the sound of voices, the movement of a lover, give 
meaning to life. For some, it is activity and achievement: gaining the summit of 
the mountain, crossing the finish line first, finding the cure, or writing the poem. 
These things last only their short time, but that does not deny them meaning. A 
smile does not need to go on forever in order to mean what it does. There is 
nothing beyond or apart from the processes of life. Furthermore, there is no one 
goal to which all these processes tend, but we can find something precious, value 
and meaning, in the processes themselves. There is no such thing as the meaning 
of life, but there can be many meanings within a life.77 
 
An optimistic naturalist like Blackburn sees no problem in thinking that a meaningful life 
can be secured in an entirely naturalistic world. Nothing additional, whether that is of the 
transcendent sort, or some non-human source of intentionality within the universe itself, 
is needed to ground those things in life that we, pre-theoretically, find to be meaningful. 
To desire more is unnecessary. 
So, with the issue of God’s existence as the point of departure, the religious view, 
the pessimistic naturalist view, and the optimistic naturalist view are three different 
positions on whether or not life can be meaningful. Both naturalist positions, of course, 
have no place for God in their ontology, but optimists see this as no real threat to a 
meaningful life, whereas pessimists do. The religious position, like the optimistic 
naturalist position, thinks a meaningful life is within reach, but like the pessimist 
position, thinks God’s existence is necessary in order to secure a meaningful life.78 In the 
                                                 
77 Simon Blackburn, “Religion and Respect,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and 
the Secular Life, ed. Louise M. Antony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 190. Notice that 
Blackburn seems to merge the two questions, “What is the meaning of life?” and “What makes a life 
meaningful?” I have argued that the two questions, while certainly related, can and should be distinguished. 
 
78 It is important to note here that there will be more nuanced variations of the three discussed in this 
section. For example, if one introduces the distinction between subjectivist and objectivist naturalists, it is 
conceivable that a naturalist could be an objectivist about value (i.e., intrinsic value exists independently of 
human desires and intentionality) but still believe that life is meaningless because the existence of objective 
value may not be sufficient to secure a meaningful life. Additionally, it is conceivable that there are 
naturalists who are subjectivists about value (i.e., human desires and intentionality create value) but are not 
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next section, I will explore what it would mean to lead a meaningful life given my 
narrative interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” 
5.8 Candidate Meaning of Life Narratives and Leading a Meaningful Life 
 As I have already noted, my discussion of the meaning of life largely centers on 
the question, “What is the meaning of life?” I argued in §2.3 of Chapter Two (“The 
Meaning of Life vs. A Meaningful Life”) that this question is conceptually distinct 
though related to the question, “What makes a life meaningful?” While these questions 
are distinct, any interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” that does 
not also address concerns of how to secure a meaningful existence is flawed, given that 
the two questions are not generally divorced in practice. Those who ask the question, 
“What is the meaning of life?” are certainly preoccupied with whether and how their life 
is meaningful. I think a desiderata of any interpretation of the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” will be that the interpretation is able to account for this distinct yet 
related quality of these two questions. Given my narrative interpretation, there is a way to 
secure answers to the second question, but in a way that is contingent upon first 
answering, at least partially, the first.79 The claim I want to explore is that one can secure 
a meaningful existence by appropriately linking oneself to the true meaning of life 
narrative. Of course, for pessimistic naturalists, no meaningful link will exist, because an 
                                                                                                                                                 
pessimists, thinking that humanly created value is sufficient for a meaningful life. These are conceivable 
positions, but the first is probably not that prevalent. 
 
79 Of course, only those of an optimistic naturalist persuasion (or secular humanists) or the religious 
persuasion will enter the discussion about how to secure a meaningful life. The skeptic or pessimist does 
not think life is meaningful, and therefore, will think there is nowhere one can look to secure a meaningful 
existence. Although, even the pessimist’s denial of a meaningful existence is largely a function of the 
pessimist’s metaphysical beliefs about how the world really is. In this sense, the pessimist does possess a 
candidate meaning of life narrative, but he or she simply believes the metaphysical theses of this 
“narrative” do not allow for a meaningful life. That is to say, the answer to the first question (“What is the 
meaning of life?”) does not allow for a favorable answer to the second question (“What makes a life 
meaningful?” or “How does one secure a meaningful existence?”). 
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atheistic ontology, according to them, will not allow a meaningful existence. My 
discussion, then, is one that only those with some form of religious view or optimistic 
naturalist view can have. Interestingly, the nature of this appropriate link will itself be 
partly relative to the candidate meaning of life narrative that happens to be true. 
Furthermore, on some level, both the Christian theistic and naturalistic candidate 
meaning of life narratives will allow for varying levels of meaningful existence, even if 
one is not fully linked to the true meaning of life narrative. 
 A primary reason why answering the first question (“What is the meaning of 
life?”) takes priority over the second (“What makes life meaningful?”) and why it 
provides an answer to how to best secure a meaningful life is that ERN is closely aligned 
with the cluster of issues that are generally associated with leading a meaningful life, 
issues like ordering one’s life around worthwhile purposes, being appropriately related to 
valuable states of affairs, making sense of and coping with pain and suffering, and 
coming to terms with death’s inevitable approach. Securing a meaningful existence, then, 
will involve linking one’s life to the meaning of life narrative. But this brings with it a 
natural question—What is the nature of the link between the meaning of life narrative and 
leading a meaningful life? Roughly, I think there are two distinct yet related levels of 
linkage worth considering: awareness and appropriation.80 The first is largely epistemic, 
                                                 
80 The picture is actually more complicated. It probably involves at least three levels: (i) awareness, (ii) 
assent, and (iii) appropriation. For example, one can be aware of a candidate meaning of life narrative 
without assenting to its truth. Furthermore, one could, in some sense, appropriate elements of a meaning of 
life narrative without satisfying either condition (i) or (ii). Discussing only (i) and (ii) will be sufficient for 
my purposes in this section, especially if one views a robust notion of appropriation as subsuming assent. 
Indeed, Christian theists think something akin to this occurs all the time in the world, as those who do not 
assent to the truth of the Christian narrative still lead meaningful lives, on some level, even if not in the 
most robust sense given certain elements of the Christian narrative. 
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the second is more a matter of praxis.81 These two levels partly follow from a 
consideration of the following question—What level of epistemic contact with the 
meaning of life narrative is needed in order to lead a meaningful life? I will briefly 
discuss these levels of linkage in reverse order.82 
 On one level, it seems as though one could lead a meaningful life, to some extent, 
even if one’s knowledge of the true candidate meaning of life narrative is incomplete or 
in some way faulty. One way in which this is possible is through what we might call 
existential luck, a close cousin to moral and epistemic luck. For example, with respect to 
aligning one’s life with valuable states of affairs, one may in fact appropriate that which 
the meaning of life narrative reveals as valuable without knowing that it is valuable, as a 
matter of luck. In this sense, the individual who finds herself in this fortuitous situation 
will enjoy a meaningful life in some measure. For example, if viewing and appreciating 
great works of aesthetic beauty, qua viewing and appreciating, is valuable and contributes 
to a meaningful existence, then, in doing so, one can experience meaning regardless of 
whether or not one knows that this experience is valuable and meaningful. 
The same claim applies to purpose. One can imagine scenarios where someone, 
largely as a matter of luck, pursues worthwhile purposes and therefore has a life 
characterized by some measure of meaningfulness. However, despite this relative 
meaningfulness, intuitions cause us to be skeptical that such a life is as meaningful as it 
                                                 
81 I use “praxis” in a minimalist sense of the term. 
 
82 Note that this discussion occurs within the context of candidate meaning of life narratives where value is 
seen to be mind-independent. On a subjectivist naturalistic candidate meaning of life narrative, one need 
not worry about whether one is in contact with what the narrative says is valuable or worthwhile, because 
such things are created by one’s own desires. Of course, there is the meta-question of whether one needs to 
be in contact with the narrative element that explains that value is entirely subjective. That is to say, does 
being aware of the subjectivist element in the narrative bring with it any meaning over and above 
participating in the valuable states of affairs one has created? 
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could be. For example, consider the cases of persons A and B. Let us say that, as a matter 
of fact, striving to be a person who cultivates the virtue of charity is an intrinsically 
valuable and worthwhile pursuit around which to partially order one’s life. Now imagine 
that both A and B endeavor to cultivate charity, but that A does so knowing that this is a 
valuable purpose whereas B does not. The knowledge that what one is doing constitutes a 
valuable worthwhile aim, and therefore brings with it meaningfulness, would seem to 
confer greater meaning on the subject, at least subjectively construed, than would a state 
of affairs where one engages in the meaningful activity but does not view it as valuable. 
Furthermore, if one views the pursuit of truth as an objectively valuable aim, then adding 
knowing that the aim to which one strives is valuable to the act of aiming for it will likely 
confer greater objective meaningfulness to the person’s life in that instance. 
Mere appropriation,83 then, of certain elements constituting the meaning of life 
narrative without knowing the story in which these elements fit, probably mitigates the 
level of meaningfulness one can attain. In this case, epistemic deficiency with respect to 
one’s level of understanding of the meaning of life narrative carries with it negative 
consequences for meaningfulness.84 Doing alone, if it is the right kind of doing, may 
bring with it “units” of meaningfulness. The claim here, though, is that doing plus 
knowing probably brings more meaningfulness. 
                                                 
83 Unless, of course, one robustly defines “appropriation” to include assent. 
 
84 This discussion of existential luck, however, is partially narrative relative. For example, a subjectivist 
naturalist who thinks value and purpose, and therefore a meaningful life, are entirely or largely person 
relative will not enter this discussion, for the narrative meaning of life is primarily something each 
individual creates. To what extent a person needs to know this (that value, purpose, and therefore meaning 
are person relative) is a different issue. I am inclined to think that one does not need to be in epistemic 
contact with the subjectivist naturalist narrative, or at least not as closely as, for example, one would need 
to be on objectivist naturalist and Christian theistic narratives. 
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 My claim that knowing that one is appropriately related to, for example, 
intrinsically valuable states of affairs bring with it more “units” of meaning than merely 
being appropriately related to such states of affairs has an analog in epistemology first 
articulated by Plato. The claim is akin to the widespread view that knowledge is superior 
to mere true belief even though in the latter case one is in “contact” with the truth. As 
Plato would say, this mitigated “contact” permits mere true belief to “fly away,” and so 
there is something more valuable about full-blown knowledge, although it is not at all 
clear how best to understand the so-called “value problem.”85 Just as knowledge is seen 
as more valuable than mere true belief, so too is knowing that what one is doing is 
meaningful more meaningful than just doing it.86 Perhaps knowing the truth about the 
meaning of life narrative, or some element therein, brings with it units of meaningfulness 
that mere appropriation of those elements within the narrative cannot secure alone in the 
absence of the requisite awareness. I am inclined to think that knowing the meaning of 
life narrative itself is partly constitutive of leading a meaningful life.87 
 My dual claims thus far in this section have been (i) that a meaningful life is 
secured by being appropriately related to the true meaning of life narrative, and (ii) that 
one need not be fully epistemically linked to the true meaning of life narrative in order to 
                                                 
85 See Meno 96d-100b in John M. Cooper, ed. Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997). The translation of Meno in Cooper’s work is provided by G. M. A. Grube. 
 
86 Notice that the comparison is not between (i) knowing that what one is doing is meaningful and (ii) 
merely happening to have, by chance, a true belief that what one is doing is meaningful, but between (i) 
knowing that what one is doing is meaningful and (iii) having no belief about the matter of whether or not 
what one is doing is meaningful. 
 
87 There is probably an additional dimension of the benefits of knowing worth noting here. The more 
complete one’s knowledge of what brings with it units of meaningfulness, the more facility, ceteris 
parabus, one will have in securing a meaningful existence. Here, I am not referring to any intrinsic 
meaningfulness that may come with knowing, but with the instrumental value that accompanies knowing 
what states of affairs are meaningful so that one can secure them. Conceding the pesky problem of “luck,” 
it seems generally true that if one is aware of valuable states worth pursuing, one will be in a better position 
of securing them and therefore enhancing the meaningfulness of one’s life. 
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live, in some degree, a meaningful life. With respect to (i), if the true meaning of life 
narrative narrates that, for example, aims x, y, and z are intrinsically valuable, then 
positive meaning can be secured in life by ordering one’s life around them. With respect 
to (ii), the level of meaningfulness in one’s life will probably reside on a continuum, and 
one need not be in full epistemic contact with the true meaning of life narrative in order 
to experience some measure of meaningfulness in life. If this is the case, then leading a 
meaningful life, at some level, will not require knowing the meaning of life narrative 
down to every jot and tittle. This claim is compatible with numerous candidate meaning 
of life narratives. For example, if a subjectivist thesis about value is part of the true 
candidate meaning of life narrative, it may not significantly matter if one is in contact 
with truth in order to lead a meaningful life, since value and meaning are entirely 
subjective qualities. Or, if, ex hypothesi, the Christian theistic candidate meaning of life 
narrative is true, even one who does not believe the narrative will secure a meaningful 
life, in some sense, in virtue of Christian doctrines like, among others, (i) the imago dei, 
and (ii) and the notion of common grace through which God’s grace extends to all of 
creation and is manifest in culture and individual lives whereby people are in contact with 
states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable. 
 My claim that leading a meaningful life can be secured, at various levels, in the 
presence of epistemic deficiencies with respect to the meaning of life narrative, is 
compatible with both naturalistic and Christian theistic candidate meaning of life 
narratives. That is to say, each is consistent with a person being in metaphysical contact 
with some meaning-producing states of affairs while lacking epistemic contact, either 
partially or entirely. This should be the case, for even in instances where one is in 
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epistemic contact with the meaning of life narrative at some level, it is extremely 
implausible to think that one will have a “God’s eye view” of all the elements in their 
narrative fullness. Certainly, leading a meaningful life cannot be contingent on 
possessing a God’s eye view of the meaning of life narrative.88  
5.9 Summary 
 I began this chapter by discussing definitional issues surrounding both naturalism 
and theism. I introduced the distinction between strict and broad naturalism, and noted 
implications this has for the meaning of life. I then discussed the distinction between 
restricted theism and expanded theism, noting that my employment of theism will largely 
occur within the context of a particular instantiation of expanded theism—Christian 
expanded theism. Next, I outlined the broad contours of a version of Christian expanded 
theism. Following this, I discussed how the candidate meaning of life narratives of both 
naturalism and Christian expanded theism fit within the category of narrative, arguing 
that the Christian metanarrative is, paradigmatically, a narrative, while the naturalist 
metanarrative is probably not. I then explained the Sartrian objection against life being a 
dramatic narrative, and argued that it does not undermine my narrative interpretation. I 
concluded with a discussion of important religious assumptions often latent in asking the 
question, “What is the meaning of life?” and provided a brief account for how leading a 
meaningful life relates to the narrative interpretation. 
                                                 
88 There is an interesting point worth considering here. Both Christian theism and naturalism seem to entail 
that their respective candidate meaning of life narratives will be relatively unknown until a certain point in 
history. The Christian theist will probably have to concede that only until very recently on the historical 
timeline have large portions of the world’s population had access to the meaning of life given the historical-
geographical reality that God’s putative revelation has not, until very recently, been widely accessible to 
the entire world. On the other hand, if naturalism is true, then knowing the meaning of life will be largely 
connected with the advancement of science and philosophical speculation on the good life. Until 








Purpose and Origins in the Theistic and Naturalistic Candidate 




 Having discussed how the concept of narrative comes to bear on Christian theism 
and naturalism in Chapter Five, I will now compare these two grand metaphysical 
“narratives” on two of the first three elements of ERQ (existentially relevant life elements 
and accompanying questions) that any candidate meaning of life narrative must include in 
order to be the kind of narrative it is—explanations of (i) Why the universe exists, and 
even the stronger, why anything exists at all, and (ii) what purpose(s) there is in life, if 
any.1 I will not compare the narratives on the issue of value specifically, given that 
considerations of origins and purpose are more often connected to discussions of life’s 
meaning, and because discussions of value naturally dovetail with discussions of purpose 
(e.g., What aims, purposes, or goal-directed behavior are valuable ones to pursue, and 
thus, contribute to a meaningful life?).  
Remember that ERN constitutes a deep, ultimate narrative context from which to 
view the other existentially relevant elements and accompanying questions of life, ERQ. 
Given that the fourth and fifth elements of ERQ (#4 = evil, pain, and suffering and 
accompanying questions, and #5 = questions on how life (individual as well as the 
universe itself) will end) are related and link up naturally and compellingly with the 
                                                 
1 These “narrative” consisting of these explanations may be little more than a conjunction of explanations 
(on naturalism), or it may be a narrative in a robust sense (on, for example, Christian theism). 
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perennial meaning of life topics of death and futility, I will devote substantial space in 
Chapter Seven to these elements, but especially the last. Chapters Six and Seven will be 
largely comparative and not evaluative. I am more interested in highlighting the 
differences between the naturalistic and Christian theistic candidate meaning of life 
narratives than I am in attempting to show one’s rational and existential superiority over 
the other. At places, however, I will allude to what I consider to be the advantages of 
Christian theism over naturalism. What follows will largely be a dialogue between 
naturalism and theism on issues broadly related to the topic of purpose. 
6.2 Meaning and Purpose 
 While the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is often interpreted as asking, 
“What is the purpose(s) of life?” I am treating issues and questions surrounding purpose 
as circumscribed elements within a larger narrative, a narrative that is, itself, the meaning 
of life. Asking, “What is the purpose of life?” is a question that closely relates to “What 
is the meaning of life?” but it is not the same question on my interpretation. However, 
questions relating to purpose are important sub-questions to which any candidate 
meaning of life narrative must provide the framework for answers. We have a deep and 
natural longing to order our lives around a purpose(s). Importantly, the origin and nature 
of such a purpose will differ dramatically among candidate theistic and naturalistic 
meaning of life narratives. I propose that the best point of departure for comparing the 
two narratives on this issue is by comparing (i) divinely imposed purpose and (ii) self 
imposed purpose.2 At the risk of incurring unnecessary criticism, I retain the word 
                                                 
2 There is a third option, the Aristotelian one. It is an interesting alternative to (i) and (ii), but which 
occupies little space in the current philosophical discussions on the meaning of life. Briefly, Aristotle 
argued that everything in nature aims toward some end. This end need not terminate (originate) in an 
extrinsic cause such as intelligence or god. Nature itself functions as an end in some sense. He argued that 
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“imposition” despite the possible foothold it gives to the charge that the divinely imposed 
purpose view undermines the dignity of man. I acknowledge this danger, and will have 
more to say about it later. The following discussion of divinely imposed purpose and 
humanly imposed purpose will expand to include other discussions that, together, capture 
the important territory in this context relating to the meaning of life. 
6.2.1 Divinely Imposed Purpose 
 In Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, Erik Wielenberg provides a 
straightforward account of what the divinely imposed purpose view involves, “. . . for a 
human life to have meaning is for it to have a purpose that is assigned by a supernatural 
being” [emphasis added].3 Entailed by this view is the conclusion that life has no 
overarching, meaning conferring purpose in the absence of a supernatural being. William 
Lane Craig represents this position, “So if God does not exist, that means that man and 
the universe exist to no purpose—since the end of everything is death—and that they 
came to be for no purpose, since they are only blind products of chance. In short, life is 
utterly without reason” [emphasis added].4 He adds, “Without God the universe is the 
result of a cosmic accident, a chance explosion. There is no reason for which it exists.”5 
                                                                                                                                                 
teleological explanations, in order to be complete and satisfying, must terminate in an end which itself is 
intrinsically valuable and not merely instrumentally valuable. Again, this ultimate end is neither self-
imposed nor divinely imposed but is, in a sense, naturally imposed. In the case of man, Aristotle argues in 
Nicomachean Ethics that eudaimonia (commonly translated as happiness although there are complex 
exegetical issue at play here) is the final end under which man’s purposive activities are subsumed. 
 
3 Erik J. Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 14. 
 
4 William Lane Craig, “The Absurdity of Life Without God,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. Klemke 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 45-46. 
 




 The intuitive idea behind the divinely imposed purpose view is clearly seen when 
it is contrasted with the “conditions” from which the universe and self-reflective life arise 
on a naturalistic paradigm. On purely naturalistic theses, neither the universe nor any 
rational life capable of asking the question about life’s purpose are the result, either 
directly or indirectly, of the purposeful creative activity of transcendent intelligent 
agency. Rather, their causal history terminates backwards in a non-intelligent, non-
personal, non-purposive first event or irreducibly primitive state of affairs that is itself 
non-rational. Clearly, on this view, there neither is nor can be a purpose imposed from 
without onto the world and rational life within that world. Mind, intentionality, and the 
introduction of purpose into the natural order are ultimately the products of matter. 
Conversely, on the supernaturalist view, matter and finite minds complete with 
intentionality and their own purposes, are ultimately, though not necessarily proximately, 
the product of an infinite purposive mind. 
 On the divine imposition view, then, the purpose of life and individual lives is 
ultimately found in the divine intentions. God, as creator, created for a purpose(s), and it 
is to him that individuals must look in order to find the purpose of life. Here, however, 
there are two distinct ways to refer to purpose in relation to God’s intentions. First, one 
can speak of God’s purposes in creating. At least on traditional Christian theistic models, 
his purposes in creating have been explicated in terms of his “desire” to share his love 
with a created order and/or his “desire” to manifest the glory of his nature to a created 
order.6 Second, but related, one can refer to God’s purposes for us. Here, answering the 
                                                 
6 There are numerous theological debates on these matters. One such debate is whether a “desire” to create 
on God’s part commits the theist to potential lurking problems for the traditional doctrine of aseity. The 
tension is real, even if ultimately soluble, for traditional theists hold firmly to both the doctrine of creation 
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question concerning our purpose is linked to the story one tells about God’s purposes in 
creating. So, for example, our purpose may be to love God or to glorify God or both. 
However, a clarification is warranted. 
 The supernaturalist who posits divinely imposed purpose onto life is not 
committed to the view that loving or glorifying God precludes a full and robust range of 
options for expressing these purposes. For example, certain traditional theists who posit 
that glorifying God and enjoying him forever is the chief purpose for human beings also 
note that this purpose is instantiated in different ways in a multiplicity of contexts.7 
Furthermore, it is entirely compatible with other purposes. While there is certainly a 
hierarchical relationship such that glorifying and enjoying God is to be the foundational 
purpose grounding all others, the others do exist and are legitimate purposes. An over-
arching purpose does not rule out subsidiary purposes. 
 A standard objection to the divine imposition view of purpose is that it robs 
humans of their freedom and dignity. For example, our moral proclivities cause us to 
think that parents who planned their children’s lives and imposed their own purposes on 
them would undermine the dignity of their children as free creatures who have a right to 
say how their lives unfold in terms of their own chosen purposes. Julian Baggini voices 
this objection in strong terms: 
 If we found that our sole purpose was to serve God then we might think that was a 
 worse fate than to have no predetermined purpose at all. Is it better to be slaves 
 with a role in the universe or to be free people left to create a role for ourselves? . 
 . . what could seem more unlikely than that the supreme being would feel the need 
 to create human beings, with all their complexity, and with all the suffering and 
                                                                                                                                                 
ex nihilo and to God’s self-sufficiency and independence. Jonathan Edwards’s “The End for Which God 
Created the World,” remains a locus classicus on the topic. 
 




 toil that human life entails, solely so that it can have creatures to serve it? This is 
 an image of God as an egotistical tyrant, determined to use its power to surround 
 itself with acolytes and have praise heaped upon it.8  
 
Setting aside the issue of Baggini’s suspect choice of language in framing the objection 
(i.e., “serve,” “slaves,” “tyrant,”) which likely clouds the issue, he has captured the 
essence of this objection. 
 Supernaturalists have a couple of responses to this charge. First, with respect to 
the above analogy, theists who hold that purpose is, in some sense, divinely imposed, will 
call attention to the fact that in the case of the parents and children, our intuition is not to 
charge the parents with tyranny and the like for “imposing” on their children certain ideas 
of what constitutes worthy purposes that ought to be followed. In this case, parents are 
claiming that following path x ought to be pursued because it is good and right. The 
“imposition” in this case is not forcing the children to do what the parents think the child 
ought to do, but suggesting that if the child wants to flourish and thrive, she will pursue 
this course.  
For example, we would commend the parents for teaching (and strongly 
suggesting to) their children that one ought to aim to love others, treat them fairly, try 
hard, etc. However, the “imposition” of these higher-order purposes (through teaching 
and strongly commending) does not rule out a range of other purposes from which their 
children are free to choose; for example, what vocation to pursue, whom to marry, or 
what sorts of hobbies to enjoy. Within each of these freely chosen contexts, though, the 
child should embrace the higher-order purposes of which her parents spoke. Just as we do 
not fault the parents for commending these higher-order purposes, we also do not fault 
                                                 
8 Julian Baggini, What’s It All About? Philosophy & the Meaning Of Life (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p. 17. 
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them for “imposing” the stipulation that their children ought not to pursue a destructive 
life. Such a life is not good for them; it is not conducive to human flourishing. Similarly, 
theists posit that a being like God, with a perfect nature and attributes like, for example, 
omniscience at his disposal, is in a position to wisely bestow good purposes on the lives 
of his creatures. However, the imposition of these foundational good purposes in no way 
mitigates good additional purposes originating in the agency of the creature. Furthermore, 
theists link fulfillment of the divine purposes with the well-being of created moral and 
rational agents, which leads to the second theistic response to the charge. 
 Classical theists posit that God does have purpose(s) for his creation. Of these 
purposes, one might say that some basic blueprint for how one is to live life and under 
what ultimate end one is to structure life resides with the creator. Against the charge that 
it is tyrannical for God to impose or require that this blueprint is followed, an additional 
response by theists may be to argue that, far from being the egotistical whims of the 
deity, the imposition of purposes originating in the divine nature and implemented 
through the divine will is actually what is best and most fulfilling for creatures who owe 
their existence to this same being. For example, there is ample precedent in Christian 
theology where the two notions (divinely imposed purpose and human satisfaction) are 
fused. Question one of The Westminster Shorter Catechism asks, “What is the chief end 
of man?” to which the response is, “Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him 
forever.”9 While such views are typically associated with reformed Calvinistic theology, 
one will find similar affirmations in, for example, Roman Catholic theology. The 
                                                 
9 Philip Schaff, ed. The Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes, Vol. III, “The 
Evangelical Protestant Creeds” (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), p. 676. The Westminster Shorter 
Catechism  was prepared by the Westminster Assembly in 1647, and is used by many Reformed groups to 




Catechism of the Catholic Church resounds just as loudly on this issue as do the 
Westminster standards:10 
 Scripture and Tradition never cease to teach and celebrate this fundamental truth: 
 “The world was made for the glory of God.” St. Bonaventure explains that God 
 created all things “not to increase his glory, but to show it forth and communicate 
 it,” for God has no other reason for creating than his love and goodness: 
 “Creatures came into existence when the key of love opened his hand...” The 
 glory of God consists in the realization of this manifestation and communication 
 of his goodness, for which the world was created. God made us “to be his sons 
 through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of his 
 glorious grace,” for “the glory of God is man fully alive; moreover man’s life is 
 the vision of God: if God’s revelation through creation has already obtained life 
 for all the beings that dwell on earth, how much more will the Word’s 
 manifestation of the Father obtain life for those who see God.” The ultimate 
 purpose of creation is that God “who is the creator of all things may at last 
 become ‘all in all,’ thus simultaneously assuring his own glory and our 
 beatitude.”11 
  
 On a view like those affirmed in The Westminster Confession of Faith and the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, it is not only possible that rational and moral agents in 
God’s creation can formulate their own purposes within the bounds of God’s most 
foundational purpose for them, but theists who adopt this or any other foundational 
purpose originating in God can argue that fulfilling God’s purposes is the very thing that 
brings existential satisfaction. Furthermore, the theist can argue that the creature, in 
fulfilling God’s purpose for her, is thereby functioning properly according to her design. 
Perhaps this does not get to the heart of the charge against divinely imposed purpose 
though. The new indictment may then be that God qua imposer of purpose on his 
creatures is tyrannical in the sense that he fashioned them such that for them to 
experience existential satisfaction requires that they live life his way. Why not give them 
                                                 
10 The Westminster Standards refer collectively to the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Westminster 
Shorter Catechism, the Westminster Larger Catechism, the Directory of Public Worship, and the Form of 
Church Government. 
 
11 #293-294, Catechism of the Catholic Church (New York: Doubleday, 2003). 
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complete autonomy and then respect that endowment by not imposing external purposes 
on their lives?  
 To the traditional theist, this response seems inadequate for the following reason. 
The God of classical theism is metaphysically necessary and perfect. Consequently, it is 
likely that he has the best idea of what are good purposes for his creatures, and indeed, 
what sorts of pursuits in life will prove most existentially satisfying to them. 
Furthermore, it is hard to imagine how something other than loving and ordering one’s 
life around such a being could supplant this as a fundamental purpose in life, given what 
this being is thought to be like. Theists reason that foundational pursuits that lead away 
from recognizing, loving, and ordering one’s life, in some measure, around the reality of 
this necessary and perfect being are flawed. This is especially noteworthy when 
discussion centers on other attributes that are posited of the theistic God like beauty and 
goodness. Admitting that our most foundational purpose, though not to the exclusion of 
others at a different level, is wrapped up in something like the Reformers’ motto coram 
deo (before the face of God) is, according to classical theists, no more an assault on the 
dignity of man than it is to require that human dignity in any other context presupposes 
that clearly inferior human purposes (e.g., desiring to rob a bank, murder) are of the same 
status as clearly superior ones (e.g., seeking to alleviate world hunger, poverty, etc.). If 
God is as classical theism states in terms of his nature and character, then for him not to 
prescribe that his creatures order their lives around him would be unloving, for he is 
infinite love, beauty, etc. He ordains what is in accordance with the truth, and therefore 
what is best for his creatures. For God not to reveal his will in this area, given classical 
theistic premises, would be akin to him telling a lie, affirming that it is not important 
193 
 
what foundational ends the human creature chooses for herself in life. It is far from clear, 
then, that God providing a plan for human flourishing is tyrannical. As Michael Levine 
notes, “God’s purpose is not some selfish end of God. To fulfill God’s purpose is at one 
and the same time to fulfill one’s own purposes and goals – to become what it is that is 
most valuable to become.”12 
 This response by the theist to the charge that divinely imposed purpose assaults 
the dignity of man also functions as a response to an interesting dilemma that external 
imposition of purpose views seem to face. The dilemma demonstrates that the imposition 
of purpose qua external imposition is not a sufficient condition for securing purpose that 
is recognized as satisfactory by those agents on whom it is imposed. In Mary Shelley’s 
classic tale, we encounter a creature tormented by questions: “My person was hideous 
and my stature gigantic. What did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I 
come? What was my destination? These questions continually recurred, but I was unable 
to solve them.”13 Eventually he did solve them. Unfortunately, this did not cure his 
existential angst. He found his creator’s journal: 
 You, doubtless, recollect these papers. Here they are. Everything is related in 
 them which bears reference to my accursed origin; the whole detail of that series 
 of disgusting circumstances which produced it is set in view; the minutest 
 description of my odious and loathsome person is given, in language which 
 painted your own horrors and rendered mine indelible. . . . I exclaimed in agony. 
 ‘Accursed creator! Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned 
 from me in disgust?’14  
 
                                                 
12 Michael Levine, “What Does Death Have to Do with the Meaning of Life?” Religious Studies 23 (1987): 
p. 461. 
 
13 Mary W. Shelley, Frankenstein (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1993), p. 134. 
 
14 Ibid., p. 136. 
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Presumably, in reading the journal, Frankenstein’s monster ascertained some of his 
creator’s reasons for giving him life. Even so, this did not bring purpose and meaning, 
recognized as existentially satisfying, into his life. 
 One way of responding to this situation that is available to those who advocate 
that fundamental purpose is externally imposed is to note that even though Dr. 
Frankenstein had reasons and purposes in creating, these purposes failed to be 
existentially sufficient for his creation, a creation which developed the capacity to 
rationally inquire into these purposes. The creature discovered his creator’s purposes in 
creating him, but found them woefully wanting. They certainly did not give him a reason 
from without for wanting to live. Does a similar situation obtain on the divinely imposed 
purpose view? These are deep waters. In a sense, there are individuals who assert from 
their first-person perspective and experience that they are not existentially satisfied with 
purpose(s) being “assigned” to them externally, perhaps by God. On that level, the 
situation would be similar to that of Frankenstein’s monster. However, in another sense, 
advocates of divinely imposed purpose might respond by saying that not only is this 
person not functioning properly, she actually misses out on the greatest existential 
satisfaction possible by rejecting the purpose assigned to her. In other words, the problem 
is not with the divinely imposed purpose, it is with her. Her perspective misses very 
important truths about the way the world operates.15 Furthermore, classical theists resist 
the analogy between Dr. Frankenstein and God. Frankenstein “played a game” for which 
                                                 
15 If her primary complaint is that she does not like the way the world operates, the first three quarters of 





he was ill-equipped. The same cannot be said for God, according to classical theists. A 
God who is ill-equipped is no longer the God of classical theism. 
6.2.1.1 Divinely Imposed Purpose: Euthyphro Revisited 
 While most naturalistic objections to the theistic proposal that a meaningful life is 
largely a function of fulfilling some divinely imposed purpose(s) center on how this 
assaults the dignity of man, another avenue is available to the naturalist. Theists arguing 
for this view are additionally committed to the claim that God’s imposed purposes are the 
kinds of purposes that make for a meaningful life, meaning they are valuable, good, etc. 
But why are these divinely ordained purposes valuable, good, or worth pursuing? It is 
here where a Euthyphro-type dilemma lurks. Indeed, a formally equivalent argument to 
the Euthyphro dilemma, the inspiration for which is found in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro, 
in divine-command theory contexts can be offered against the divinely imposed purpose 
view of life’s meaning.16 However, there are actually two ways a Euthyphro problem can 
be constructed here. In the first case, one might identify divinely imposed purpose(s) with 
divine command(s) such that something similar to the following propositions is true: 
 [DP1]  The purpose of your life is x (where x is commanded by God as a   
  moral imperative around which humans ought to orient their lives). 
 
On this rendering, divinely imposed purpose is faced with Euthyphro’s dilemma simply 
in virtue of its status as a divine command. The proponent of divinely imposed purpose, 
then, seems committed to either (i) the existence of a standard of goodness and value 
outside of God to which he conforms his imposed purposes (commands), or (ii) some 
                                                 
16 In its most basic statement, the dilemma is drawn from a proposition like the following: Does God 
command something because it is right, or is something right because God commands it? The dilemma’s 
advocate thinks the theist is committed to this dilemma, where each horn is equally problematic for the 
theist given other premises within the theists’ theological and philosophical framework (i.e., divine aseity, 
divine necessity, etc.). 
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form of theological voluntarism, whereby there is nothing good or valuable about the 
purposes (commands) God imposes (gives) antecedent of His commanding them, given 
that the theist is unlikely to concede their antecedent value or goodness. Consequently, 
discussion of the dilemma within this context will be nearly identical to discussions of the 
dilemma within the standard divine command theory context. 
 On another rendering, the connection between the Euthyphro dilemma in the 
context of divine command theory and in the context of divinely imposed purpose is 
looser and yet formally identical. In this case, theists are committed to the claim that 
divinely imposed purpose must be good or valuable, and its goodness or value is either 
because God has imposed it, in which case it seems to be arbitrary, or because it is itself 
an intrinsically valuable or good purpose, in which case it seems as though there is some 
standard for good and valuable purposes outside of God to which He is subject. The 
following proposition is subtly different from DP1: 
 [DP2] The purpose of your life is x (where x’s relationship to the divine   
  commands is not specified) 
 
What makes this case different from the first, though? In this scenario, we are not so 
much concerned with whether divinely imposed purpose just is another divine command 
as we are with what makes this purpose(s) good and valuable. Is it so simply because it is 
God’s intended purpose for us, or are God’s intentions in line with something 
antecedently (of him) good and valuable? It is a difference in perspective. Again, neither 
of the options apparently available is likely to appeal to the theist, and so she is 
confronted with something at least formally equivalent to Euthyphro’s famous dilemma 
in ethical discussions of divine command theory. The plausibility of the theist’s reply to 
these Euthyphro dilemmas in the meaning of life context will track the plausibility of the 
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replies on behalf of divine command theory in general. And while there is a sense among 
many contemporary philosophers that divine command theories are seriously flawed, 
there exist formidable versions of the theory of which it is not at all clear that conclusive 
refutation has been offered.17 
6.2.1.2 What About God’s Purpose and Meaning? 
  An additional criticism raised against views of life’s meaning that posit God as 
necessary and sufficient to ground purpose and meaning in life, is that the very same 
questions raised in relation to the universe and the finite creatures who populate it, 
seemingly can be raised about God’s own purpose and meaning. When we ask about the 
meaning of life, we are very often asking a large-scale question about existence. We want 
to know the purpose or meaning of the universe around us as well as of our own lives. 
Generally, we take these questions to be inseparable such that an answer to the first will 
likely elucidate the latter. Often, the assumption is that life’s purpose and meaning are 
somehow derived from God. That is to say, his existence, in some sense, secures meaning 
for everything else that exists. But what about God’s meaning? Can the same question be 
asked about Him? 
 On this matter, Paul Edwards distinguishes between what he calls the “theological 
why” and the “super-ultimate why,” both of which are considered cosmic why-
questions.18 The theological-why is best identified in that one asking such a question 
                                                 
17 For example, see Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); 
and Philip L. Quinn, “Obligation, Divine Commands, and Abraham’s Dilemma,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 64 (March 2002): pp. 459-66. For a recent discussion of this and other central 
issues in religious morality, see William J. Wainwright, Religion and Morality (Aldershot, Hampshire: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 
 
18 Paul Edwards, “Why,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vols. 7 & 8 (New York: Macmillan 




would be satisfied with a theological answer given the answer’s plausibility in its own 
right. That is to say, the person asking this question will likely think the problem of 
purpose and meaning has been sufficiently addressed in obtaining a theological answer, 
whereby God grounds and secures such things. But some think an even deeper why 
question can be asked. A person asking this potentially deeper “why” will feel that the 
answer given to the theological-why is inadequate and has not really answered the 
question of the meaning of existence because it has not given an account of why it is that 
this particular God and not another, and this particular set of God-purposes and not 
some others obtain. They seek a deeper rationale for existence simpliciter, and not simply 
the universe’s existence or human existence or your and my existence.19 In the words of 
Heidegger, the one whose cosmic-why question ends with God has not pushed his inquiry 
“to the very end.”20 Assuming the coherence of the super-ultimate why, a critic of the 
theistic hypothesis in this context might seek to create a tension for the theist—the theist 
posits the ultimate grounding for meaning and purpose in God, but then what is the 
ultimate rationale for this God and not another? In other words, in asking why anything 
exists at all, one must include God in the anything. 
 In response to this, the theist might argue that continuing to request a deeper 
context through which to understand some phenomenon or entity or state of affairs leads 
to an infinite regress, and that it is plausible to terminate the regress with God, given 
traditional theistic postulates about His nature that the universe does not share, even 
                                                 
19 Some argue that the very concept of the super-ultimate why question is incoherent. A case can be made 
that Wittgenstein falls in this group. Cf. Tractatus, 6.432-7. 
 
20 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Trans. by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, CT: Yale 




though he is one of those entities that exists. The most salient property of God relevant in 
this discussion is God’s necessary existence, roughly the idea that it is impossible for him 
not to exist or that he exists in every possible world. God’s necessary existence is 
inseparable from his aseity and eternality, and these attributes force why questioning to 
stop with God. In fact, one can argue that in addition to explanatory and teleological 
considerations terminating in God, so too, do cosmological and ethical considerations. 
 Theists are often criticized for positing God as an arbitrary terminus to such 
questions. Naturalists often think the universe itself provides a sufficient terminus. The 
issue, then, is whether there is something about the nature of life in the universe and the 
universe itself (perhaps something like contingency or a similar notion) that prompts 
legitimate “why” questions for which naturalism does not have the conceptual resources 
to sufficiently address. And if the theist posits a necessary being to answer them, it seems 
as though the criticism is not successful which demands a further why question for that 
being’s cause, the ethical status of his commands, or his purposes in existing. Within the 
context of the dialectic between naturalism and classical theism, then, there are two 
options. Either the universe or the ultimate non-agential state of affairs from which it 
arose is the ultimate brute fact, or the necessary personal being responsible for the 
universe is the ultimate brute fact. Whatever the real brute fact ends up being, no further 
why questions can be asked if one wishes to avoid incoherence. 
 The nature of this dialectic is seen in how theists and naturalists might respond to 
the question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” as well as to each others’ 
answers. The theist thinks the question, at one level at least, is answerable. He responds 
by affirming the existence of a necessary being who is the ultimate and most basic 
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ground of all that exists which is distinct from him. He needs no ground of existence 
outside himself, for he is necessary. Consequently, according to the theist, to ask the 
further question of why this being exists rather than just nothing demonstrates a failure to 
grasp the nature of a necessary being. So, on theistic premises, there is a sense in which 
the question is answerable and a sense in which it is not. God is the reason why there is 
something rather than nothing, but one cannot coherently ask the further question of why 
God himself exists. 
 The naturalist response tracks the theistic response, at least formally. He too 
might think the question is incoherent on one level precisely because the universe (or 
some non-agential, basic state of affairs), for him, occupies the same “explanatory” and 
ontological role as God in the theistic framework. The naturalist might simply claim that 
the universe or the most basic state of affairs from which it arises is necessary. To ask the 
further question of why it exists, then, is incoherent. It just does. The theist, however, 
thinks the fingerprints of necessity are not found in the universe or any non-agential most 
basic state of affairs from which the universe is said to have arisen, and that one only 
finds a forensic match only in the God of traditional theism. Commenting on this 
question and the dividing line between science and metaphysics on the possibility of an 
answer, Étienne Gilson remarks: 
 Why is there something rather than nothing? Here again, I fully understand a 
 scientist who refuses to ask it. He is welcome to tell me that the question does 
 not make sense. Scientifically speaking, it does not. Metaphysically speaking, 
 however, it does. Science can account for many things in the world; it may 
 some day account for all that which the world of phenomena actually is. But 
 why anything at all is, or exists, science knows not, precisely because it cannot 
 even ask the question. To this supreme question, the only conceivable answer is 
 that each and every particular existential energy, each and every particular 
 existing thing, depends for its existence up a pure Act of existence. In order to be 
 the ultimate answer to all existential problems, this supreme cause has to be 
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 absolute existence. Being absolute, such a cause is self-sufficient; if it creates, its 
 creative act must be free. Since it creates not only being but order, it must be 
 something which at least eminently contains the only principle of order known to 
 us in experience, namely, thought. Now an absolute, self-subsisting, and knowing 
 cause is not an It but a He.21 
 
6.2.2 Self Imposed Purpose22 
 It is commonly assumed that in the absence of any divinely imposed purpose on 
human existence that life is without purpose and therefore without meaning. This 
assumption is challenged by many naturalists though.23 A widely accepted candidate 
naturalistic meaning of life narrative has something to say about purpose in world devoid 
of purpose originating outside finite human intentionality. According to such a narrative, 
if purposes originate in the intentionality of rational creatures, then finite agents can 
manufacture their own purpose(s) in life, and this is sufficient for the judgment that their 
lives have purpose and therefore meaning. Certainly, naturalists concede that with the 
“death” of God comes the loss of a species of purpose, but this variety is not required for 
a life full of existentially satisfying purpose and meaning. To those who think naturalists 
are committed to a purposeless and meaningless life, Kurt Baier offers the following 
assessment, “These people mistakenly conclude that there can be no purpose in life 
because there is no purpose of life; that men cannot themselves adopt and achieve 
                                                 
21 Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 138-40. For a 
naturalistic discussion of why there is something rather than nothing, see Bede Rundle, Why There is 
Something Rather than Nothing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). 
 
22 I am using “self-imposed purpose” as a contrasting position to divinely imposed purpose. I identify this 
as a naturalistic option, even though it is logically possible that there exists a state of affairs where God 
exists but a divinely imposed purpose fails to obtain. 
 
23 Some naturalists of a pessimist bent however, do concede that in the absence of God life really is 
purposeless in a sense that also entails meaningless. 
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purposes because man, unlike a robot or a watch dog, is not a creature with a purpose.”24 
Baier’s claim is that one commits a non sequitur in concluding that a lack of externally 
imposed purpose onto life entails a lack of internally generated purpose as rational 
creatures lead their lives. The latter does not follow from the former, and this internally 
generated purpose is sufficient for a purposeful and meaningful life. 
 Michael Martin distinguishes talk of purpose into two categories, cosmic and 
terrestrial, a distinction that largely tracks the difference between the divine imposition 
view and the self imposition view.25 Cosmic purpose is that purpose which is part of a 
larger cosmic plan not ultimately originating with man, whereas terrestrial purpose has no 
such relationship to a larger plan at the cosmic level.26 Naturalism entails the rejection of 
cosmic purpose, but not terrestrial purpose. As such, provided that a given terrestrial 
purpose meets certain conditions, it can be considered a purpose that contributes to a 
meaningful existence. On this view, talk of a single purpose for human life is 
unwarranted and unnecessary, for there exist numerous purposes that can contribute to a 
meaningful life. 
 Naturalists who advocate something like the self-imposition view challenge the 
assumption that divinely imposed purpose or predetermined purpose that is “introduced 
at the design stage”27 is more real or substantial or significant than the sort of purpose 
                                                 
24 Kurt Baier, “The Meaning of Life,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. Klemke (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 120 
 
25 Michael Martin, Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), pp. 188-91. 
 
26 Although, terrestrial purposes can transcend individuals and perhaps even come to include all of 
humanity. However, this is not sufficient to qualify as cosmic purpose, neither on Martin’s taxonomy nor 
on any supernaturalist view. 
 




that humans themselves can manufacture. Daniel Dennett summarizes this challenge 
rhetorically, “Why should our purposes have to be inherited from on high? (I call that the 
trickle-down theory of importance – everything important has to get its importance from 
something else that is even more important.) Why can’t we invent our own purposes?”28 
And so naturalists think it is entirely plausible to secure a purposeful and meaningful 
existence in an atheistic universe precisely because meaningful purposes can have as their 
originating and sustaining conditions the minds and intentions of human beings. 
6.2.2.1 Subjectivism, Objectivism, and Self-Imposed Purpose 
 A dividing line exists, however, among naturalist views that posit the sufficiency 
of self-imposed purpose for a meaningful life between subjectivist and objectivist views. 
Subjectivist views maintain that what counts as a worthwhile purpose is relative to an 
individual’s unique desires and goals, whatever they might be.29 Objectivist views, on the 
other hand, posit that the worth or value of purposes is a natural, mind-independent fact 
that lacks variance.30 On strong versions of subjectivism (which few hold without some 
measure of qualification), a meaningful life can be secured if one sets for himself the 
purpose of counting and recounting the blades of grass in his front lawn, and he finds this 
task personally satisfying. Such a purpose would not produce a meaningful life on 
objectivism, whereas pursuing ideals like justice on earth and alleviating as much 
preventable pain as possible likely would. There is more to be said here, given that 
discussions of purpose are closely intertwined with discussions of value. Subjectivist and 
                                                 
28 Quoted in Baggini, What’s It All About?, p. 14. 
 





objectivist naturalists agree that valuable purposes should be pursued if one seeks to lead 
a meaningful life, but disagree on the source of that value. 
 So, even though naturalists are generally unified in their rejection of the view that 
theistic premises are necessary and sufficient in order to secure valuable, worthwhile 
purposes around which to order a meaningful life, they disagree about what “gets the job 
done” in a purely natural world.31 The disparity between subjectivist naturalism and 
objectivist naturalism is nicely captured in a thought experiment developed by Richard 
Taylor involving the mythical figure Sisyphus.32 Recall that Sisyphus was damned to a 
dreadful punishment by the gods for offering divine secrets to mortals. He was 
condemned to roll a rock to the top of a hill, and when he finally reached his goal the 
rock would tumble back down. Sisyphus would follow it to the bottom, and again roll it 
to the top. The absurdity and meaninglessness of the situation is that Sisyphus was to 
repeat this task forever. Apparently the gods thought that there is no more dreadful 
punishment and misery than futile and hopeless labor that never accomplishes anything 
and is never finished. 
 After introducing the myth, Taylor has us imagine a scenario where the gods 
implant an impulse in Sisyphus to desire to do what he will be doing forever.33 This new 
Sisyphus gets precisely what he wants, a stone to ceaselessly roll up a hill. The external 
circumstances in which Sisyphus find himself do not change. Something internal, 
Sisyphus’ perspective on his states of affairs, is the only aspect of the situation that 
                                                 
31 I say “generally” because some naturalists hold that (i) theistic premises are necessary to secure value 
and meaning, (ii) God does not exist, and therefore (iii) there is no value and meaning in life. Skeptics 
about the whole project of finding and securing a meaningful existence and nihilists would fit here. 
 
32 See Richard Taylor, Good and Evil: A New Direction, Chapter 18 (London: The Macmillan Company, 
1970), pp. 256-68. 
 
33 Ibid., pp. 259-60. 
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exhibits discontinuity from the original scenario. The original scenario was, intuitively, 
meaningless. But does Sisyphus new found love of ceaseless rock-rolling endow the 
situation with meaning? In terms of value, if the original situation was said to lack value, 
does Sisyphus’s changed inner perspective confer value on it? Subjectivist and objectivist 
naturalist views are split in response to this question. 
 The subjectivist intuition is that Sisyphus’ endless rock-rolling is valuable in 
virtue of the fact that he now views it as valuable. His desire is in line with his task, and 
this makes his situation one that is valuable and meaningful, precisely because it is 
valuable to him. The objectivist, on the other hand, thinks there is something wrong with 
Sisyphus’s desire itself. His desire is incompatible with what ought to be desired in virtue 
of its connection to some mind-independent, objective value. Indeed, according to the 
objectivist, the value of some state of affairs or end is not primarily the function of 
whether an agent deems it to be valuable. There are more and less valuable states of 
affairs, and their value resides in a mind-independent fact about the world. In the case of 
Sisyphus, the objectivist argues that ceaseless rock rolling in the manner in which 
Sisyphus performs it is not valuable, even though one, like the “reconfigured” Sisyphus, 
may derive great pleasure, satisfaction, and even putative meaning from this. 
 Currently out of favor, the subjectivist naturalistic option introduced and defined 
above, entails that (i) if one values memorizing the names in the phonebooks of the five 
largest U.S. cities, and (ii) one is reasonably successful in realizing this self-determined 
valuable end, then (iii) this person has secured a meaningful existence. (iii) follows from 
(i) and (ii) on subjectivist premises because value and, hence, a meaningful life is solely a 
matter of individual preference. 
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 Objectivists are uncomfortable with what subjectivism seems to entail. For 
example, in response to Harry Frankfurt’s (who is difficult to categorize as a full-blown 
subjectivist) claim that, “Devoting oneself to what one loves suffices to make one’s life 
meaningful, regardless of the inherent or objective character of the objects that are 
loved,”34 Susan Wolf responds that a meaningful life cannot be solely a function of 
caring or loving deeply qua caring and loving, for then loving people and loving to 
torture them would both be constitutive of a meaningful life. Intuitively though, we think 
that loving others as opposed to loving to torture them is the more valuable and 
meaningful thing to do. As such, Wolf proposes that a meaningful life is constituted by 
loving what is worth loving. Wolf, speaking for many other naturalists, maintains that 
there exist fully natural, mind-independent standards “governing” those things one ought 
to love or care about.35 
6.2.2.2 Objectivist Naturalism and Self-Imposed Purpose: A Dilemma? 
 The objectivist naturalist who thinks that one ought to order her life around 
objectively valuable, mind-independent purpose(s) in order to secure a meaningful 
existence seems to be faced with a similar objection as the theist who posits that a person 
must order her life around divinely “imposed” purposes. In the latter case, an oft-repeated 
criticism is that such a view diminishes or destroys human dignity and autonomy. It is 
argued that the creature must be allowed to choose her purpose(s), and if not, she is 
deprived of her dignity. But is not the objectivist naturalist faced with a formally 
equivalent problem, even if the details are different? 
                                                 
34 Harry Frankfurt, “Reply to Susan Wolf,” in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry 
Frankfurt. Eds. S. Buss and L. Overton (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), p. 250. 
 




 If, as the objectivist naturalist claims, we must conform our aims with objective, 
mind-independent valuable purposes in order to lead a meaningful life, then we do not 
really get to decide what we can pursue if we want to lead a meaningful life. To be sure, 
one gets to decide whether or not to pursue the objectively valuable ends, but the same 
can be said for the theist. Similar to the perceived dilemma in the theistic scenario, it 
seems as though those who want to align their lives with objectively valuable purposes, 
on objective naturalist premises, will have ipso facto limited human autonomy. In other 
words, they will not get to create, by human fiat, and choose valuable purposes. This 
largely remains outside of one’s control on objective naturalist premises. On such 
premises, one must first discover objectively valuable ends, and then order her life 
around such ends. In the end, whether one is a theist or a naturalist where objective value 
is part of one’s fundamental ontology, certain normative properties will, so to speak, be 
outside of the agent’s hands to create. Even on objectivist naturalism, then, an account of 
dignity will have to be harmonized with this claim that, prima facie, appears to diminish 
autonomy.36  
6.2.3 Purpose and the Discovery of Origins 
 Questions about purpose naturally link to questions about origins. This is part of 
the reason why issues surrounding origins are thought to be so relevant to the issue of 
life’s meaning. Indeed, questions that can be plausibly substituted for, “What is the 
meaning of life?” in many contexts are, for example, “From whence did I come?” or 
“Why am I here?”  This is not surprising, as there exists a common assumption that in 
                                                 
36 For many, the lack of absolute autonomy is no problem, as voiced in the following rhetorical question, 
“Why is the preservation of absolute human autonomy needed for human dignity, and why is this claim 
assumed to be a reasonable normative Archimedean point by which all other normative and ethical 
questions are answered about how we ought to order and live our lives?” 
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discovering from where it is that one ultimately comes, one will be in a good position to 
also discover her purpose or reason for existing. The prima facie plausibility of this 
assumption is evidenced in numerous examples where in discovering the origins of an 
item, we think we can learn its purpose. For example, discovering the origins of an 
automobile, can-opener, or toothbrush seems to bring with it information about the 
function these items are to serve. However, such a discovery only does so because of an 
additional assumption that in discovering something’s origin, we will also discover the 
intentionality through which it is assigned a function or purpose. This assumption 
highlights an important ambiguity in the question, “Why am I here?” 
 The ambiguity in this and other why questions is addressed in the distinction 
between efficient and final causality, two of Aristotle’s four species of causation. 
Roughly, efficient causes are prior conditions, entities, or events from which the thing in 
question arises. For example, the efficient cause of a billiard ball moving would be its 
being struck by a cue, or perhaps the agent who initiates the causal sequence. Final 
causes are purposes or ends (telos) for which something is done. In the above example, 
the final cause of the billiard ball moving is likely the aim of getting it into one of the six 
pockets on the pool table. When asking, “Why are we here?” or “Why am I here?” it is 
conceptually possible then that one is asking the question either on efficient causal 
assumptions or final causal assumptions or both. In reality though, a case can be made 
that nearly all who ask the question, pre-philosophically at least, ask it with final 
causation intuitions at the fore. Theirs is, as Paul Edwards identifies, an “ultimate or 
cosmic” use of “why” as found in questions like, “Why do we exist?” “Why does the 
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world exist?” or “Why is there something rather than nothing?”37 It is not the kind of why 
question that science can answer in its empirical explorations and descriptive narratives 
of efficient causal processes in nature.38 
 When asking, “Why am I here?” most people strongly link the possible state of 
affairs of finding out about their origins with additionally discovering their purpose for 
existing. Here, talk of origins is not in reference to the immediate origins of a person (i.e., 
his parents), but to the origins of all those like us (i.e., humans) and indeed the very 
universe itself, with the assumption that there exists something like a teleological 
blueprint, perhaps provided by our and the universe’s designer that can be secured in 
discovering information about our origins.39 For those with such assumptions, the 
purpose needed to make life meaningful is something to be discovered and which 
originates externally apart from our own intentionality, rather than something we can 
create internally.  
 Those who advocate self-imposed meaning reject this assumption though, as it is 
replete with teleological implications and seems to strongly presuppose transcendent 
intentionality behind the cosmos and life.40 Given the strong ties between the self 
imposed purpose view and naturalism, advocates of this view think no such purposive 
blueprint, anchored in God’s intentionality, exists for the ends around which human life 
                                                 
37 Paul Edwards, “Why,” p. 296. 
 
38 Cf. John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 4-7. 
 
39 Among other things, this shows that, as a matter of fact, questions about the meaning of life quite often 
are religiously motivated, even if many contemporary philosophers think sufficient non-religious 
considerations can provide for a meaningful life. 
 
40 Of course, logically, the option remains on the table of there being a purpose originating independent of 
human intentionality but somehow within the universe to which we can align our lives. Three possible 
avenues for this are (i) Aristotelianism, (ii) Perhaps some Eastern forms of religion, and (iii) possibly, to 




is to be ordered. Consequently, an inquiry into the universe’s and humanity’s origins will, 
in principle, yield nothing but an efficient causal story detailing the ultimate prior 
conditions from which sentient life emerged. These prior conditions culminating in the 
kind of sentient life capable of asking question’s about the meaning of life were not 
intentionally ordered, and, in a sense, their product is quite improbable, according to the 
late paleontologist, Stephen J. Gould: 
 We [humans] are here because one odd group of fishes had a peculiar fin anatomy 
 that could transform into legs for terrestrial creatures; because comets struck the 
 earth and wiped out dinosaurs, thereby giving mammals a chance not otherwise 
 available. . . . We may yearn for a “higher” answer—but none exists. This 
 explanation, though superficially troubling, if not terrifying, is ultimately 
 liberating and exhilarating. We cannot read the meaning of life passively in the 
 facts of nature. We must construct these answers for ourselves . . .41 
 
 Such is the human predicament regarding our purpose or lack thereof if 
naturalism is true. For advocates of self imposed meaning, however, it is no real cause to 
worry that life has no purpose, for the creation of that purpose is up to us (at least in the 
case of subjectivist naturalists). The universe is filled with intentionality and purpose—
ours and that which we choose to create. We are the authors of life’s blueprint(s), in one 
sense, and we will not find any other by turning our gaze to life’s ultimate origins. In the 
case of objectivist naturalists, even though objective, mind-independent purpose exists, 
we need not, nor can we, look to some originating intentionality that has endowed life 
with purpose. 
 As with the distinction between divinely and self imposed meaning, the 
assumptions from which one asks the question, “Why are we here?” generally tracks the 
distinction between supernaturalism and naturalism. One who asks the question with 
                                                 
41 From David Friend and the editors of Life, The Meaning of Life: Reflections in Words and Pictures on 
Why We Are Here (London: Little, Brown, 1991), p. 33. 
211 
 
teleological intuitions at the fore is likely searching for an answer that requires some form 
of supernaturalism. He is in search of a pre-ordained purpose for his life that is thought to 
issue from a source outside of himself, likely the same source responsible for the 
existence of the universe. Conversely, one operating under naturalist assumptions either 
does not ask the question in this way at all, or if she does, thinks the only answers she 
will find are efficient causal ones. It is within this universe, which at its most basic level 
is mechanistic and non-teleological, that internally originating purposes must be created 
and lived out according to the naturalist. 
 Out of these assumptions and motivations, one discovers hints of why the 
question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is so strongly connected with the 
meaning of life. To be sure, this is a metaphysical question that is the product of a 
profound sense of awe at the staggering reality of existence, and why anything exists at 
all. But it is more than this. It is existential in the sense that we ask it in an effort to make 
sense of the world and, particularly, how we fit into this larger conception of existence as 
a whole. In answering it, we think we will not only receive rational satisfaction, but that 
we will receive a deeper existential and emotional satisfaction in discovering why we are 
here. And until we do so, there is a measure of restlessness and lack of peace. We think 
that in discovering the answer to why anything exists rather than just nothing, we will 
discover a purpose or reason for our existence. Again, teleological assumptions are 
salient in the very asking of the question. Furthermore, even though the question, “Why 
is there something rather than nothing?” is global whereas the question, “Why am I 
here?” is local, many think an answer to the former will elucidate the latter. In all this, we 
see that, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is another of those questions 
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among many that are part of the larger family of questions associated with the meaning of 
life. 
6.3 Summary 
 In order for a narrative to qualify as a candidate meaning of life narrative, it must 
possess the correct narrative elements. Of importance, is that it contains a cluster of 
elements that address a number of salient concerns and questions surrounding purpose. I 
have briefly sketched some of the more prevalent of these concerns in this chapter. In 
keeping with my dialectical aims in Part II of the dissertation, I have used theism and 
naturalism as the grid by which to contextualize the discussion. In Chapter Seven, I will 
move to a consideration of two more related elements for which any candidate meaning 
of life narrative must provide an explanatory or narrative framework: pain and suffering 












 Understanding the question, “What is the meaning of life?” with the aid of 
narrative has already proven fruitful in this dissertation. The benefits of the narrative 
interpretation have not, however, been exhausted; possibly the most noteworthy of 
them—how the importance of narrative ending provides a powerful way to frame 
discussions of death and futility within the more general territory of life’s meaning—has 
yet to be discussed. My main, though not only, goal in this final chapter will be to show 
how the concept of narrative ending naturally links to the perennial meaning of life topics 
of death and futility. It does so primarily by offering a deep rationale for why death and 
futility have so often been thought to be relevant to life’s meaning, largely, in virtue of 
being perceived threats to a robustly meaningful life. 
 I will argue that futility is often thought to characterize naturalistic candidate 
meaning of life narratives, or metanarratives,2 because the way a narrative ends has 
significant proleptic power to elicit a wide range of broadly normative human responses 
on, possibly, emotional, aesthetic, and moral levels towards the narrative as a whole in 
                                                 
1 I have reworked a significant portion of the content in Chapter Seven into a paper titled, “Death, Futility, 
and the Proleptic Power of Narrative Ending,” which is forthcoming in Religious Studies. 
 
2 Hereafter, I will use the terms “candidate meaning of life narrative” and “metanarrative” interchangeably. 
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virtue of it being the ending.3 I will begin by explaining the conceptual and dialectical 
context in which discussions of death and futility often unfold. Second, I will compare 
the respective endings of the candidate naturalistic and Christian theistic meaning of life 
narratives. Third, I will explain the rationale behind the evaluative significance of 
narrative ending for broadly normative appraisals of narratives as a whole. Fourth, I will 
clarify three important senses of ending, noting which is required for my argument to 
succeed. Fifth, I will propose two strategies to explain how my own proposal relates to 
another plausible account of the perceived connection between death and futility in a 
strictly naturalist world, an account Ronald Dworkin presents in Chapter Six of his 
Sovereign Virtue.4 Sixth, I will enlist my conclusions about the evaluative significance of 
narrative ending in order to frame and bring greater nuance to discussions of death and 
futility, and why futility is thought to follow from the nature of naturalistic metanarrative 
endings. Finally, I will explore potential implications that the evaluative significance of 
narrative ending has for the tasks of defense and theodicy. Like Chapter Six, this chapter 
is not primarily evaluative (vis-à-vis the debate between naturalism and Christian 
theism), but is intended as a way to frame discussions of death and futility given 
resources only available from within the narrative interpretation. 
                                                 
3 A similar claim can be made for any metanarrative. That is, metanarrative x’s ending has significant 
proleptic power to elicit a wide range of broadly normative human responses on, possibly, emotional, 
aesthetic, and moral levels towards that metanarrative as a whole. The content of the broadly normative 
responses will then be dependent upon how metanarrative x ends. 
 
4 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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7.2 The Connection Between Death, Futility, and The Meaning of Life: The Received 
Dialectical Context 
  
 Death and futility are among a cluster of themes that closely track discussions of 
life’s meaning.5 Precisely why death and futility bear such a close relationship to the 
meaning of life has received relatively little sustained articulation beyond the oft-repeated 
pessimistic claim that cosmic or deep futility supervenes upon the entirety of human 
existence,6 given a naturalistic view of the ultimate fate of life, both human life as well as 
the universe itself, where entropy, dissolution, and death are thought to have the final 
word. If we and all the products of our human energies including the immediate building 
of a family, accomplishments, and the distant traces of progeny will someday cease to 
exist forever, then our lives and our pursuits, indeed, existence in its entirety, are deeply 
futile, so the argument goes. 
 Both defenses and attempted rebuttals of the above conditional have broadly 
unfolded within relatively well-defined dialectical parameters. Those who accept the 
consequent generally do so, I think, largely by focusing on what can be called the Staying 
Power Intuition (SPI). Roughly, SPI is the idea that, ceteris paribus, worthwhile, 
significant, and meaningful things last.7 Though SPI is vague and subject to counter-
examples in various contexts, in terms of human life, SPI requires that we leave some 
sort of indelible mark on reality (usually articulated in a sense requiring a doctrine of 
post-mortem survival that itself requires the survival of the person), something which is 
                                                 
5 As already noted earlier in the dissertation, others include origins, purpose, value, pain and suffering, and 
how life is going to end. 
 
6 I contrast cosmic futility with local futility. The latter is futility that supervenes upon a localized state of 
affairs, for example, a four year old’s aim to climb Mt. Everest in a day. The entirety of existence being 
cosmically futile is consistent with localized aims being worthwhile and attainable. 
 




not possible,8 or at minimum, highly unlikely on naturalism. Those who reject the 
consequent generally make one of two (or both) moves—(i) appeal to a contrary 
intuition, what can be called the Scarcity Intuition (SI) whereby life is thought to be 
worthwhile, significant, and meaningful—and therefore not deeply futile—precisely 
because death looms on the horizon, bringing a sense of poignant urgency and 
specialness to fleeting life,9 or, more often, (ii) argue that the requirement of post-mortem 
survival of human beings and the fruits of their labors, extending endlessly into the 
future, is too strong a condition to be met in order for life to be worthwhile, significant, 
and meaningful.10 
                                                 
8 I am, of course, not referring to logical impossibility, but metaphysical impossibility. Though, it must be 
admitted that strictly speaking one can imagine scenarios where post-mortem survival is even 
metaphysically possible within an exclusively naturalist ontology, for example, through successive 
transfers of consciousness into different material bodies, as an anonymous reviewer reminded me. 
Nonetheless, post-mortem survival fits much more naturally within a theistic ontology, and attempts to 
secure it on naturalism are tenuous at best. 
 
9 Something in the neighborhood of SI is captured on one construal of the popular maxim, live everyday 
like it is your last. Marcus Aurelius may have advocated something like this: “Do not act as if you had ten 
thousand years to throw away. Death stands at your elbow!” Meditations, trans. J. Collier (London: Walter 
Scott Publishing Co. Ltd., 1805), 52. Although, Aurelius’s words may be little more than an affirmation of 
the fleeting nature of this life, something held by many who also believe in post-mortem survival. For more 
explicit affirmations of SI, note the words of Victor Frankl, who said, “. . . death itself is what makes life 
meaningful.” The Doctor and the Soul (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957), p. 73; and those of Karl Popper, 
“There are those who think that life is valueless because it comes to an end. They fail to see that the 
opposite argument might also be proposed: that if there were no end to life, life would have no value; that it 
is, in part, the ever-present danger of losing it which helps bring home to us the value of life.” in “How I 
See Philosophy,” Philosophers on Their Own Work, eds. A. Mercier and M. Svilar, vol. 3 (Berne and 
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1977), p. 148. 
 
10 This is the position of Brooke Allen Trisel in “Human Extinction and the Value of Our Efforts,” The 
Philosophical Forum, 35 (Fall 2004): pp. 371-91, along with most contemporary naturalists. Interestingly, 
there are those who think that not only is post-mortem existence, extending endlessly into the future, not 
necessary for a worthwhile, meaningful life, but that such a state would actually threaten such a life. For 
example, see Bernard Williams’s existential—as opposed to logical or metaphysical—objection to 
traditional accounts of post-mortem survival in his, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of 
Immortality,” in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 82-100. 
Importantly, (ii) additionally highlights the difference between optimistic and pessimistic naturalists. 
Pessimistic naturalists, along with most theists, claim that God’s existence and post-mortem survival are 
necessary conditions for a meaningful and worthwhile life. Unlike theists, pessimistic naturalists deny that 
God exists, and so conclude that life is meaningless and futile. Schopenhauer, Camus, and possibly 
Bertrand Russell fall into this category. Optimistic naturalists, however, deny that God and post-mortem 
survival are necessary for a meaningful, worthwhile life. Thus, they would deny a strong version of SPI 
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 Within the dialectical parameters noted above, discussions over the perceived 
threat of death to living a meaningful life, as death is construed on naturalism, have been 
fruitful up to a point. In this context, death and futility are thought to link to the meaning 
of life as a threat to leading a meaningful life. While this analysis may be correct as far as 
it goes, it is surely a truncated story of their connection. Therefore, considerations of SPI 
can and should be supplemented in order to bring a more robust account of this 
relationship. This involves combining three claims which then provide the deeper 
rationale through which to understand something like SPI. These three claims are as 
follows: 
(1) Entire metaphysical systems (e.g., naturalism, Christian theism) can be 
thought of as narratives or metanarratives, narrating across the cluster of 
humanly-deemed existentially relevant ‘features’ of life (e.g., origins, 
purpose, value, pain and suffering, and how it is all going to end). 
 
 (2) The way a narrative ends qua ending, contributes to a wide range of  
  broadly normative human responses on, possibly, emotional, aesthetic, and 
  moral levels towards the narrative as a whole. 
 
 (3) Per (1) and (2), many have concluded that naturalistic metanarratives are  
  characterized by deep or cosmic futility given the way they end, and the  
  way they end is important for such normative appraisals partly because  
  narrative ending qua ending is important to these appraisals. 
 
Note carefully that the reason subsumed under (1) – (3) is importantly different from the 
reason anchored exclusively in a principle such as SPI where futility is thought to follow 
from the naturalistic metanarrative ending given naturalistic premises about the nature of 
that ending. In the case of (1) – (3), the reason is even more theoretically and practically 
fundamental—that narrative ending qua ending is salient in our broadly normative 
                                                                                                                                                 
applied to human life. Most contemporary philosophical naturalists would recognize themselves as 
optimistic, in the sense the term is used in this context. I discussed optimistic and pessimistic naturalism in 




assessments of narratives as a whole. Hence, while judging the naturalistic metanarrative 
to be irredeemably futile is, no doubt, made partly on the basis of the nature of its ending 
(what can be called a “second-order futility-conclusion”),11 an important reason that the 
nature of the ending possesses such normative weight is that it is already anchored in the 
fact that narrative ending qua ending is thought to be normatively important (a first-order 
conclusion about endings in general).12 Put simply, second-order futility-conclusions, or 
second-order non-futility-conclusions for that matter, would lose much of their force if 
something like first-order conclusions about the evaluative significance of narrative 
ending qua ending were not already in place. 
 Of course, introducing the concept of narrative ending presupposes an intelligible 
framework in which it sufficiently links up to the question of life’s meaning in general 
and to death and futility specifically. It will only work if narrative, as a concept, 
appropriately relates to the meaning of life in a coherent way. I defended this view in Part 
I of the dissertation, positing an analytic relationship between the question, “What is the 
meaning of life?” and the concept of a narrative, whereby the question is interpreted as 
the request for a metanarrative that narrates across those elements and accompanying 
questions of life of greatest existential import to human beings. Space does not allow for 
a re-articulation of the narrative interpretation, and its analytic proposal for how to 
understand the request, “What is the meaning of life?” However, it is worth noting that 
                                                 
11 The judgment might also be based upon other considerations, like whether or not one thinks objective 
value can be secured in an exclusively naturalistic ontology. The debate over the ontology of value, even 
within the naturalist camp, reveals that there is not just one naturalistic metanarrative, even though there 
will be some continuity across all naturalistic metanarratives in virtue of shared theses about the nature of 
reality. 
 
12 Regardless of whether or not the endings of narratives should possess such influence over our broadly 
normative assessments of narratives as a whole (or whether or not narrative theorists and philosophers have 




the analytic claim is not needed in order for my thesis in this chapter to be plausible. 
Indeed, one can introduce a weaker, synthetic relationship between the meaning of life 
and narrative in that narrative is one, among other concepts, that importantly links to 
issues that are largely co-extensive with the meaning of life. Here, narrative occurs 
alongside other theories and concepts that aid us in addressing the cluster of questions 
and concerns found in the meaning of life context, even if none, individually, covers all 
of the conceptual territory.  
 Whether or not conclusions that life is in fact cosmically futile have philosophical 
merit is not my concern in this chapter. Rather, I am focusing on answering the question 
of why futility is often thought to saliently characterize naturalistic candidate meaning of 
life narratives in a way that moves beyond the received dialectical parameters. I am 
primarily interested in what I term above, a “first-order conclusion about endings in 
general,” which follows from the perceived normative significance of narrative ending 
qua ending. On this more fundamental level, I will argue that futility is often thought to 
characterize naturalistic metanarratives because the way a narrative ends has significant 
proleptic power to elicit a wide range of broadly normative human responses on, 
possibly, emotional, aesthetic, and moral levels towards the narrative as a whole in virtue 
of it being the ending. 
7.3 The Ending on the Naturalistic Narrative13 
 There are several dimensions to ending in an exclusively naturalistic world that 
are apropos to a discussion of life’s meaning. The best way to unpack the naturalistic 
candidate meaning of life narrative ending will be through a consideration of each of 
                                                 
13 Naturalists of all persuasions, whether reductive, non-reductive, subjectivist, or objectivist, will agree on 
the characteristics of death as delineated in this section. 
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these distinct dimensions. With the concept of death at the fore, one can refer to three 
relevant deaths: (i) the deaths of individual humans, (ii) the “death” of the earth, and (iii) 
the “death” of the universe. But there are other important aspects to these dimensions of 
naturalistic narrative endings (both penultimate and ultimate) that are important in the 
context of meaning of life discussions, two of which are the fact that, ex hypothesi, (iv) 
the local endings of dying humans and our “dying” earth, and the global ending of the 
universe are definitive and irreversible, resulting in the dissolution of self-aware, first-
person consciousness (in the case of humans) and complete and irreversible entropy (in 
the case of the universe),14 and (v) the final ending of the universe is one that is neither 
previsioned nor planned, and, in that sense, is not brought about (either weakly construed 
or strongly construed depending upon the notion of divine agency in view) by intelligent, 
purposeful direction. I will briefly consider what death means in the first three 
dimensions, and will address the fourth dimension within the respective discussion of 
each species of death. I will close the section by considering the fifth dimension. 
 With respect to the deaths of individual human beings, one can distinguish dying, 
death, and being dead. As John Martin Fischer has noted, “Dying is a process. Being 
dead is a condition or state. Death intervenes between dying and being dead; it takes 
place at the end of dying and the beginning of being dead.”15 Parsing the conceptual and 
metaphysical relations between dying, death, and being dead is not important here; all 
three are part of the phenomenon of death, and it is the ending that death brings that is 
                                                 
14 I will not consider some of the more exotic claims of certain scientists that lack mainstream acceptance 
like, for example, those of Frank Tipler in The Physics of Immortality (New York: Macmillan, 1994). It is 
worth mentioning, however, that there are a few who think some semblance of immortality is at least 
possible within a naturalist worldview. 
 





relevant. On the naturalistic narrative it is the fact that dying ushers in the irreversible 
state or condition of being dead that is important. 
 On the naturalistic narrative, death is solely a biological event, an event which, in 
principle, can be understood entirely naturalistically. Importantly, there is no spiritual 
explanatory layer that contributes to an accurate and exhaustive understanding of this 
phenomenon, even if many claim there is a spiritual dimension to death and view death, 
at least partly, spiritually. Tabling discussions about when death occurs and the 
complexities of securing a criterion of death (whether the traditional heart-lung death 
criterion or the brain-death criterion),16 death is associated with the biological demise of 
the human organism, bringing with it the dissolution of that entity. These biological and 
scientific considerations, though important in some contexts, are not most important for 
the meaning of life. What is important about human death for the meaning of life is that, 
on naturalistic premises, the loss of self-reflective, first-person consciousness in death is 
definitive and irreversible. Our person is dissolved, never again to experience anything if 
naturalism is true. It is not important to explain what death is, rather it is important to 
discuss what state of affairs death brings about for the one who undergoes death. What is 
relevant here is that this biological demise is final and irreversible. The loss of conscious 
life is a permanent loss, even if, upon that loss, the one who previously was is no longer 
around to experience this loss. It is a loss nonetheless. 
                                                 
16 While these two criterions can be further nuanced, the general idea is that death occurs when there is 
permanent and irreversible cessation of heart and lung functioning (heart-lung death criterion) or death 
occurs when there is permanent and irreversible cessation of the functioning of either (i) all parts of the 
brain or (ii) the parts that sustain cognitive functioning, including consciousness (brain-death criterion). 




 The second relevant “death” is that of the earth and/or the solar system of which 
the earth is a part, which would bring with it the deaths of all human beings, if the former 
death occurred before the latter deaths.17 There are certainly realistic, possible states of 
affairs that could bring this about, some of them of entirely naturalistic causes, some of 
them, to varying degrees, products of human activity. Scientific research abounds with 
earth-ending scenarios, many of them initially catalogued by Isaac Asimov in his well-
known book, A Choice of Catastrophes.18 Such earth-ending disasters include possible 
devastating asteroid and comet impacts, the eventual death of our sun due to the 
processes involved in stellar evolution, the formation of a black hole due to the 
“collisional coalescence” of two neutron stars in our own galaxy within 1,500 to 3,000 
light years of earth,19 or widespread cancer and genetic mutations arising from an 
invisible collapse of a massive star within “. . . a few tens of light years from earth.”20 As 
with the deaths of human beings, any of the above catastrophes would cause the “death” 
of the earth as we know it, and the resulting condition would be permanent. 
 The final relevant death is that of the universe. William R. Stoeger notes that “. . . 
from all that we know about the evolution and dynamics of the observable universe, and 
                                                 
17 Although, the plausibility of such earth-ending disasters is low during the projected life of homosapiens, 
occurring “. . . on time-scales of the order of more than 50 million years, much longer than the time-scales 
on which our species may significantly evolve or disappear . . .” William R. Stoeger, S.J., “Scientific 
Accounts of Ultimate Catastrophes in Our Life-Bearing Universe,” in The End of the World and the Ends 
of God: Science and Theology on Eschatology, ed. John Polkinghorne and Michael Welker (Harrisburg, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), p. 21. Furthermore, given enough scientific progress, one can 
imagine scenarios where some segment of the human population is able to leave the earth and colonize 
somewhere else prior to the earth’s destruction. 
 
18 Isaac Asimov, A Choice of Catastrophes: The Disasters That Threaten Our World (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1979). 
 
19 See Robert Zimmerman, “When Neutron Stars Collide,” Astronomy 25, no. 4 (April 1997): pp. 52-55. 
 
20 All of these catastrophic scenarios are from William R. Stoeger, “Scientific Accounts of Ultimate 




about the laws of nature that govern it . . .” that the “. . . universe as a life-generating 
ensemble . . .” will die.21 It “. . . will eventually evanesce or possibly collapse in a fiery 
final conflagration (the big crunch).”22 It is important to note that the final naturalistic 
ending—the universe’s final state—is not thought to be a final event followed by 
absolutely nothing (like the endings of literary narratives), but will be a certain final state 
of affairs characterizing the space-time universe we now inhabit. Importantly though, this 
final state of affairs is such that it will no longer permit life of any sort, especially not 
human life. On naturalism, the universe is inevitably moving towards (but in a non-agent 
directed way of course) this ultimate, non-life permitting, irreversible state. It is an 
ending owing nothing to anything but non-intelligent natural processes proceeding 
towards “death” according to natural law. In the words of C. S. Lewis, the naturalistic 
story of our universe: 
. . . is going to end in NOTHING [maybe not literally, though]. The astronomers 
hold out no hope that this planet is going to be permanently inhabitable. The 
physicists hold out no hope that organic life is going to be a permanent possibility 
in any part of the material universe. Not only this earth, but the whole show, all 
the suns of space, are to run down. Nature is a sinking ship. . . . Nature does not, 
in the long run, favour life. If  Nature is all that exists – in other words, if there is 
no God and no life of some quite different sort somewhere outside Nature – then 
all stories will end in the same way: in a universe from which all life is banished 
without possibility of  return. It will have been an accidental flicker, and there will 
be no one even to remember it.23 
 
Lewis’ words indirectly highlight the fifth relevant dimension of the naturalistic 
ending, namely, that none of these levels of death in an entirely naturalistic world is part 
of a narrative that is, in some sense, previsioned, planned and/or brought about (either 
                                                 








weakly construed or strongly construed depending upon the notion of divine agency in 
view) under the watchful eye of intelligent, purposeful direction. Death is simply a 
biological fact that occurs in a universe such as ours. There is no one with any interest in 
it, except for those of us with self-reflective capacities. As Bertrand Russell famously 
said: 
Brief and powerless is man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom 
falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent 
matter rolls on its relentless way; for man, condemned today to lose his dearest, 
tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness . . .24 
 
This reality, on naturalistic premises, is hard to swallow for many; that something 
with so much existential gravity like death, a reality that powerfully evokes deeply seated 
human expressions of emotion, creative reflection, and hope for something more, finally 
and irreversibly silences these and other human energies. So, death, on naturalism, is a 
final “state of affairs” from which we will never recover, quite literally, because there 
will no longer be a you and me. In John Updike’s wonderful short story, “Pigeon 
Feathers,” David, the existentially sensitive and troubled young character, has a profound 
“vision” of naturalism’s conception of death and what it entails: 
Without warning, David was visited by an exact vision of death: a long hole in the 
ground, no wider than your body, down which you were drawn while the white 
faces recede. You try to reach them but your arms are pinned. Shovels pour dirt in 
your face. There you will be forever, in an upright position, blind and silent, and 
in time no one will remember you, and you will never be called. As strata of rock 
shift, your fingers elongate, and your teeth are distended sideways in a great 
underground grimace indistinguishable from a strip of chalk. And the earth 
tumbles on, and the sun expires, and unfaltering darkness reigns where once there 
were stars.25 
 
                                                 
24 Bertrand Russell, “A Free Man’s Worship,” pp. 115-16. 
 
25 John Updike, “Pigeon Feathers,” in Pigeon Feathers and Other Stories (New York: Random House, 




The Christian theistic meaning of life narrative, though in substantial agreement with 
naturalism on certain levels of explanation of death, substantially departs from the 
naturalistic narrative at other places. It is to a discussion of death in the Christian theistic 
narrative that I now turn. 
7.4 The Ending on the Christian Theistic Narrative 
 The ending, or at least certain penultimate endings, of the Christian theistic 
meaning of life narrative are ones that are similar to those of naturalism. For example, on 
the Christian theistic narrative under consideration in this dissertation, death is a 
biological event (dying is actually the event, whereas death is the intervening “point” 
between the process of dying and the state of being dead), although it is more. Christian 
theism does not, at every explanatory level,26 offer competing explanations about death to 
those of naturalism; it only adds explanatory layers in order to provide what Christian 
theists consider to be a full explanation of what death involves. In addition, the ultimate 
ending of the Christian theistic metanarrative is probably consistent with the additional 
metaphorical deaths of the earth and the universe itself, although it is not clear on 
Christian theistic premises whether the ending of the present portion of the metanarrative 
(i.e, post-lapsarian, pre-consummation history) will involve one or another universe-
ending scenario as hypothesized by current cosmology.27  
Though important, I will not consider this in any detail here. Nor will I discuss 
everything relevant to a robust theological and philosophical consideration of Christian 
                                                 
26 Naturalists, of course, would deny that some of these explanatory levels actually exist. 
 
27 The Christian theism with which I am working in this dissertation presupposes that there will be a new 
heavens and earth, and that the old heavens and earth is in the process of being redeemed. There will be 
both continuity and discontinuity between the old and the new. How and by means of what this will take 
place is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The redemption of the old is not inconsistent with a “death” 




eschatology.28 I do, however, want to briefly discuss three relevant aspects of the 
Christian theistic meaning of life narrative ending in this context: (i) death is largely 
unnatural and something that needs to be defeated,29 (ii) the defeat of death is part of the 
wider redemptive work of God, imbedded within an intentionally, teleologically driven 
narrative, whereby all of creation is in the process of being redeemed (and will be finally 
redeemed), and (iii) death does not bring with it the lasting extinction of the human 
person. Again, note that this section is not evaluative. I am not concerned here with 
arguing for the rational merits of the Christian theistic narrative on any of these narrative 
fronts I will discuss; what follows is a minimalistic exposition of various features of the 
Christian metanarrative directly relevant to my purposes in this chapter. 
 While there are, historically, strands within Christian theology that view death 
largely as a natural implication of human materiality and finitude,30 I am here operating 
within theological parameters whereby death is viewed as fundamentally unnatural, 
ultimately a devastating consequence of a moral and relational breach in the relationship 
between the sovereign Creator and those creatures made in the imago dei.31 In the 
Christian theistic narrative under consideration, this sovereign established a covenant 
with the first human persons (and, in the theological context of the federal theology 
                                                 
28 For example, any comprehensive theological-philosophical discussion of Christian eschatology should 
address, among others, religious pluralism and Divine judgment. Here, substantive treatment of views like 
(i) universalism, (ii) inclusivism, (iii) escapist views of hell, (iv) views where suffering and separation in 
hell are followed by inevitable redemption, and (v) exclusivism will be necessary. I cannot enter such 
discussions in this dissertation, though I am aware of the nuances of this debate. 
 
29 This is largely because death, along with its biological dimension, includes moral, spiritual, and 
relational dimensions within the Christian theistic metanarrative. 
 
30 For example, Pelagians, Socinians, and theological rationalists held variations of this view. 
 
31 There has been widespread opinion in the history of the Church over what constitutes the image of God. 
Some have located it in human rationality, or the freedom of the will, or in humanity’s dominion over 




within which I am situating these issues, ipso facto, with the entire human race), whereby 
the “. . . indefectibility of holiness and blessedness. . . .” was promised and conditioned 
upon obedience to God’s command (cf. Gen. 2:15-17).32 On the other hand, the 
consequences for violating this original covenant arrangement were no less than death 
itself. This death, following human disobedience to God’s command, had at least a 
twofold nature: (i) immediate loss of communion with God, and therefore separation 
from the ultimate source of life and blessedness, which resulted in spiritual death,33 and 
(ii) the inevitable eventual biological demise of the human person, in which humanity 
was doomed to return to dust (cf. Gen. 3:19). 
 Importantly, within this particular Christian theistic metanarrative, the breach 
upon which human death is occasioned is also the occasion for the entire cosmos being 
subjected to a state of futility. The Hebrew word that powerfully captures this state is 
hebel (lit. “breath, breeze, vapor”), which possesses strong connotations of fleeting 
temporality, insubstantiality, vanity, meaninglessness, and futility in various contexts.34 
Interestingly, the teacher in Ecclesiastes, Qohelet, begins his careful reflection on life 
“under the sun” with this striking pronouncement, “[habēl habālîm], says the Preacher 
[Teacher], [habēl habālîm]! All is hebel” (Ecc. 1:2).35 The Apostle Paul, in his Epistle to 
the Roman Church, extends this theme, “For the creation was subjected to futility, not 
                                                 
32 William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 3rd Ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 2003), p. 537. 
 
33 Cf. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1996), p. 226. 
 
34 For a helpful discussion of this word, see Tremper Longman III, The Book of Ecclesiastes, The New 
International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1998), pp. 61-65. 
 
35 Here, Qohelet forms the superlative to signify the extent of the vanity and futility in the cosmos 
considered from a certain perspective. 
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willingly, but because of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set 
free from its bondage to corruption . . .” (Rom. 8:19-21a). Those very ideas, then, that 
cause human beings to entertain the conclusion, even if only tentatively or provisionally, 
that life is utterly meaningless are those same constructs that, partially, characterize the 
fallen world in which we live according to Christian theism. If they have the last word in 
the world’s narrative, then perhaps life really is futile and meaningless.  
Not only do human beings wonder if there is more and long for more in this world 
saliently characterized by hebel, even the creation itself is said to anticipate deliverance 
from the death, decay, and provisional futility to which it has been subjected following 
the moral and relational breach by creatures created in the imago dei. Importantly, the 
futility spoken of in Ecclesiastes and Romans is compatible with hope, hope grounded in 
God’s redemptive economy. God’s wider redemptive work is a robust project by which 
remedy is being brought to the entire cosmos, and which will eventuate in a new heavens 
and new earth, themselves physical (as opposed to immaterial) and yet incorruptible.  
 Death, then, is not something inherently and naturally built into the fabric of a 
cosmos where explanations are exhausted naturalistically. It is a narrative element 
introduced because of the wrongful exercise of the human will in opposition to the 
authority and stipulations of the Creator. In the Christian theistic metanarrative, it is a 
great evil that stands in need of defeat, as it threatens both the meaningfulness of human 
life, as well as the power and grace of God to redeem people despite their rebellion.36 
This leads to the second relevant aspect of the ending of the Christian theistic meaning of 
life narrative. 
                                                 
36 The first threat is genuine; the second only hypothetical. 
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 On Christian theism, death is addressed by the wider redemptive work of God, 
imbedded within an intentionally, teleologically driven narrative, whereby all of creation 
is in the process of being redeemed (and will be finally redeemed). Death, in the Christian 
metanarrative, is not simply some subjectively lamentable isolated element that has no 
relationship to the rest of the narrative. In fact, death, in its connection to creaturely 
rebellion, its threat to deep human meaning and felicity, and the eventual defeat of it and 
its effects, is central to the Christian theistic meaning of life narrative. As such, a central 
existential concern of large numbers of human beings (i.e., can a meaningful life be 
secured in the face of death), is a vital concern of the Christian theistic metanarrative, 
though in a theologically multi-layered way. This probably should not surprise us, as 
those engaged in the phenomenology of religion identify distinguishing marks of religion 
as, among others, attempts to contextualize the universal (or near universal) human 
phenomenological experience of guilt and fear of death.37 
  It was noted earlier that the Fall brought with it, not only human death, but decay 
and provisional futility to the entire cosmos, and therefore a state of affairs where the 
desired human experience of deep meaning, significance, and robust felicity are 
genuinely threatened. This theme begins in the third chapter of Genesis, is given 
profound commentary in the wisdom book of Ecclesiastes, is echoed by the Apostle Paul 
in the eighth chapter of his letter to the Christians in Rome, and is finally terminated in 
John’s Apocolyptic vision on the island of Patmos. God’s wider redemptive work is, on 
one level, very much concerned with remedying this perceived problem. 
                                                 
37 See, for example, Merold Westphal, God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion 




In the Christian theistic metanarrative, the focal point of God’s redemptive 
activity in the world is the person and work of Christ, in which the futility inherent within 
fallen creation is addressed in a multifaceted way. In the person of Christ, traditional 
Christian theology understands that the second person of the Trinity, the Son, took upon 
himself human flesh in the incarnation event to dwell with his people (lit. “tabernacled,” 
which is a semantic-theological point with great historical-redemptive significance). In a 
real sense, then, God himself enters into this world characterized by hebel to provide the 
definitive remedy.38 The God-man identifies with the plight of humanity. He enters the 
narrative and fulfills the demands of God’s law. He suffers and dies by means of the 
Roman crucifixion, taking upon himself the sins of the world, and, in so doing, also the 
full wrath of God.39 Then, after being in the grave, the God-man is physically resurrected 
on the third day;40 this resurrection’s significance being rich and multi-layered. Christ’s 
resurrection is referred to in Scripture as the firstfruits (cf. 1 Cor. 15:20), as a sign and 
guarantee of, among other coming realities, the final salvation and resurrection of human 
                                                 
38 This Christian theistic claim is also a central and powerful element in a Christian theodicy. It may not 
provide an answer to why God allowed evil to occur in the first place, but it does show that God gets his 
hands dirty so to speak. He identifies with the plight of sufferers, by suffering himself (note that I am not 
here affirming patripassionism). The charges of capriciousness, carelessness, and lack of love, in light of 
the pain and suffering in the world, against God are made much less credible by this, and other 
Christological doctrines. 
 
39 The atonement of Christ is certainly a multi-dimensional event. No one theory, considered singularly, 
likely does justice to its full meaning. There has been much speculation, historically, about how best to 
view the atonement; for example, What did it accomplish? What was its primary aim? What does it say 
about God? With respect to views stressing the substitionary and propitiary nature of Christ’s atonement, 
some contemporary biblical scholars and theologians see such views as involving God the Father in 
something akin to divine child abuse. My truncated discussion here does not require me to enter this debate. 
 
40 First century Jews would have understood resurrection to be nothing less than the resurrection of the 
body. Some amorphous immortality of the soul doctrine would have been entirely foreign to the first-
century Jew. Anything less than physical embodied resurrection, was emphatically not resurrection. For the 
most substantive scholarly discussion of this and other issues surrounding the resurrection, see N. T. 
Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, Vol. 3. Christian Origins and the Question of God 




beings, the transformation of a creation that groans in futility,41 and the eventual 
definitive triumph of truth, goodness, and beauty over evil.  
The God-man, on the cross, was, among others, a substitutionary atonement, a 
propitiation for God’s righteous justice and wrath, a Christus Victor over the destructive 
powers at work within our fallen world, and the divine guarantee that God cares about the 
world and desires a felicitous ending to creation’s narrative as much as we do.42 In the 
Christian narrative, Christ’s resurrection functions, not only as the metaphysical blueprint 
for our own, but also as an event which transforms the desires for resurrection and a 
blessed ending from mere wishful thinking into robust hope, as hope, in contrast to 
wishful thinking, is rational to the extent that it is legitimately grounded (cf. 1 Cor. 15:1-
58).43 As philosopher Paul K. Moser notes, “My hope is grounded in a good reason; my 
wish is not.”44 
Finally, on the Christian theistic metanarrative, death does not usher in the final 
and irreversible extinction of the human person. This is not because the soul, on Christian 
theism, is inherently immortal in virtue of special intrinsic properties it has, but due 
                                                 
41 “Transformation” is probably a more theologically accurate descriptor of the process eventuating in the 
new heavens and earth than terms that emphasize discontinuity over continuity. As John Polkinghorne 
writes, “. . . the new creation is not due to God’s wiping the cosmic slate clean and starting again. Instead, 
what is brought about is the divine redemptive transformation of the old creation. The new is not a second 
creation ex nihilo, but it is a resurrected world created ex vetere. Involved in its coming to be must be both 
continuity and discontinuity, just the Lord’s risen body bears the scares of the passion but is also 
transmuted and glorified.”  “Eschatology: Some Questions and Some Insights from Science,” in The End of 
the World and Ends of God: Science and Theology on Eschatology, p. 30. 
 
42 Cf. footnote 39. 
 
43 For an interesting recent phenomenological discussion of hope within the Christian theistic tradition, see 
James K. A. Smith, “Determined Hope: A Phenomenology of Christian Expectation,” in The Future of 
Hope: Christian Tradition Amid Modernity and Postmodernity, eds. Miroslav Volf and William Katerberg 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 200-27. 
 
44 Paul K. Moser, “Divine Hiddenness, Death, and Meaning,” in Philosophy of Religion: Classic and 





solely to the grace and power of God who is both willing and able to resurrect the human 
person.45 Conscious, self-aware existence continues for human persons after biological 
death. The grave is not the end on the Christian theistic meaning of life narrative. The 
death of the human person and the deaths of the earth and the universe, if they occur, are 
only penultimate on the Christian narrative; they are part of a larger narrative where the 
ending of this “chapter” in the history of reality is an ending that itself never ends.46 
And so the Trinity’s (Father-Son-Holy Spirit) wider redemptive economy 
includes personal (individual persons), corporate (the Church), and cosmological (the 
entire space-time continuum) dimensions, whereby indefectible shalom comes to infuse 
the ending that itself never ends. Redemption, as robustly construed on Christian theism, 
is not about spiritual escape from this world or from the necessarily limited condition of 
corporal existence, but is about peace, justice, reconciliation, and restoration being 
brought to all aspects of the cosmos to the glory of God. Christ’s bodily resurrection is 
the definitive event that grounds hope in this coming eschatological reality involving real, 
material beings and creation itself. In the words of N. T. Wright: 
                                                 
45 Note that the Christian theistic concept of resurrection may underdetermine any specific ontology of the 
human person. For that matter, biblical anthropology in general may underdetermine any specific ontology 
of the human person. However, strong forms of Platonic and Cartesian dualism not only appear at odds 
with current empirical findings from neuroscience, they do not appear consistent with an exegetically 
rigorous biblical anthropology whereby the psycho-physical unity of the human person is stressed. For 
further discussion of these and related issues see, for example, John Cooper, Body, Soul and Life 
Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian 
Materialist Alternative to the Soul (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), Kevin Corcoran, ed. Soul, 
Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons; Joel B. Greene, Body, Soul, and Human 
Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008); Nancy Murphy, 
Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Peter Van 
Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, eds., Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). The 
relationship between philosophy, science, and biblical exegesis is itself a very complex hermeneutical 
issue. 
 
46 The claim that there is an ending that itself never ends creates some prima facie difficulties that would 
need to be addressed in a fuller evaluation and defense of this thesis. I reflect further on this issue in §7.7 
“The Concept of Narrative Ending.” 
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The message of the resurrection is that this world matters! That the injustices and 
pains of this present world must now be addressed with the news that healing, 
justice, and love have won . . . If Easter means Jesus Christ is only raised in a 
spiritual sense—[then] it is only about me, and finding a new dimension in my 
personal spiritual life. But if Jesus Christ is truly risen from the dead, Christianity 
becomes good news for the whole world—news which warms our hearts precisely 
because it isn’t just about warming hearts. Easter means that in a world where 
injustice, violence and degradation are endemic, God is not prepared to tolerate 
such things—and that we will work and plan, with all the energy of God, to 
implement victory of Jesus over them all. Take away Easter and Karl Marx was 
probably right to accuse Christianity of ignoring problems of the material world. 
Take it away and Freud was probably right to say Christianity is wish-fulfillment. 
Take it away and Nietzsche probably was right to say it was for wimps.47 
 
This final blessed and beatific state, anchored in and resulting, in a real sense, 
from Christ’s resurrection is, as the prophet Isaiah depicts, something of a return to the 
Garden of Eden, where deep harmony between humanity, creation, and God comes again 
to fruition, and where, among others, disease, hatred, racial violence, injustice, and death 
are abolished forever (cf. Isa. 11:1-9). Here, there will be no slaves, criminals, rape, 
tornadoes, or tearful mourners in despair. This true and ultimate Sabbath rest, pre-figured 
in the creational narrative itself and pre-enacted in the life of Israel, will have arrived, as 
God “descends” to be with his people forever: 
Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth 
had passed away, and the sea was no more. And I saw the holy city, new 
Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for 
her husband. And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, “Behold, the 
dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and they will be his 
people, and God himself will be with them as their God. He will dwell with them, 
and they will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God. He 
will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither 
shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain anymore, for the former things have 
passed away (Rev. 21:1-4).48 
                                                 
47 N. T. Wright, For All God’s Worth: True Worship and the Calling of the Church (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 65-66. 
 
48 That God Himself, in final fullness, will dwell with his people is the final coming to fruition of what we 
might call the tabernacle principle, in which God, at various times and in various ways, is said to dwell 




The afflicted Job, the paradigmatic sufferer, and whose story is often the entry point into 
discussions of theodicy, “hoped” in the eschaton, where ultimate justice and vindication 
would come to permanently characterize reality, “For I know that my Redeemer lives, 
and at the last he will stand upon the earth. And after my skin has been thus destroyed, 
yet in my flesh I shall see God . . .” (Job 19:25-26).49 
7.5 Discontinuities Between the Naturalistic and Christian Theistic Narratives 
  
The discontinuities that are relevant to the meaning of life between the naturalistic 
ending(s) and the Christian theistic ending(s) are threefold. First, on naturalism, death is 
entirely natural, a consequence of natural law and the fact that we are, in some sense, 
material creatures. Despite death’s naturalness on naturalism, many have found its 
lurking presence to be profoundly lamentable for a wide variety of reasons. Conversely, 
death is both unnatural and something in need of defeat on Christian theism. Second, 
death is neither previsioned nor central on the naturalistic narrative, whereas death is both 
previsioned and centrally located within the Christian theistic narrative. On Christian 
theism, there are compelling narrative reasons why death is viewed so negatively, both 
objectively and subjectively. In a real sense, the narrative is primarily concerned with 
addressing and remedying the cause, reality, and effects of death. Regardless of whether 
death is considered objectively and/or subjectively bad on naturalism, it is not the case 
that the entire narrative, in some sense, is oriented around it. Finally, saving some remote 
naturalistic scenario, death is final and irreversible on naturalism, whereas, on Christian 
theism, death does not bring with it the permanent cessation of personal, self-aware 
conscious existence.  
                                                 




 A final discontinuity worth noting here is that something most human beings 
consider to be necessary to leading a meaningful life, deep loving relationship with other 
persons, has no lasting place in the naturalistic metanarrative.50 On Christian theism, 
love, grounded in an ultimate loving being, has a lasting place in reality, whereas on 
naturalism it “. . . is a momentary accident scudding atop a reality indifferent to it—a 
reality that will soon reach up and submerge it.”51 On Christian theism, however, love is 
more fundamental to the ontological structure of the world, given that reality, at its 
deepest level, includes the intentions, dispositions, etc. of a person—i.e., God and those 
capacities of mind that make love possible. That something as profound as love has no 
lasting place given naturalism is probably a large reason why death is often considered to 
be so terrifying and objectionable; not simply because death brings with it our ending. It 
is what the ending brings, namely, severance from all love, deep and meaningful 
relational connection, and intimacy that is what elicits such negative reactions toward 
death. Conversely, this is also why continued, endless post-mortem existence qua 
continued existence is not thought to be a sufficient condition for a meaningful life, even 
if necessary. Indeed, one can imagine profoundly undesirable states of affairs where a 
person continues to exist forever in a way that is meaningless. But continued post-
mortem existence, on Christian theism, posits no such scenario. Within this narrative, 
there is a fecundity of love that is “. . . new every morning” (Lam. 3:23).52 
                                                 
50 Love can only endure if lovers endure. 
 
51 Brad Seeman, “Death and the Place of Love: Motivating a Question in the Philosophy of Religion,” 
unpublished manuscript. I owe the trajectory of this paragraph to Brad’s thoughts in his paper. 
  
52 The locution new every morning, in context, refers to the Lord’s compassion and mercy, but the principle 




 In contrast, on naturalism, love and all of its traces will eventually succumb to a 
dying universe. Sociologist Peter Berger explains the existential implications if 
naturalism is the true narrative of our world in the following scenario where a mother 
comforts her terrified child by saying “Everything’s all right,” after the child wakes up 
alone in the darkness from a nightmare: 
 If reality is coextensive with the “natural” reality that our empirical reason can 
 grasp, then the experience is an illusion and the role that embodies it is a lie. For 
 then it is perfectly obvious that everything is not in order, is not all right. The 
 world that the child is being told to trust is the same world in which he will 
 eventually die. If there is no other world, then the ultimate truth about this one is 
 that eventually it will kill the child as it will kill his mother. This would not, to be 
 sure, detract from the real presence of love and its very real comforts; it would 
 even give this love a quality of tragic heroism. Nevertheless, the final truth would 
 be not love but terror, not light but darkness. The nightmare of chaos, not the 
 transitory safety of order, would be the final reality of the human situation. For, in 
 the end, we must all find ourselves in darkness, alone with the night that will 
 swallow us up. The face of reassuring love, bending over our terror, will then be 
 nothing except an image of merciful illusion.53 
 
7.6 The Rationale Behind the Evaluative Significance of Narrative Ending 
 The way a narrative ends is important. Various claims have been made in support 
of this,54 though I will discuss only one that is especially relevant in the immediate 
context. It is the claim that the way a narrative ends, in virtue of it being the end, has 
great power to elicit a wide range of broadly normative human responses on, possibly, 
emotional, aesthetic, and moral levels towards the narrative as a whole. This claim is 
                                                 
53 Peter L. Berger, A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 56. 
 
54 For example, with respect to defining narrative ending, it has been proposed that a narrative’s ending is 
largely constituted by “scratching” or resolving an emotional “itch” initially instantiated by the narrative’s 
beginning and variously perpetuated throughout the narrative. See, J. David Velleman’s article, “Narrative 
Explanation,” The Philosophical Review, 112 (January 2003): pp. 18-20. This “scratching” is 
organizational and unifying, for example, like the “tock” of a clock; the tock, of the clock’s tick-tock, is the 
fictionalized ending we bestow on the sequence, thus conferring upon the space between tick and tock 
“duration and meaning.” In this way, the interval between tick and tock becomes something more than the 
interval between tock and tick; it is transformed from mere successive chronos to pregnant kairos. See, 




important given the close connection that discussions of futility have had with the 
meaning of life. Conclusions of such discussions, especially those of cosmic futility, are 
largely connected with theses about how it is all going to end, including human life and 
the universe as a whole. And, it is reasonable to think that conclusions of futility are 
broadly normative conclusions. Furthermore, it has often been thought that naturalistic 
metanarrative endings threaten the entire narrative with cosmic futility and 
meaninglessness, whereas theistic endings are generally thought to not pose such a 
threat.55 
 Why should one think that a narrative’s ending has such ‘retroactive’ or proleptic 
power? Furthermore, why can, for example, the final emotional state instantiated in a 
reader subsume or overshadow the cluster of varying emotional states instantiated 
throughout the narrative? And what gives this final state evaluative salience out of which 
we then adopt a settled stance toward the narrative as a whole; why is the future 
privileged over the present? For, as J. David Velleman notes: 
What’s more, the emotion that resolves a narrative cadence tends to subsume the 
emotions that preceded it: the triumph felt at a happy ending is the triumph of 
ambitions realized and anxieties allayed; the grief felt at a tragic ending is the 
grief of hopes dashed or loves denied. Hence the conclusory emotion in a 
narrative cadence embodies not just how the audience feels about the ending; it 
embodies how the audience feels, at the ending, about the whole story. Having 
passed through emotional ups and downs of the story, as one event succeeded 
another, the audience comes to rest in a stable attitude about the series of events in 
its entirety [emphasis added].56 
 
This is no small point, and it seems largely correct. The ending marks the ‘last word’, 
after which nothing else can be said, either by way of remedying problems or destroying 
                                                 
55 Though, theistic endings will have to contend with, among other criticisms, that of Bernard Williams 
mentioned in footnote 10. 
 




felicities that have come about within the narrative. If the last word is that hope is finally 
and irreversibly dashed, then grief will probably be salient at the end; if the last word is 
that ambitions have been realized, then triumph will probably be salient at the end. 
Perhaps more importantly, one cannot backtrack into a narrative, for example, where the 
grief felt at a tragic ending is the final word, and expect that one’s emotional stance 
toward any specific event within the narrative will not now be affected, in some sense, by 
the ending of the narrative. The ending relevantly frames the entire story. This framing 
falls broadly within the normative sphere, and includes a salient emotional component. 
An example here will bring more clarity to the point. 
 Consider a case where you are dating someone. In this context, the claim under 
scrutiny is whether and how the terminus of this relationship is important for your 
appraisals throughout the relationship of those moments and events that compose it, as 
well as the relationship as a whole.57 Here, by “terminus,” I am referring to whether the 
relationship ends in something like marriage (or some culturally recognized equivalent) 
or dissolution whereby each party seeks to go his or her separate way. The thought is that 
how it ends is very important for how you view the relationship as a whole. But in what 
sense is how it ends very important? Can an undesirable ending nullify the happy times in 
the relationship, retroactively causing them to be unhappy? This surely cannot be correct. 
Indeed, it is eminently reasonable to think that even if the relationship ends in dissolution, 
that the pre-end relationship cannot be fully robbed of, for example, the joy, richness, and 
                                                 





vibrancy that once may have characterized it. Regardless of whether these realities cease, 
they were once present, and they cannot be nullified in this sense.58  
But what if those in the relationship know in advance how the relationship will 
end? It seems equally plausible to think that this privileged foreknowledge will affect 
their appraisals now, in some sense, of what is presently occurring in the relationship. If 
the relationship is to end in dissolution, that fact will make some difference right now; if 
the relationship is to continue, for example, in marriage, that too will make some 
difference right now. Each of these endings will limit the evaluative horizon for how the 
relationship is appraised. Indeed, the relationship will likely mean something different, in 
some non-trivial way, depending upon how it will end. Furthermore, if those in the 
relationship want the relationship to end in marriage, then those pre-end joyful moments, 
while still possibly joyful, will not be as joyful as they could be. The joy experienced will 
be mitigated by knowledge of the coming dissolution. The joy is tainted. This may not 
make it cease from being joy (although it might), but surely it becomes less joyful. Once 
this ending is known, the present can never quite be the same as before. The settled 
perspective of looking back from the end saliently looms, as the present now somehow 
relevantly contains the future, though not, of course, in any strict metaphysical sense. 
I think there is an important truth here. The evaluative priority and indelibility of 
the final stance one takes toward a narrative as a result of the way the narrative ends 
provides a powerful reason for the importance of ‘apocalyptic’ (ending) accounts, 
whether naturalistic or theistic, for how we appraise life. It is why so many have 
difficulty shaking conclusions of cosmic futility and meaninglessness on metanarratives 
                                                 
58 It seems unreasonable to place a condition upon any instance of putative happiness that in order for it to 
actually be an instance of happiness it must satisfy some strong requirement whereby it has to be 
permanently stable and indefectible happiness forever. 
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where death has the final word and love is eventually consigned, with lovers, to 
nothingness forever. This is partly, or largely, why so many have seen the existential (and 
some would argue rational) need, in order to avoid cosmic futility and retain 
meaningfulness, of positing an ending where life and love and other deeply held 
desiderata for a flourishing human existence have a lasting place. The general point, 
though, is that the way life ends is so important to us, because narrative ending itself is 
important to us. And, if we view life as a whole metanarratively, it becomes clearer why 
we are so concerned with how it will all end. Neither naturalist nor theist can avoid the 
evaluative encroachment of the apocalypse into the present moment of their respective 
metanarratives. 
 In summary, the evaluative priority attached to narrative ending resides in its 
being the last word, a ‘word’ that brings with it the finality and indelibility of a settled 
normative stance towards the narrative as a whole. As Christiaan Moster notes, “The 
ending is a necessary part of the story, notwithstanding its open-endedness; it is not a 
dispensable part. It affects proleptically every part of the story; no part can be considered 
apart from it. . . . Regardless of how unexpected or incongruent the end of a story is, it is 
decisive for the story’s meaning.”59 And, as human beings, we are deeply interested in 
how the metanarrative we inhabit is going to end. Many are searching for a specific kind 
of closure; the kind that allays our deepest hurts and satisfies our deepest longings. In the 
words of H. Porter Abbot, such closure involves “. . . a broad range of expectations and 
                                                 
59 Christiaan Moster, “Theodicy and Eschatology,” in Theodicy and Eschatology, eds. Bruce Barber and 




uncertainties that arise during the course of a narrative and that part of us, at least, hopes 
to resolve, or close.”60 
A final important point lingers here; one that adds further plausibility to my use of 
the term “narrative” to describe whatever it is, conceptually, that metanarratives 
constructed around the cluster of issues relevant to the meaning of life are. I have already 
noted earlier in this dissertation that that certain metanarratives, naturalistic ones for 
example, are more like conjunctive explanations as opposed to full-blown narratives in 
the paradigmatic sense. But this does not mean that we should think of metanarratives, 
even naturalistic ones, primarily as explanations as opposed to narratives. The reason 
follows from a consideration of narrative ending. For example, on naturalistic 
metanarratives, the way it all ends is often, though by no means always, thought to be 
relevant to how we view life right now. If this is the case, then it is perhaps better to think 
of the metanarrative narratively and not merely explanatorily. Importantly, we do not 
attach such significance or priority to the endings (or the last portion of the explanation) 
of non-narrative explanations.61  
For example, in explaining how it is that water boils, each part of the explanatory 
account is equally important in order to fully elucidate the physical process; the last 
component of the explanation is no more or less important than any other part.  
But, on one level, this is not the case, for example, on naturalistic metanarratives. From a 
detached and disinterested perspective where all one is concerned with is explaining the 
                                                 
60 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 53. Whether the desire for such closure in terms of the redemptive-eschatological vision of, say, 
Christian theism is mere wishful thinking or more akin to a natural desire is an interesting question, but one 
that I will not discuss in the present context. 
 
61 I say “non-narrative explanations” because narrative can be thought of as a species of explanation. For a 
defense of this, see J. David Velleman’s article cited earlier. 
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naturalistic metanarrative, it is true that no component of the explanation is any more 
important than the others. However, from the human, existentially-interested standpoint, 
the ending does become relevant, or at least this is where the evidence points. I think this 
partly shows that it is more natural to think meta-narratively about ultimate explanatory 
accounts of the world and their features and not meta-explanatorily. We do not attach any 
sort of special significance to the endings of non-narrative explanations, whereas we do 
to explanations that at least partially merge into the category of narrative. 
7.7 The Concept of Narrative Ending 
 My discussion thus far of narrative ending and its evaluative significance for 
entire narratives invites important questions about what a narrative ending is as well as 
what sense of ending is consistent, if any, with the conjunction of the general claim that 
narrative ending is normatively important but within metanarratives that posit immortal 
life as being necessary, though not sufficient, for a meaningful life. Indeed, prima facie, it 
would appear that the Christian theistic metanarrative, for example, fails to allow for the 
kind of view of the whole from the perspective of the end that is needed in order to 
appraise life as either futile or meaningful precisely because such a metanarrative never 
truly ends. Though in a slightly different context than that of the concern of this paper, 
John Martin Fischer notes a similar objection: 
 If our lives are narratives [or in the case of my paper—life in general should be 
 viewed metanarratively], or have the distinctive structure of narrative, then they 
 must have endings. On this view, we cannot be immortal (insofar as our lives are 
 narratives or have narrative value), if our lives are indeed narratives. To imagine 
 immortal human life is to imagine human life devoid of an essential or at least 
 very important characteristic: having narrative structure and thus a distinctive 
 dimension of value. 
  I think that, strictly speaking, this is correct. If a narrative must have an 
 ending, then it is clear that our lives cannot have the sort of meaning that involves 
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 taking a retrospective perspective on its totality, as it were, and assigning a 
 meaning that reflects the overall arc of the lifestory.62 
 
Fischer proceeds to reject the worry by noting that although an immortal life resists final 
circumscription and appraisal as a whole from some absolute end, its parts can be 
thought of narratively and thus conferred with what he calls “narrative value.” I think 
Fischer’s point, though plausible in its own right and helpful here, can be supplemented 
in light of the slightly different dilemma in the present context: the problem as posed for 
metanarratives about all of life, and not just narratives about an individual life. 
 The dilemma can be dissolved in securing a sense of ending from which to 
appraise life that is also consistent with immortal life. Fortunately, such a sense is 
available. There are at least three relevant ways of understanding the concept of ending: 
(i) ending as termination, (ii) ending as telos, and (iii) ending as closure. The first sense 
of ending is that of something being finished. Locutions such as “the race is over” or “I 
am finished with school” or “it ceased to exist” all capture important connotations of this 
sense of ending. The second sense of ending tracks the notion of final causality or 
purpose. Ideas like “the end of this pencil is to write” or “the end of creation is to glorify 
God” are examples of this sense. Importantly, ending as telos, when considered within 
the historical context, carries additional connotations of the purposeful progression of 
history towards an intended end, or for that matter, the purposeful progression of the plot 
within a narrative toward an intended end. Finally, the third sense of ending, ending as 
closure, refers to a contextually anchored settled stance with respect to a ‘problem’ or 
cluster of problems emerging within a given narrative or portion of that narrative.  
                                                 
62 John Martin Fischer, “Free Will, Death, and Immortality: The Role of Narrative,” Philosophical Papers 
34 (November 2005): pp. 379-403. 
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 These three senses of ending differ conceptually, though they are compatible—
e.g., an intended, purposeful end might also be a termination, or it may serve as the 
occasion for a settled stance toward a problem having emerged in the narrative. 
Furthermore, when comparing ending as termination and ending as closure, it is 
important to note that neither the presence of ending as termination nor the presence of 
ending as closure is sufficient for the presence of the other. That is to say, a narrative 
could terminate without closure, and closure could be present without a narrative 
terminating, at least in one important sense. Works within the horror genre are often 
examples of narratives that end in the terminating sense, but lack a certain kind of closure 
or resolution. 63 Conversely, closure can occur, even though the lives of the fictional 
characters in a narrative often presumably continue, as in they lived happily ever after. 
The post-narrative state (from the perspective of the characters, not the reader) of living 
happily ever after, though not an ending in the terminating sense, is still a narrative 
ending, because it brings an end to what J. David Velleman calls the “emotional cadence” 
that a narrative evokes in its audience.64 In these cases, ending is never cessation, at least 
from the characters’ perspective. Rather, it is the resolution of a conflict or series of 
conflicts that have arisen over the course of the narrative, providing the settled stance 
toward the pre-end (end as closure) portion of the narrative. It is an end of something 
though not an ending in an absolute sense. Ending as closure, then, is contextual rather 
than absolute. 
                                                 
63 Of course, one could plausibly argue that closure is present in works of horror in the sense of a settled 
stance, but that the settled stance itself is one of shuddering or despair. 
 
64 J. David Velleman, “Narrative Explanation,” pp. 18-22. 
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 With this set of distinctions in hand, the following claims can be harmonized: (i) 
an ending is required in order to appraise life as either futile or meaningful, and (ii) some 
metanarratives, like that of Christian theism, posit immortal life as necessary for a 
meaningful life and have no ending. The way out of the impasse involves two related 
moves. First, adopting the ending as closure sense is sufficient for the necessary appraisal 
of life. And, second, contextually anchoring such closure to the portion of the 
metanarrative where questions about futility and life’s meaning form at least part of the 
plot’s problem set allows for the relevant appraisal from a settled perspective, even 
though that perspective itself never ends in either the terminating sense or in the closure 
sense for that matter.65 
 If one posits an immortal life and also seeks to circumscribe all of life, including 
the immortal life, then one can neither invoke ending as termination nor ending as closure 
in order to appraise that life given that the life never ends, either in terms of termination 
or closure. Fischer is correct to note that this is, by definition, not possible. But to see that 
such ultimate termination or circumscription from some privileged vantage point of 
ultimate closure is not necessary, we must recall the target to which the charge of futility 
is largely directed. That target is poignantly captured in Qohelet’s memorable refrain in 
Ecclesiastes, “life under the sun” (Ecc. 1:3).66 The life that people are worried is 
threatened by futility is the life here and now. We worry that this life might be 
systemically futile, one where, despite all our growth in knowledge, we know so little 
                                                 
65 Of course, an advocate of a metanarrative that posits eternal life may argue that there is no longer any 
need of closure for the post-consummation portion of the metanarrative, precisely because the problem set 
has been remedied. There may be other dilemmas for the immortal life, but perhaps this is not one of them. 
 
66 This popular refrain occurs at least twenty-nine times in the book of Ecclesiastes. My use of the phrase is 
exegetically plausible, though scholars of Ecclesiastes debate its precise meaning. Unless otherwise noted, 




about the vast universe we inhabit. We worry that this life, with all its pain, suffering, and 
hardship might be deeply futile. We worry that the loss of this life in death brings with it 
irredeemable futility. The target, then, of the closure-bringing vantage point is not 
literally all of life, if all of life also includes indefinite post-mortem existence, it is life 
under the sun, that portion of the metanarrative where the cluster of problems associated 
with our common human predicament palpably remain. 
 The settled stance of the end, then, need not be an absolute end, just an end that 
includes the appropriate horizon from which to appraise that part of life whose features 
give rise to problems and questions about meaning and futility in the first place. That 
relevant horizon, in the Christian theistic metanarrative for example, is that of the new 
heavens and new earth where pain and sorrow are definitively eradicated, and where tears 
of sadness are wiped away forever. It is the vantage point of indefectible shalom. This is 
still an end, it is still closure, though it is neither termination nor absolute closure. And 
yet, the Christian theistic metanarrative postulate of an ending that itself never ends is 
coherent precisely because the sense in which it never ends is the terminating sense and 
the sense in which it does end is the closure sense, where the closure sense is 
contextually tied to the post-lapsarian, pre-consummation portion of Christian theism’s 
redemptive-historical narrative. So, although it must be conceded that there can be no 
ultimate, settled stance from which to appraise the entire Christian theistic metanarrative 
if that settled stance is meant to also circumscribe indefinite post-mortem enjoyment of 
the Beatific vision, there can be a settled stance from which to appraise the portion of the 
metanarrative that is itself the salient context for the problems of futility and meaning in 
the first place. And this kind of settled stance is sufficient to dissolve the prima facie 
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dilemma of needing an end from which to appraise life as either meaningful or futile, but 
seemingly not having such an end on metanarratives that posit immortal existence. 
7.8 The Evaluative Priority of Narrative Ending and Competing Accounts of the 
Relationship between Death and Perceived Futility 
 
 Though most accounts of why deep or cosmic futility is thought to supervene on a 
naturalistic narrative amount to little more than stating a deeply held intuition, there are 
some notable exceptions where such intuitions are conceptually augmented. One such 
exception is Ronald Dworkin’s discussion, in Chapter Six of his Sovereign Virtue, of the 
model of impact within the general context of searching for a reasonable metric by which 
the good life can be measured. Part of his entry point into this discussion is to note the 
oft-repeated dilemma that eventually surfaces within discussions of life’s meaning, and 
which is embodied in the Staying Power Intuition (SPI) to which I alluded in the 
introduction:  
 How can it matter what happens in the absurdly tiny space and time of a single 
 human life? Or even in the almost equally tiny episode of all sentient life taken 
 together? The universe is so big and has lasted so long that our best scientists 
 struggle even to give sense to the question of how big it is or how long it has 
 lasted. One day—any second now in the history of time—the sun will explode, 
 and then there may be nothing left that can even wonder about how we lived. 
 How can we reconcile these two ideas: that life is nothing and that how we live is 
 everything?67 
  
This problem is acute, at least emotionally. On the one hand, we believe that something’s 
significance depends on proportion, meaning that nothing of infinitesimal size or scope 
relative to the universe as a whole can be really important. On the other hand, most of us 
cannot help believing that it is crucially important how we live in spite of our seeming 
insignificance from the vantage point of a spatially and temporally vast universe, and, 
furthermore, one that is, if naturalism is true, entirely unconcerned about us. 
                                                 
67 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 246. 
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 According to Dworkin, one could analyze the prospects for securing a good life 
through one of two primary models in light of our common human predicament: (i) the 
model of impact, and, the model he favors, (ii) the model of challenge.68 I will not discuss 
the model of challenge, given that I am only concerned with reasonable alternative 
accounts of explaining the futility that is often thought to supervene on naturalistic 
metanarratives. Indeed, the model of challenge is partly a response to arguments that 
invoke death in order to threaten the good life, and is considered immune from such 
arguments if one finds it plausible as an account of the good life. 
 The model of impact is a metric of the good life that requires a person to make a 
positive impact to the objective value in the world in order to secure a good life.69 
According to Dworkin, this model harmonizes with some common value judgments 
about the nature of the good life. For example, an inventor of a cure for a ravaging 
disease is thought to secure a good life, at least partly, by her helpful contribution to the 
world. As such, the model of impact is strongly tied to the positive consequences of a 
life, or activities partly constituting that life. However, the model does not capture what 
are thought to be other non-consequential features of the good life, for example, 
mastering a musical instrument simply for the sake of the activity done well. Some 
features of the good life, then, seem to be intrinsically valuable as ends in themselves, 
and the model of impact is weak at this point to account for these. 
                                                 
68 According to the model of challenge, a good life has the inherent value of an Aristotelian skillful 
performance, and thus, in contrast with the model of impact, events, achievements, and experiences can 
have value though they may have no impact beyond the life in which they occur (p. 253). Death cannot 
nullify their value, significance, and meaningfulness, because such constructs are not functions of impact or 
continuation or consequence, but rather of the skillfulness of the performance(s) itself. Furthermore, the 
model of challenge circumvents the objection that nothing humans do in the face of the vast, unconcerned 
universe matters because it does not anchor value in anything other than life and the activities of life 
performed well. 
 
69 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 251. 
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 More relevant in the present context, if one takes the model of impact as the 
primary metric for measuring the good life, then futility looms threateningly on the 
horizon, as nothing we do will make an impact in any sort of deep, lasting, or ultimate 
sense in the universe as posited by naturalism. Even seemingly great impacts, like finding 
a cure for cancer, end up not mattering from the unconcerned, temporally distant 
perspective of a universe in ruins. On the model of impact, circumstances act as 
limitations, the most limiting of them all being a naturalistic understanding of human 
mortality, one that views mortality as final.70 So, on this view, the reason futility is 
thought to supervene on the naturalistic metanarrative follows from this conjunction—we 
often analyze the good life or a meaningful life in terms of the impact a life makes, but 
the nature of the universe, on naturalism, undercuts any real possibility for making a 
deep, lasting, or ultimate impact. It is worth noting also that this model presupposes 
something like SPI. Dworkin’s model of impact, then, is one way of accounting for the 
perceived connection between futility and mortality specifically, or futility and 
naturalism in general. 
 There are two plausible strategies to explain how my own narrative proposal 
relates to Dworkin’s account of the perceived connection between death and futility in a 
strictly naturalistic world. I am more interested in the second strategy, though the first is 
worth noting. Like theories of a meaningful life, it is likely that no one model captures 
every relevant dimension to the perceived connection between futility and mortality 
precisely because no one model may sufficiently capture what constitutes a meaningful 
life. If this is the case, then those who worry that a naturalistic conception of death 
threatens life with futility may both hold something like the model of impact as relevant 
                                                 
70 Cf. footnote 8. 
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to analyzing the good life, but also think of life narratively, and thereby conclude that the 
way it all ends is additionally important for deciding whether or not life is futile. 
Therefore, it seems as though Dworkin’s model of impact account and my own narrative 
account may not be competitors at all. Rather, they are loosely associated constructs 
through which we seek to understand an already enigmatic concept and the broad 
normative territory it encompasses, that of a meaningful life. 
 Second, and more importantly, I think there is a relevant sense in which accounts 
like Dworkin’s or even Robert Nozick’s—that a meaningful life is about transcending 
limits and mortality prohibits this—actually presuppose important elements of my own 
account regarding the evaluative significance of narrative ending qua ending. Remember 
that the threat of futility enters on Dworkin’s model of impact because death in a 
naturalistic world prevents a positive, deep, and significant impact to objective value in 
the world. But this raises the question: Why have we allowed death and the ultimate fate 
of the naturalistic universe to be that which is most salient in our appraisals of whether or 
not our lives make an impact, are meaningful, and avoid deep or cosmic futility? The 
answer, I think, resides in the prior normative significance we already assign to narrative 
endings. Indeed, I think the point about narrative endings is more basic, and is likely 
presupposed in the dilemma for the good life that emerges on Dworkin’s model of 
impact. That is, it is only because we attach such evaluative significance to endings that 
the worries tied to the model of impact become relevant. Death prevents a significant 
impact only because some choose to require significant impact, in order to be significant, 
to be so from the perspective of the settled end. Without the perspective of the settled end 
already looming large, the worry about impact may not be nearly as bothersome. But we 
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need a deeper rationale for why the perspective of the settled end itself is important, and 
that deeper rationale is provided by my own account which appeals to the evaluative 
significance of narrative ending for broadly normative appraisals of narratives as a whole.  
7.9 Metanarrative Ending, Death, and Cosmic Futility 
 Understanding the relationship between futility and the meaning of life in general 
and futility and the naturalistic metanarrative specifically is as much about a first-order 
conclusion regarding the proleptic power of narrative endings in general as it is a second-
order futility-conclusion based upon the nature of naturalistic metanarrative endings. 
Indeed, the reason the nature of the naturalistic metanarrative ending is thought to be 
normatively important for appraising the entire narrative is first anchored in the fact that 
narrative ending qua ending is thought to be normatively important for appraising the 
entire narrative. Hence, judging naturalistic metanarratives, for example, as cosmically 
and deeply futile is a function of both first-order and second-order conclusions in this 
respect. The latter would lose much of their force if the former were absent. 
 As already noted, it has often been claimed that cosmic or deep futility supervenes 
on the naturalistic metanarrative, a metanarrative where death has the ‘final word’. 
Reference to cosmic futility, though, presupposes that we know what we are talking 
about when we refer to futility. As such, the concept of futility needs unpacking. Futility 
supervenes upon states of affairs where two conditions obtain: (i) one aims at some 
desired end, and (ii) attaining that desired end is impossible for one reason or another.71 
This is largely why the case of Sisyphus has been the paradigmatic example of futility in 
                                                 
71 Here, impossible may refer to either logical impossibility (e.g., me writing and not-writing at the same 
time and in the same sense) or metaphysical impossibility (e.g., me bicycling to the North Pole in four 
minutes and forty-five seconds). Everything that is logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but 




the West. On the canonical version of the story,72 Sisyphus never accomplishes that 
which he aims to accomplish; namely, ascending with his boulder to the top of the hill. 
On the above analysis, futility would characterize a state of affairs where I, for example, 
aimed to research, write, and submit a paper for publication, all in twenty-four hours. 
There is an extreme discrepancy between an end at which I aim, and the possibility of 
actually accomplishing that end. My aim, given the way the world is in terms of what it 
takes to accomplish the above task, is futile; it ‘cannot’ be done.73  
If we take the impossibility of attaining an aim toward which one directs effort to 
be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for the presence of futility, then futility likely 
comes in degrees. One aim can be more or less futile than another aim. On this analysis, 
the degree of futility that characterizes a state of affairs will be directly proportional to 
the implausibility (rather than impossibility) of attaining an end toward which one directs 
effort. For example, even though it is neither logically nor metaphysically impossible that 
I research, write, and submit a paper for publication in one month, it is highly unlikely. It 
is so unlikely, that my exerting effort to attain this end is more or less futile, though 
exerting the same effort in order to accomplish the task in, say, eight months is probably 
not futile. 74 But, since futility comes in degrees, researching, writing, and submitting a 
                                                 
72 There have been numerous alterations made to the Sisyphus story in order to test philosophical intuitions 
about what constitutes a futile state of affairs, and if such conclusions themselves are functions of whether 
one thinks valuable, worthwhile, and meaningful states of affairs should be construed as such, either 
subjectively or objectively. For an example of such alterations and subsequent discussion, see Richard 
Taylor, Good and Evil: A New Direction (London: The Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 256-68. 
 
73 “Futile,” then, can be a noun, picking out some state of affairs, or it can be more of an adjective, 
characterizing the effort put into trying to accomplish an impossible end—e.g., a futile aim. 
 
74 Whether or not effort directed at some end is futile is context relative. It will include conditions tied to 
external circumstances as well as conditions tied to the agent himself. For example, it may not be futile for 
me to research, write, and submit a paper for publication in eight months, but it would be futile for my 




paper for publication in one month is less futile than my exertion of effort to have these 
things occur within two weeks, and more futile than my exertion of effort to see them 
occur within four months. 
There is one further dimension of futility that is especially relevant here. The level 
of angst experienced in response to either perceived futility or genuine futility will be 
proportional to (i) the extent to which one is invested (emotionally, rationally, 
relationally, etc.) in attempting to reach some desired end, and (ii) the relative  perceived 
desirability of the end at which one is aiming.75 For example, the level of angst felt in a 
situation where someone confined to a wheelchair strongly desires to climb Mt. Everest 
as part of securing a flourishing life will be much greater than someone who desires to 
mow her lawn (and enjoys mowing her lawn) on a day where uncooperative weather 
conditions prevent her from doing so. In both cases, it would be futile to undertake the 
desired activity, but the existential distress felt in response to this futility will be 
dramatically different. I will call this the Principle of Proportionality (POP): 
The existential angst attached to any putative instance of futility is directly 
proportional to the level of one’s investment, broadly construed, in some desired 
end and the perceived desirability of that end. 
 
Something like POP is salient in conclusions of cosmic futility given naturalistic 
premises, as those adopting such conclusions experience a high level of existential angst. 
Such conclusions are no doubt influenced by POP, as there is a prima facie discrepancy 
felt by many between the profound human investment in life, the deep-seated desire for 
that life to continue, and the fact that it will almost certainly not continue on naturalism. 
                                                 
75 I distinguish between perceived and genuine futility because one could be wrong about (i) whether or not 
some goal is attainable/unattainable, or, more subtly and relevantly in this context, (ii) whether some goal 
or end state of affairs needs to obtain in order to avoid futility (e.g., post-mortem survival extending 
endlessly into the future). 
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 The futility that often comes into focus in meaning of life discussions is 
analogous, though not identical to that which emerged in the above analysis. The 
discrepancy component that produces futility remains the same, but the nature of the 
discrepancy is subtly different as already seen in my application of POP to futility within 
the meaning of life context. In the case of the futility that is sometimes thought to 
characterize life in a naturalistic universe, the discrepancy is not so much between a 
desired end and the profound lack of ability to attain that end through intentionally 
guided effort, but rather between a salient feature of the final state of affairs where, quite 
literally, nothing matters, and the current state of affairs where lots of things seem to 
matter (e.g., relationships, personal and cultural achievements, and scientific 
advancements, among others). 
This futility or perceived futility can be thought of either strongly or weakly. In 
what can be called the Strong Futility Conclusion (SFC), it is thought that if the final 
state of affairs of the metanarrative is one in which nothing matters, then nothing ever 
really mattered. SFC does have historical precedent.76 In what can be called the Weak 
Futility Conclusion (WFC), it is thought that if the final state of affairs of the 
metanarrative is one in which nothing matters, then the mattering or significance of 
things currently is in some way mitigated, either minimally or considerably, though 
probably not completely destroyed. There are those, of course, who reject SFC and 
probably WFC too.77 In the words of C. S. Lewis, critics of SFC and WFC might contend 
                                                 
76 See, for example, possibly Qohelet (especially in Ecclesiastes Chapter One, though debate exists about 
how best to interpret Qohelet’s pessimistic musings in the book), Arthur Schopenhauer, “On the Vanity of 
Existence,” in Essays and Aphorisms (London: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 51-4, and Leo Tolstoy, “A 
Confession,” in Spiritual Writings (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006), pp. 46-59. 
 
77 See, for example, Brooke Allen Trisel’s article, “Human Extinction and the Value of Our Efforts.” This 
paper develops a line of argument that casts suspicion on the intuition that nothing is now valuable or 
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that “. . . instead of criticizing the universe we may criticize our own feelings about the 
universe, and try to show that our sense of futility is unreasonable or improper or 
irrelevant.”78 Regardless of whether or not one finds either SFC or WFC philosophically 
plausible, the important claim for my purposes is that both SFC and WFC should be 
viewed as conclusions receiving momentum from a more basic source: the evaluative 
importance attached to narrative ending qua ending. 
On the above analysis of futility, one could construe human effort rather broadly 
to include the wide variety of activities, achievements, and relationships that partly 
constitute human existence. In this case, the discrepancy upon which futility is often 
thought to supervene is between the profound human investment and value attached to 
such effort, and that neither these efforts nor any of their products will last. Again, 
regardless of whether this conclusion of futility is itself a reasonable one, the likely 
rationale for why it is often adopted (as a second-order futility conclusion) lies partly, if 
not largely, in the discrepancy between the ending of the naturalistic metanarrative where 
nothing matters, and the middle of the metanarrative where lots of things seem to matter. 
In Thomas Nagel’s words, this is an “absurdity.” When human life and the activities that 
populate human life are viewed from a distant, detached perspective—sub specie 
aeternitatis—they seem to lose all value, worth, and significance.79 Analogously, when 
                                                                                                                                                 
worthwhile if extinction is the final word of the universe, by highlighting a competing intuition in the 
following thought experiment. Consider the case where (i) your son is on the railroad track about ready to 
be struck by an oncoming train, and (ii) you just learn that the universe will come to an end in three days. 
With this knowledge of the universe’s imminent demise, would you still find rescuing your son to be a 
valuable aim (and not simply emotionally required)? Most think the answer is yes. 
 
78 C. S. Lewis, “De Futilitate,” in Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1995), p. 59. 
 
79 Though, in light of this absurdity, Nagel concludes that we should approach life with a sense of irony as 
opposed to either tragic heroism (possibly Bertrand Russell) or pessimistic despair (Camus). For Nagel, 
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those things which seem to matter now are viewed from the temporally distant 
perspective of death, in all its dimensions (both individual and cosmic), they seem to 
matter very little, if at all, from this final, settled ‘point of reference’ from which there is 
no possibility of return.80 
If the ending of a narrative takes evaluative priority in assessments of the 
narrative as a whole, then a metanarrative ending where nothing matters seems to cast a 
threatening shadow, either weakly or strongly, over the parts of the metanarrative where 
lots of things at least seem to matter. In the same way that knowing a courting 
relationship will end in dissolution and not marriage will affect, in some sense, how one 
views the relationship right now, including one’s emotional participation and response to 
the various dimensions of the relationship, so too might the knowledge that death, not 
life, that non-consciousness, not consciousness, that non-love, not love will be the final 
word affect the perspective we adopt towards life right now. On the naturalistic 
metanarrative, nothing we do, nothing we consider valuable or worthwhile or significant, 
no achievement, no advances in scientific understanding, no progress, and no deep, 
loving relationships, in any sense, will last as part of the fabric of reality. Their marks 
may have been significant and felt for a season, when feelers and recognizers, or possibly 
inventers, of significance are around, but those marks are not indelible as they are, for 
example, on theistic metanarratives.  
The difference, for example, between naturalistic and Christian theistic 
metanarratives with respect to their final words is the difference between entropy, decay, 
                                                                                                                                                 
conclusions of cosmic futility are built upon an illicit assumption—that some future state of affairs 
detached from the first-person human perspective—because humans are no longer around—matters for 
states of affairs involving the first-person human perspective. 
 
80 This phrase is a bit misleading for there will literally be no one to take up this point of reference. 
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death, and the dissolution of conditions that make love possible on naturalism, and 
resurrection, recreation, limitless fecundity, and love on Christian theism. Naturalistic 
metanarratives ‘close’ with complete dissolution such that it will be as if none of this ever 
happened. And, from this most remote and distant perspective,81 none of this matters. It is 
not significant. It is not meaningful. It was, and it is no more. No one cares. No one is 
concerned. No one remembers. Whether the final state should be able to hold such veto 
power over life here and now is not the point; that it does for so many is undeniable, and I 
have here tried to provide a plausible rationale for why this has so often been the case by 
grounding second-order futility-conclusions tied to the nature of naturalistic 
metanarrative endings in first-order conclusions about the evaluative priority of narrative 
ending qua ending for normative appraisals of narratives as a whole. We want the 
features of human existence to matter, and to matter deeply; we want them to make an 
indelible mark. An ending of complete dissolution does not allow for this. 
In the end, whether or not one deems life to be futile on naturalistic premises will 
be largely a function of which perspective one adopts: that of the ending or the more 
immediate perspective of the present or even that portion of the universe’s history that is 
coextensive with human history, and therefore, a season where those who care about 
what matters are around to care about it. Of course, given the evaluative priority of 
narrative ending, it may be difficult to prevent the ending’s proleptic encroachment on 
how we view the here and now. Those who think the ending takes priority for our 
                                                 
81 Again, there are those who argue that this most remote and distant perspective, itself, does not matter and 
is not relevant to appraisals of the worth, value, and meaningfulness of what goes on now in the lives of 
human beings. The only perspective relevant, some argue, for appraisals of the worth, value, and 
meaningfulness of human pursuits, projects, and relationships is the human perspective, and the perspective 
from the end may not be a perspective at all given that taking a perspective entails the presence of 
intentionally directed consciousness. Of course, one might argue that it is relevant that we can take a 
perspective now about a state of affairs when we will no longer be able to take a perspective at all. 
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evaluations of whether life is characterized by cosmic or deep futility will likely side with 
theists like William Lane Craig: 
If each individual person passes out of existence when he dies, then what 
 ultimate meaning can be given to his life? Does it really matter whether he 
 ever existed at all? It might be said that his life was important because it 
 influenced others or affected the course of history. But this only shows a relative 
 significance to his life, not an ultimate significance. . . . Look at it from another 
 perspective: Scientists say that the universe originated in an explosion called the 
 “Big Bang” about 15 billion years ago. Suppose the Big Bang had never occurred. 
 Suppose the universe had never existed. What ultimate difference would it make? 
 The universe is doomed to die anyway. In the end it makes no difference whether 
 the universe ever existed or not. . . . Mankind is a doomed race in a dying 
 universe. Because the human race will eventually cease to exist, it makes no 
 ultimate difference whether it ever did exist. . . . The contributions of the scientist 
 to the advance of human knowledge, the researches of the doctor to alleviated 
 pain and suffering, the efforts of the diplomat to secure peace in the world, the 
 sacrifices of good men everywhere to better the lot of the human race—all these 
 come to nothing. In the end they don’t make one bit of difference, not one  bit.82 
 
In such claims, Craig’s implicit commitment to both SPI and SFC is clear. For human 
existence to avoid irredeemable futility, it must carry on in some robust sense, a sense 
requiring, at minimum, post-mortem survival extending endlessly into the future.83 
 Those who are suspicious of Craig’s and many others’ stringent conditions placed 
upon a worthwhile, meaningful existence will side with Brook Allen Trisel: 
 The higher one’s aspirations are, the more likely it is that the efforts associated 
 with bringing about these goals will be considered futile or ineffective. For 
 example, if we seek to have our works last forever, then, at some point, we will 
 probably conclude that our efforts are futile since this goal is unachievable. 
 However, if we have more realistic aspirations . . . then we would be much less 
 likely to conclude that our efforts at achieving this goal are futile [emphasis 
 added].84  
                                                 
82 William Lane Craig, “The Absurdity of Life Without God,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. Klemke 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 42. 
 
83 This, of course, makes post-mortem survival extending endlessly into the future only a necessary 
condition for a worthwhile, meaningful existence. Christian theists do not affirm this to be a sufficient 
condition. A robustly construed meaningful existence is built upon numerous doctrines that are woven into 
the Christian theistic metanarrative, just one of which is post-mortem survival. 
 




The kinds of cosmic futility conclusions that Trisel criticizes are largely built around 
what Erik J. Wielenberg refers to as final outcome arguments.85 It is thought by critics 
that such arguments are contingent upon a suspect assumption, namely, arbitrarily 
placing an undue amount of importance (perhaps all the importance!) on the final state 
of affairs to which life leads. But why place such priority on the future over the present or 
the past? 86 In the words of Thomas Nagel, “. . . it does not matter now that in a million 
years nothing we do now will matter.”87 Of course, there may be good, principled reasons 
for placing normative priority on the future, but such a case will not be made here. 
 The important point presently is that even if such criticisms of final outcome 
arguments have philosophical merit, they run up against our deep narrative proclivities as 
human beings, proclivities out of which we assign profound normative significance to 
narrative endings in virtue of them being endings. Indeed, the significance we attach to 
narrative ending will likely make it difficult for many to adopt these “more realistic 
aspirations” of which Trisel spoke above toward our human efforts in the face of 
impending and final dissolution from which there is no possibility of return. And this is 
largely due to the fact that SPI and either SFC or WFC gain momentum through the 
evaluative significance of narrative ending qua ending. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
85 Erik J. Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), pp. 16-31. 
 
86 For example, see Paul Edwards, who refers to this as a “. . . curious and totally arbitrary preference of the 
future to the present.” “The Meaning of Life,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E. D. Klemke (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 140. 
 
87 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 11. 
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7.10 Evil, Eschatology, and Narrative Ending 
 The evaluative priority of narrative ending in general and the way a narrative ends 
for broadly normative appraisals of narratives as a whole is not only helpful in providing 
a richer account for why death and futility so closely track discussions of the meaning of 
life, but may also add a helpful dimension to considerations of another issue closely 
linked to the meaning of life—the problem of evil. The ugly reality of pain and suffering, 
along with accompanying questions on philosophical, existential, and eschatological 
levels about such suffering, is one of a number of existentially relevant elements and 
accompanying questions of human existence for which we are seeking a larger narrative 
through which to understand and appraise such existentially relevant elements of life 
(Chapter Three). Though the problem of evil is multi-dimensional and most philosophical 
energy is often directed toward the theoretic-philosophical aspects, those most relevant in 
the immediate context are the existential and eschatological dimensions.88 Roughly, by 
“existential” I mean especially the first-person, humanly-centered emotive aspects of 
pain, suffering, and evil—largely, the feelings of angst that characterize the sufferer;89 by 
“eschatological,” I mean future-oriented questions about whether pain, suffering, and evil 
will be, in some robust sense, redeemed and defeated. 
                                                 
88 There is obviously significant overlap between the philosophic and eschatological dimensions of the 
problem of evil. 
 
89 In fact, I think arguments from evil receive significant motivating force, a force contributing to their 
perceived strength as putative instances of atheology, from the problem of evil’s palpable emotional 
component. Compare such arguments to other atheistic arguments, for example, arguments based upon 
perceived incoherence among theistic divine attributes. Of course, rationally, one may think such 
arguments are strong; however, they have not occupied the significant place that the problem of evil has in 
philosophy of religion. One interpretation of this historical reality is that the problem of evil, rationally, is 
the best atheological argument. Perhaps that is the case, but I suspect that there is more to the story; that the 
emotional dimension to the problem of evil is a salient component of the problem of evil’s perceived 
philosophical merit, a component not shared by other atheological arguments. 
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 Eschatology has occupied a prominent place in discussions of theodicy. 
Generally, it is thought by theists that, in some sense, the blessed final state is part of a 
fuller answer to the problem of evil. I think something is right about this approach, 
although I will not enter discussions of the specifics here. I am more concerned with a 
general point, which is—if the ending of a narrative takes some sort of evaluative priority 
for broadly normative appraisals of a narrative as a whole, then a ‘good ending’ to life’s 
narrative where redemption is robustly and fully accomplished will loom large for how 
the entire narrative is appraised. If an ending that itself never ends is one where deep and 
abiding shalom reigns for all eternity, then that state affairs is really important for the 
entire metanarrative, not just then, but also now. 
 This does not commit one to the utilitarian approach whereby the eschaton itself 
is somehow worth all the horrendous evil that countless millions have experienced in this 
life. To such a proposal, we, like Ivan Karamazov, might shudder in moral horror at the 
thought that the torture of even one child is worth a peaceful human destiny for all 
people. Of course, this might be a subtle misconstrual of what it might mean to say that 
the eschaton “is worth” the pain and suffering saliently populating human history. 
Neither is such an approach warrant for somehow, retroactively, calling evil “good.” That 
the blessed state is blessed does not retroactively erase all the pain, suffering, and evil of 
post-lapsarian, pre-consummation history on the Christian theistic metanarrative. 
 But none of this is the point. The very general and modest claim I am advocating 
is simply that, given first-order conclusions about the evaluative significance of narrative 
ending qua ending, and second-order conclusions based upon the nature of a given 
ending, some measure of plausibility is brought to the practice of enlisting eschatological 
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considerations in the projects of defense and theodicy. The final, settled stance toward 
life’s metanarrative from the perspective of eternal blessedness surely makes a difference 
for how we evaluate the elements of the metanarrative right now. Unfortunately (for 
philosophers), to try and speculate during the middle of life’s metanarrative, if it is of the 
theistic variety, on how possibly this might look and what kind of difference it might 
make is probably mitigated by the Pauline statement, “For now we see in a mirror dimly, 
but then face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12a).90 
7.11 Summary 
 
 Assessments of naturalistic metanarratives as cosmically and deeply futile, given 
the way they end, will likely remain prevalent as long as we continue to first attach a 
significant evaluative function to narrative ending qua ending for broadly normative 
appraisals on emotional, aesthetic, and moral levels of narratives as a whole. I have 
argued that understanding the connection between futility and naturalistic metanarratives 
solely in terms of the nature of their endings is truncated, and that considerations of the 
evaluative priority of narrative ending in general add substantially to an understanding of 
this connection. A robust account of the connection, then, must not only include 
considerations of the Staying Power Intuition and Strong and Weak versions of the 
Futility Conclusion, but should locate them within an intelligible framework, something I 
have attempted to accomplish by discussing the evaluative significance of narrative 
ending in general. As long as our views of the world continue to be powerfully shaped by 
our deep seated narrative proclivities, a sense of cosmic futility will likely stubbornly 
persist for those who worry that we might live in a Russelian universe, one in which our 
                                                 
90 Ancient mirrors in the Graeco-Roman world were made from polished metal; thus one’s reflection was 
considerably more “dim” than with modern mirrors. 
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grandest achievements, our most profound loving relationships, and our very lives 
themselves will eventually “be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins.”91 
                                                 
91 Bertrand Russell, “A Free Man’s Worship,” in Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion 







8.1 The Broader Philosophical Pay-off of the Narrative Interpretation 
From the vantage point of the last century of analytic philosophy, any attempt to 
interpret, with appropriate levels of philosophical clarity and rigor, what the question, 
“What is the meaning of life?” means may appear both presumptuous and unmanageable. 
It is my hope that my central thesis in this dissertation—roughly, that the question is best 
interpreted as the request for a narrative of the world that sufficiently addresses those 
areas of greatest existential import to rational, emotional, and self-reflective creatures 
such as us—has, at least partly, shown such suspicions to have only prima facie 
plausibility and not ultima facie plausibility. This narrative interpretation is one that, at 
once, takes seriously our pre-philosophical tendency to view the question as profound 
and worthy of careful consideration, salvages the question’s basic philosophical integrity, 
and powerfully unifies the cluster of issues thought to be relevant to the meaning of life 
under one construct—a narrative built around this cluster of issues. 
 In addition to satisfying the above desiderata, the narrative interpretation provides 
further philosophical pay-off. Perhaps most importantly, it introduces an additional 
paradigm to the ongoing dialectic in contemporary analytic philosophy, and especially 
analytic philosophy of religion, between the various instantiations of naturalism and 
theism. More often than not, these competing metaphysical accounts of reality line up 
against one another on specific issues; this seems necessary and fruitful. However, the 




through which these competing systems can be compared as full-blown metaphysical 
narratives in terms of what each offers on the topic of life’s meaning. This will involve 
each system explicating its category of ERN with a view to the candidate meaning of life 
narrative that these respective metaphysical systems have to offer. Why might this be 
significant? 
 Primarily, it provides further, possibly deeper, motivation for directing our 
philosophical gaze towards extant problems largely discussed from other philosophical 
vantage points. So, for example, debates about reductionism will become just as much 
about the meaning of life as they already are about ontology, and the dialectic between 
reductive naturalists, non-reductive naturalists, and theists will take on new significance. 
The question of whether normative properties can be reduced to physical properties then 
becomes critical as we compare competing meaning of life candidate narratives. This will 
crystallize differences even within the naturalist camp, pitting non-reductive forms of 
naturalism against reductive forms. The question of if and how a meaningful existence 
can be secured will be answered differently within the various meaning of life narratives 
emerging. 
 Similarly, the problem of evil will be as much about the meaning of life as it is a 
sub-question within philosophy of religion. No doubt, the presence of evil is one of those 
existentially relevant facts of existence (ERQ) for which we seek a narrative in which to 
contextualize it. Turning our attention to the problem of evil in this way more clearly 
highlights the multi-faceted dimensions of the problem often only latent or entirely absent 
in much of the philosophical dialectic. One thinks here of the eschatological dimension 




theistic metanarrative cannot neglect eschatology. As the German theologian Wolfhart 
Pannenberg notes on the penultimate page of his Systematic Theology: 
Only in the light of the eschatological consummation is the verdict justified that in 
the first creation story the Creator pronounced at the end of the sixth day when he 
had created the first human pair: ‘And God saw everything that he had made, and 
behold, it was very good’ (Gen. 1:31). Only in the light of the eschatological 
consummation may this be said of our world as it is in all its confusion and pain. 
But those who may say it in spite of the suffering of the world honour and praise 
God as their Creator. The verdict ‘very good’ does not apply simply to the world 
of creation in its state at any given time. It is true, rather, of the whole course of 
history in which God is present with his creatures in incursions of love that will 
finally lead it through the hazards and sufferings of finitude to participation in his 
glory.1 
 
Bringing future-oriented considerations of pain and suffering into the philosophical 
discussion will also naturally link to perennial meaning of life topics like death and 
futility. Additionally, it will motivate more vigorous research and debate over whether 
the inherent human desire for a felicitous ending to life’s narrative, including, for 
example, post-mortem survival and enjoyment of the beatific vision, is mere wishful 
thinking or a cousin to our desire for water, and thus, a truly natural desire that points to a 
referent capable of fulfilling it. Might some sort of cosmic hope that demands redemption 
and eschatological fulfillment be an intellectual virtue as well as a theological virtue? 
Such projects evidence potential philosophical pay-offs if the narrative interpretation of 
the question, “What is the meaning of life?” is adopted. 
8.2 Areas for Further Research  
 Although I spent considerable time exploring the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of what constitutes the narrative interpretation, I have been forced to leave 
much either underdeveloped or unsaid, as such topics would have required me to move 
                                                            
1 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, trans. Geoffrey Bromily (Grand Rapids, MI: William 




beyond the immediate focus of the dissertation. Here, I want to briefly introduce the 
contours of relevant and important work left to be done with respect to various claims 
and ideas introduced and developed in this dissertation. Importantly, some of this will 
involve interdisciplinary cooperation. I will identify two such areas. 
 First, in light of the distinction I introduced in Chapter Two between paradigmatic 
and non-paradigmatic instances of narrative, and how whether a given candidate meaning 
of life narrative is a paradigmatic instance of narrative is itself worldview-relative (or 
metanarrative relative), further work should be done in order to understand why it is that, 
historically, most of the satisfying (at least existentially) meaning of life narratives are 
those that are paradigmatic instances of narrative. That most, if not all, of these meaning 
of life narratives are also religious narratives gives rise to an important question—Are 
such meaning of life narratives, as opposed to their non-paradigmatic cousins, thought to 
be more existentially satisfying in virtue of their explicitly religious perspective on the 
world or in virtue of the fact that they are paradigmatic instances of narrative or both? In 
terms of an interdisciplinary approach, the work of cognitive scientists who are informing 
us that personal identity has a substantial narrative component may be of benefit here. 
Perhaps our deep human need to construct meaningful narratives in order to contextualize 
parts of our lives and our very lives themselves is genetically hardwired. More 
specifically, perhaps our existential need to locate our lives and the profound elements 
that populate human life toward which we direct our existentially interested gaze, in 
metanarratives that are paradigmatic instances of narrative is genetically hardwired. If 




of life with such intensity and angst is correlated with the rise of a meaning of life 
narrative that is a non-paradigmatic instance of narrative—i.e., naturalism. 
 Second, much important work is left regarding the evaluative significance of 
narrative ending for the meaning of life. I have argued that the broadly normative 
significance of narrative ending for appraisals of the entire narrative provides a 
compelling rationale for why discussions of death and futility have been part and parcel 
of meaning of life discussions, and, specifically, why the naturalistic ending often has 
been thought to threaten the entire narrative with meaninglessness. The evaluative 
significance of narrative ending not only plausibly frames discussions of death and 
futility; it provides further motivation for thinking that the question of life’s meaning is 
best thought of as requesting a certain kind of narrative—i.e., that we attach such 
evaluative significance to how it is all going to end, provides evidence that we often and 
already think of ourselves as characters in a grand metanarrative. 
 If narrative ending in general is important, then how a narrative ends is equally as 
important. For example, there is a widespread and deep seated hope for a “good” ending 
to the universe’s narrative. Though what constitutes a good ending is partly 
metanarrative relative, “good” ending is often construed, especially on theistic meaning 
of life narratives, as requiring some form of post-mortem survival in a blessed state of 
affairs whereby redemption is fully accomplished. An important question surfaces here—
Is this widespread, deep seated hope merely wishful thinking with no rational grounding, 
or rather, akin to a natural desire that points to some mind-independent referent capable 
of fulfilling it?2  
                                                            




If this desire and other transcendent passions are merely instances of wishful 
thinking, then Camus’ concept of the absurd comes to the fore, as there exists a profound 
discrepancy between the intense human desires for happiness and reason to coalesce and 
the unreasonable silence of the universe about such desire. Camus calls the salient 
incongruity here, “absurd.”3 In classical terms, Camus’ absurd might be thought of as the 
existentially lamentable fragmentation of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. Perhaps the truth 
might not ultimately be aligned with the beautiful; perhaps that which is beautiful might 
not ultimately be true.4  
Prior to his conversion to Christian theism, C. S. Lewis aptly stated the prima 
facie impasse for naturalism that has left naturalists like Camus and others in profound 
existential befuddlement and angst, “The two hemispheres of my mind were in the 
sharpest conflict. On the one side a many-islanded sea of poetry and myth; on the other a 
glib and shallow ‘rationalism.’ Nearly all that I loved I believed to be imaginary; nearly 
all that I believed to be real I thought grim and meaningless.”5 Perhaps the pessimist 
                                                            
3 Camus’ concept of absurdity is subtly different from Thomas Nagel’s. Nagel thinks the absurdity of life 
derives from the incongruity between two perspectives—the existentially passionate and involved human 
perspective whereby life is lived as being valuable, worthwhile, and significant, and the remote, non-
sentient perspective whereby human life and activity are viewed sub specie aeternitatis. From this remote, 
disinterested perspective, the things we feel most strongly about as having value and significance, appear 
arbitrary and wholly contingent. For a comparison of Nagel on Camus on the topic of the absurd, see 
Jeffrey Gordon, “Nagel or Camus on the Absurd?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 
(September 1984): pp. 15-28. 
 
4 Such judgments, of course, are complexly intertwined with the plausibility of systems of value. For 
example, if the perceived fragmentation of truth, goodness, and beauty on naturalistic premises is thought 
to weaken the plausibility of naturalism, the naturalist may simply deny that (i) truth is not beautiful on 
naturalism, or that (ii) the felt need to harmonize truth, goodness, and beauty is an adequate criterion by 
which to assess the plausibility of metanarratives. 
 
5 C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 
p. 170. Lewis proceeds to describe his thinking, “I chewed endlessly on the problem: “How can it be so 
beautiful and also so cruel, wasteful, and futile?” Hence at this time I could have almost said with 
Santayana, “All that is good is imaginary; all that is real is evil.” In one sense nothing less like a “flight 
from reality” could be conceived. I was so far from wishful thinking that I hardly thought anything true 




intuitions at play here in the thought of Lewis, Camus, and many, many others are 
themselves suspect. Maybe our “requirements” on what is good and beautiful are too 
high, and these inflated expectations make naturalism look woefully inadequate on 
existential levels. But maybe they are not. Perhaps they are cloaked pointers to the reality 
of a stronger connection between robust notions of truth, goodness, and beauty, and their 
ultimate harmony. 
One way of assessing the question of whether such desires are instances of mere 
wishful thinking or something more is simply to engage the debate between naturalists 
and Christian theists over the rational merits of their respective metanarratives. It is the 
“debate” between the Athenian philosophers and the Apostle Paul at the Areopagus, 
between David Hume and Jonathan Edwards, Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston, 
J. J. C. Smart and John Haldane, and between Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga, 
among many others.6 If Christian theism, as a complete metaphysical package, is 
rationally anchored, then one has rational grounds for believing the central theses of 
Christian eschatology, and ipso facto rational grounds for hoping. 
 The above epistemological approach to rationally grounding hope has its place in 
the philosophical discussion over the widespread and deeply seated hope for a good 
ending to life’s narrative, but there may be a more interesting question surrounding the 
epistemological basis for rational hope. Might hope qua hope that reality is a place where 
love, blessedness, and fecundity have the last word, as opposed to the loss of the 
necessary conditions for such things in death, be in some sense self-justifying? Might our 
profound longing for robust conceptions of truth, goodness, and beauty to ultimately and 
                                                            
6 For example, see J. J. C. Smart and J. J. Haldane, Atheism and Theism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Alvin 





deeply coalesce be, in some sense, self-justifying? In other words, might this species of 
hope, akin to what the nineteenth century Thomist Josep Pieper termed fundamental 
hope,7 function centrally or foundationally in the epistemological process of rationally 
grounding this “particular way of intending the future.”8 Whether such an enterprise has 
philosophical merit and what it would involve is too large a question to be considered 
here, but philosophical and theological precedent exists for the claim, and it is worthy of 
further consideration. 
8.3 Russell and Cab Driver 
 I close this dissertation where it began—in the back seat of a cab with Bertrand 
Russell who sat in silence when asked by his driver, “What’s it all about?” Russell’s lack 
of response to his inquisitive chauffeur would be viewed by many contemporary analytic 
philosophers as implicit and legitimate philosophical chastisement for a rationally sub-par 
request, rather than revelatory of any philosophical shortcomings on Russell’s part. 
Though I have deep respect for the philosophical acumen of Russell, I have to side with 
the cab driver’s bemusement at Russell’s pregnant silence. I think his question is, at once, 
profound, meaningful, and worthy of serious philosophical reflection; and therefore one 
about which Russell should have had something to say. Where the cab driver’s famous 
occupant was silent, I have tried to say something in developing my narrative 
interpretation of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” If this proposal has merit, it 
                                                            
7 See Josef Pieper, Hope and History, Five Salzburg Lectures, trans. Dr. David Kipp (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1994). 
 
8 I borrow the description of hope as a “particular way of intending the future” from James K. A. Smith’s 
essay, “Determined Hope: A Phenomenology of Christian Expectation,” p. 205. Smith identifies five 
formal features of hope, irrespective of the content of a given instance of hoping. They are (i) a hoper 
(subject who hopes), (ii) an object hoped for, (iii) an act of hope which is an act of consciousness, (iv) a 




will have brought some measure of philosophical respect to the question of life’s 
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